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WOMEN, CONSERVATISM, AND SOCIAL WELFARE*

INTRODUCTION
The timing of this special issue is particularly fortunate, coming as it does
during a period of reassessment and retrenchment in the women's movement. The
attacks of the New Right, the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment, and the growing
maturity and sophistication of the women's movement, have spurred an intense reexamination and reanalysis of basic tenets and strategies. The articles in this special
issue, although broadly diverse, reflect this effort to come to a deeper analysis of
women's oppression and of effective ways to overcome it.
The importance of women's political activity is a common theme in these articles. From the initial struggle to gain access to the political sphere through
suffrage to the successes of the 1970s, the main thrust of the women's movement in
the United States has been to pursue equality in citizenship and legal rights within
a framework of liberal democracy. Although the revolution in social relations that
antisuffragists expected to result from woman's enfranchisement has not yet occurred,
as Ehrenreich and Howard describe, conservatives and antifeminists still express many
of the same fears and expectations of profound social change from liberal reforms.
Eisenstein, in her essay on the defeat of the ERA, however, shows that these fears
are groundless. She underscores the inadequacy of a strictly reformist approach
to women's rights and the contradiction that, at the same time a liberal-reformist
strategy is insufficient in its effects to achieve equality, it is radical in its
potential to change the social relations between men and women.
Indeed, the fear of a radical restructuring of male-female relationships, as
Ehrenreich points out, fueled the anti-feminist drive against the ERA. Suspecting
that feminist promises of equality and independence for women were "so much pie in
the sky", conservative women rallied to defend their traditional source of security:
a wage-earning male required, at least in theory, to support them for life. Their
intense and single-minded opposition to feminist proposals such as reproductive
choice, equal employment opportunity, and the ERA, as Ehrenreich shows, was easily
coopted by the New Right in a successful effort to create a political opposition to
liberal feminism which did not exist in the early 1970s. In blaming feminists for
encouraging male irresponsibility and threatening women's security within the family,
the New Right found the powerful political ideology that helped to defeat the ERA.
The ease and rapidity with which the Reagan Administration struck down rights,
entitlements, policies, and programs which women gained in the 1970s is evidence
*The editor wishes to gratefully acknowledge the assistance in assembling this
special issue of the following able and prompt reviewers: Paul Adams, Mary Jo
Deegan, Carole Joffe, Linda Kerber, Anne Lawrence, Leslie Leighninger, Robert
Leighninger, David R. Simon, and Jill Zahniser.
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enough of the strength of the New Right and of the shortcomings of a strictly reformist approach. Abramovitz catalogues these losses and draws attention to their
role in the conservative response to the current economic crisis. As a strategy
not only to redistribute income away from the poor, among whom women and their
children are disproportionately represented, but to weaken the political power of
women and other oppressed and exploited groups, the Reagan Administration's policies
seek to reverse the direction the state has taken since the New Deal. The development of the welfare state has not only politicized the struggle between workers
and capitalists over wages and put both in direct contention with the state over
health, education, and welfare benefits, but it has politicized the struggle between
feminism and patriarchy by bringing such issues as economic support of women and
children, equal educational and work-training opportunities, and child care into the
political arena through state provision. To paraphrase Abramovitz, social policy is
a women's issue.
According to the New Right, the fundamental issue is whether the traditional
responsibilities of women to care for children and other dependents (such as the
elderly), to meet the every day physical and emotional needs of men, and to
buffer economic crises through their work in the home or labor force will continue
to be fulfilled by individual women in families or whether they will be transferred,
at least in part, to the state. The implications for women of this issue are clear.
If women are to continue to meet their traditional responsibilities in the private
sphere, they will have little opportunity to participate as equals in the male-dominated public sphere.
Ehrenreich, Abramovitz and Stoesz demonstrate the importance of the New Right's
support of the traditional family to its political agenda. Nelson and Kahn further
analyze how the women's movement has challenged the traditional power relationships
of patriarchy and how the New Right, acting through conservative legislators and
the Reagan Administration, has reacted by seeking to push women out of the public
sphere and to restore traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity. Schirmer,
however, shows that it is not just conservatives who support and defend patriarchal
privilege. Even under a social democratic regime such as that in Denmark, women
are manipulated through the very social policies which purport to help them. Subsidizing their availability as a cheap and flexible work force drawn into public
labor or expelled from it through the expansion and contraction of day care, maternity leave, vocational training, and wage rates, the state is a partner of both
patriarchy and capitalism. Acting as such it thus betrays the promise of equality
for women through liberal reform.
Although many issues raised by the women's movement speak to the interests of
all women, feminists need to be aware of the four-fold nature of social relations
under capitalist patriarchy. Male members of the upper classes hold the most power
in society and female members of the lower classes, the least. Thus upper-class men
have, structurally, the most interest in preserving both capitalism and patriarchy
and working class women, the most interest in opposing both. Upper-class women
and working-class men are in an ambivalent position vis a vis either class or gender.
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Upper-class women, for example, as Howard shows, may put class interest before
gender interest. Only working class women, have an unambiguous interest in pressing
women's demands. However, the emphasis of the women's movement on liberal reforms
such as the ERA has failed to address their vital interests. It is only by directly
addressing these interests and defending them against the assaults of conservatives
on such issues as entitlement programs and abortion rights that the women's movement
can present a broadly based, unambivalent demand for women's rights.
It is the very contradiction between the needs of capitalism and the needs of
patriarchy, between women's power in reproductive labor and historically determined
impotence in production, that needs to be exploited in order to overcome women's
oppression. As Sable's analysis shows, even the New Right falls apart in confusion
and dissension when it faces the real demand of women for safe and effective means
of controlling their own reproductive powers. No longer willing to be kept "barefoot and pregnant," women of all classes are pressing for the freedom to choose
motherhood, not to have it imposed on them. The women's movement must not let itself
be divided by state policies which allow some women this choice while denying it to
others.
Women, historically have also been united in their demand for the means to
support and nourish their children once they are born. To have a truly free choice
about motherhood women must know they will have the means to support their children
and not be forced to decline motherhood out of economic necessity. Thus far, women's
demands have only been seen as putting them in conflict with the needs of children.
Framed in a context of free choice, however, these demands are actually consonant
with the needs of children. Women and their children are poor; women and their
children benefit from equal pay, good day care, and parental leave; women and their
children have an interest in putting an end to violence in the family.
Although the women's movement may have underestimated the strength of patriarchy
and the depth of resistance to change in women's roles, it has succeeded in bringing
attention to the fundamental questions: In whose interest is state power to be
used? What role are women to have in the public sphere? How are they to combine
productive and reproductive labor so that men, women, and children all gain rather
than lose from a change in women's roles? The pessimism of the New (and Old)
Right about deeply rooted social change must be countered by the conviction of
feminists that these changes are not only right and just, but good. New understanding and strategies for change are beginning to emerge. As Simon shows, women
are developing their own way of organizing and of institutionalizing change to meet
the specific challenges posed by their circumstances. This ability to create new
forms shows the potential of the women's movement. The promise of uniting and transcending the oppositions of public and private, masculine and feminine, without
hiding behind them or reducing women to pale imitations of men, is the strength of
the women's movement.
Kristine Nelson
Special Issue Editor
School of Social Work
The University of Iowa
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COMMENT
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE PATRIARCHAL STATE
AND THE DEFEAT OF THE ERA
Zillah Eisenstein*
Department of Politics
Ithaca College

What does it signify politically--that is what does it tell us about the relations of power of the 'state' in 1982--that the Equal Rights Amendment has not been
ratified? It tells us that the patriarchal foundations of the state, even when
narrowly defined in terms of the law, remain necessary to those in power. Or (at
least) that those in power, particularly in this case state legislators as well as
President Reagan, think that the political system of capitalist patriarchy cannot
abide women's (legal) equality.
Why has the ERA been singled out by politicians, particularly of the right,
for defeat? Because they think that by defeating the ERA they can defeat the
women's movement. Hence, the question constantly posed by the media: Does the
defeat of the ERA signify the demise of the women's movement? And, the corollary
question: What did the women's movement do wrong; how and why did N.O.W. fail to
get the ERA ratified?
First one needs to recognize that the ERA, in demanding equal rights before the
law for women, reflects that minimum vision of women's equality which is entertained
by feminists today. This is not to say that it is an irrelevant or inconsequential
demand. But the demands of the ERA are understood, by most feminists including liberal feminists, to be necessary but not sufficient for creating real sexual, economic, and racial equality for women. It is true that the ERA would make it illegal
to pay women 59t when a man is paid $1.00 for doing the same work. But the ERA
would not by itself enforce economic equality or destroy the sexual or racial ghetto
of which woman is a part. It would simply make unequal pay illegal while doing
little about the structural relations of inequality.
Feminists know that a law in and of itself cannot create sexual equality. But
they also know that it can lay the basis for further assaults against patriarchal
privileges, and is therefore important. In this same vein, feminists also know that,
although it will affect them, the ERA does not legislate relations in the home
between husband and wife. Even though Phyllis Schlafly argues that it will, the ERA
applies directly to the public, not the private sphere.
To the degree feminists understand that sexual equality requires changes in the
'ditor and contributor to Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism
and the author of The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism.
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private and the public realm, and changes in the way these realmsare defined in
relationto each other, they also understand the limits of liberal legislation
which focuses on the public realm. Hence, although feminists, especially liberal
feminists who are committed to creating legal equality between men and women,
believe the ERA is utterly important to American women in 1982, they also know
that it is more symbolic than it is substantive. Abortion law would be an example
of legislation which has a real, direct, effect. Interestingly enough legislators
like Paul Laxalt seem to be backtracing on their antiabortion stands, whereas
Senators Hatch and Hatfield cannot seem to agree on how to demobilize this aspect
of the women's movement. It is much simpler to attempt to delegitimize the women's
movement by defeating the ERA because of the ambiguities it reflects and because
it is limited in terms of its direct effect.
The ERA clearly reflects the contradictory nature of liberal (and liberal
feminist) reform legislation. It may be more symbolic than real, but it does
affect consciousness. It also constructs ideology, which never reflects a true
or full picture of reality and yet defines reality. And it operates in a semiautonomous fashion from our real sexual, economic, and racial identities. This
contradictory nature of the ERA has limited its effectiveness as a rallying point
for the women's movement because it is so clearly insufficient for creating
woman's real sexual equality. As a demand, it does not encompass the politics of
feminism, which in some sense has moved beyond it. Yet, the ERA remains a neccessary element in the struggle toward equality in a liberal democratic society.
It is because the ERA does not represent the feminism of the 1980s adequately, and
because it does represent the antifeminist politics of the New Right sufficiently,
that the New Right was able to mobilize against the ERA so effectively. The New
Right sought to curtail the radical potential of the ERA to go beyond its own
liberal-legalistic framework. New Rightist, George Gilder has argued in this vein,
that even reformist feminists are really revolutionary, in that, in order to create
sexual equality, the male role as we know it will have to be destroyed. It is this
revolutionary aspect of feminism which the state sought to destroy in defeating the
ERA.
The problem with the ERA is that it seems to be, and is, insufficient to
feminists, and it is also radical in its potential to redefine patriarchal law.
The ERA is not enough for feminists, and it is too much for antifeminists. The New
Right has therefore been more singly committed t--thIefeat of the ERA than feminists have been singly committed to its ratification. It remains to be seen whether
feminists will be able to build a pro-ERA politics which more directly encompasses
the radical potential of feminism itself by focusing on the private as well as the
public realm. This is really the crucial dilemma which faces the women's movement
today: To decipher how it can utilize the radical potential of liberal feminist
reform which challenges the legal basis of patriarchal privilege while not being
limited to liberal feminist reforms of the public arena.
To return to the question of what the women's movement did wrong in its campaign for the ERA, I think it did nothing wrong. The movement should not have
focused all its energy on the ERA, for the very reason N.O.W. found it impossible
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to endorse Carter in the 1980 election. Officers of the state seek to protect
patriarchal privilege. Feminists must therefore not allow those who wish to
defeat them to set their political agenda, because they will only narrow feminism's vision.
The ERA was defeated by state legislators, not the incapacity of the women's
movement or the skill of Phyllis Schlafly. A simple lesson can be uncovered here.
Legislators effectively protect the interests of the patriarchal state, even when
there is not popular support for such legislation. With a majority of Americans
supporting the ERA, the only explanation for its defeat is that those in positions
of power rule in their own patriarchal interest. The defeat of the ERA only proves
the state's commitment to patriarchal politics, and its desire to fight it out in
this arena because it has the upper hand. The bluntness of this contradition-between majority opinion in favor of the ERA and its legislative defeats--has
radicalized feminists in the pro-ERA struggle. This can be seen in N.O.W.'s
announced political strategy for the new ERA campaign which calls for the election
of women to state and federal legislatures. Such a strategy which is clearly
reformist also points to what George Gilder has called the revolutionary aspects
of feminism, i.e., that the role of men as the primary operatives in the public
sector is under attack.
Whether the ERA is finally passed (as women finally got the vote) or not,
feminists must remember what they already know: that equality, although it can
be formulated in legislation, cannot be created by it. The state hopes to limit
the feminist movement to the struggle for the ERA and feminists must not allow
this to happen. Feministsneed to use the existing pro-ERA political forces to
unify the organization and broaden the commitments of the feminist movement.
With the defeat of the ERA the women's movement has begun to rethink what a
viable strategy within the electoral arena should be. I think this strategy should
be built upon the political autonomy of the women's movement with its own agenda,
while recognizing the importance of electoral and reform politics. The seeds for
such a politics exist at present. As long as feminists, while fighting for the
ERA, continue to fight for reproductive freedom, economic and racial equality,
freedom of sexual preference, sexual freedom, and international peace, the Right
won't get what it wants, which is a demobilized femimst movement. The defeat of
the ERA can only mean the deradicalization of the women's movement if liberal
feminism, the largest part of the movement. narrows its vision and limits its
struggle to the ERA.
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DEFEATING THE ERA:
A RIGHT-WING
MOBILIZATION OF WOMEN*
Barbara Ehrenreich
Associate Fellow of the New York
Institute for the Humanities
Fellow at the Institute
for Policy Studies

In an irony that feminists and their liberal supporters have yet to fully
grasp, the opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment celebrated its defeat as a
"great victory for women' and as a "great achievement by women."
The ERA had been
a major--perhaps the major--goal of the American feminist movement for ten years.
It would have rendered unconstitutional dozens of arcane state laws which limit
women's property rights during and after marriage.
It would have strengthened
women's position as wage-earners--helping open up higher-paying, traditionally male
jobs, and providing a wedge against all the subtle, informal mechanisms of wage discrimination.
It would have, in symbolic fashion, finally given women recognition as
full and equal citizens. Yet on June 30, 1982, it was defeated.
Most of the 1400 who celebrated the ERA's defeat in the grand ballroom of
Washington's Shoreham Hotel on the evening of June 30, were in fact women.
Many
were middle-aged and middle-class, and seemed slightly out of place in floor-length
pastel gowns which looked like they had done prior service in decades of Rotary Club
balls; others had the confident look of Sun Belt wealth, their hair frosted, their
skins tanned. Most of them had been foot soldiers in the campaign against the ERA,
and had well-rehearsed reasons for their opposition.
"Women have all the freedom
they need already," said Lillian Smitherman from Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
referring all further questions to her husband.
"It would have de-sexed society,''
a stylish 34-year-old from Baltimore told me, "There would be unisex rest rooms."
Another woman, who had flown to the event from Lake Oswego, Oregon, feared that
sexual equality would legitimate ''homosexual marriages," and that the homosexuals,
thus encouraged, would start reproducing. A retired general averred that the ERA
would require women to be drafted into combat duty.
Several women said they
feared "the destruction of the family" and one tired-looking woman from Boston
believed the ERA would lead to a state of unisex anarchy in which "the difference
between the sexes would be abolished by law."
Of all the fanciful arguments used against the ERA in the ten-year campaign
for its passage, the most compelling one, and the one which probably did more than

*The author wishes to acknowledge the support of a Ford Foundation Grant for
Non-Fiction Writers.
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any other to mobilize the female opposition, was economic: that equality would take
away "the rights women already have," that is, the "right to be a housewife." When
organized opposition to the ERA surfaced at the beginning of 1973, it was with the
stated concern that the ERA would "abrogate the laws that require men to support
their families." And, apart from the lurid possibility of encountering men over
mixed-sex urinals, it was this threat that inspired the thousands of women who
showed up at state capitols throughout the country to lobby against the ERA and for
"the preservation of the family." A pamphlet from the anti-ERA League of Housewives, an offshoot of the multi-issue antifeminist group which called itself, cheerfully, "Happiness of Womanhood," asserted that it is
the right of a woman to be a full-time wife and mother, and to have
this right recognized by laws that obligate her husband to provide the
primary financial support and a home for her and their children, both
during their marriage and when she is a widow (O'Reilly, 1980:
189).
Mrs. Jacquie Davison, the founder of Happiness of Womanhood, was proud to state
that her own husband provided not only for her personal needs, but also--evidently
without legal compulsion--for her organizational expenses (New York Times, January

15, 1973).
The fact that there are no laws requiring husbands to buy life-insurance policies did not weaken the anti-ERA forces' insistence on women's "right" to lifelong
support.
Nor did the fact, only slightly less accessible to the casual student of
the law, that those state laws that do name the husband as the primary provider
have never been enforced to win a larger share of a husband's wage for any resident
wife. The "rights" and "privileges" which the antifeminists believe are accorded
to women by marriage are, at best, private arrangements reinforced by convention, at
worst, comforting fantasies.
In neither case are they threatened by legal injunctions against sex discrimination. What was at stake in the battle over the ERA was
the legitimacy of women's claim on men's incomes and for this there was reason
enough to fear--and to judge from the intensity of the opposition, fear enough to
abandon reason.
If she read the antifeminist literature available to her, the average woman who
lobbied against the ERA with offerings of home-baked bread or future votes was
remarkably well-informed about at least one sociological datum, the divorce rate.
If, in addition, she did some thinking about her own chances of making a living as a
self-supporting wage-earner (and she would have to do this thinking on her own,
because the antifeminist literature is studiously silent about women's collective
disadvantage as wage-earners), she would have formed a terrifying sense of her own
vulnerability. The slightest outward ripple from the sexual revolution or the
human potential movement could be enough to dislodge a husband from his marriage
and catapult his ex-wife into sudden, midlife downward mobility.
Faced with such
a possibility, a woman could, quite sensibly, decide that the feminist promise of
eventual economic equality was so much pie in the sky. Better, perhaps, to check
the forces that allow men to think they have no natural obligation to support
women, and, one of these, clearly, was feminism itself.

-392-

In the ideology of American antifeminism, it is almost impossible to separate
the distrust of men from the hatred of feminists, or to determine with certainty
which is the prior impulse. There is a clear recognition that "men have rebelled,"
as anti-ERA leader Kathleen Teague puts it, and sometimes an acknowledgment that
their rebellion has inspirational sources other than feminism.
"The man is not
responsible any more," observes Onalee McGraw, who is credited by the Conservative
Digest with being a national pro-family leader. "It's the whole me-decade thing-humanistic psychology," she explained in an early 1982 interview, "and men are
taking advantage of the situation." To antifeminists who focus on the issue of
abortion, it is the possibility of sex without babies that has undermined male
responsibility. After all, if pregnancy is ''a woman's choice," as feminists
insist, what's to prevent men from thinking that it's also a woman's responsibility?
In a 1980 speech offered "in defense of the Christian family," anti-abortion leader
Mrs. Randy Engel presented the view that, "men desire sex without responsibility.
They become unmanly and frightened by the thought of having to assume economic
responsibility for a family:
they instinctively try to escape" (1980:
1).
But the antifeminist analysis of male irresponsibility stops short of questioning the structural insecurity of marriage.
Distrust of men takes the socially more
acceptable form of resentment directed at the would-be independent woman, who, in
her selfishness, would undermine other women's fragile privileges. Thus behind
every male rebel the antifeminists can point to a female instigator--to Mrs. Engel,
it is the "emancipated, pill-popping" wife who deprives her husband of the chastening effect of frequent conception.
Teague and McGraw blame organized feminism. The
male rebellion has "victimized women," and "women's lib has to answer for it."
If men are rebelling in a way that hurts women, children and even unborn babies,
then the women who abet them must be either traitors or fools.
The genius of
Phyllis Schlafly, chief organizer and ideologue of the anti-ERA movement, was to
argue that feminists are both.
In her book The Power of the Positive Woman, which
is considerably milder in tone than her public utterances, she observes that "some
ERA proponents argue that husbands support their wives only because of love, not
because of the law."
This, she quickly explains, is foolish romanticism, because
love "is not apt to survive all those years 'for better or worse, for richer for
poorer, in sickness and in health, till death we do part.'"
Love is one thing;
duty is another, and "duty is essential to marriage.''
"Furthermore," she warns,
"the high divorce rate proves that many husbands have stopped loving their wives."
If men have become less willing to volunteer their support, then it is hardly the
time to relax the external constraints on them. "Should a husband have the legal
right to stop supporting his faithful wife of twenty or thirty years by the simple
expedient of saying, 'I don't love her anymore; I love a younger woman'?" Then,
in a quick leap that obscures the fact that few men--except perhaps the wealthiest--are compelled to support their "faithful wives'' for a moment longer than they
are inclined to, she answers sternly:
"Even though love may go out the window,
the obligation should remain.
ERA would eliminate that obligation'' (1977:
76).
Feminists, too, addressed the situation of the financially dependent housewife,
but it was the antifeminists who played on her sense of vulnerability. While the
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feminist analysis spoke to the housewife's anger and frustration, the antifeminist
analysis spoke to her fear--fear that she might, after all, be a parasite whose
At
support rested on neither love nor accomplishment, but only "obligation."
bottom, the antifeminists accepted the most cynical masculine assessment of the
heterosexual bond: that men are at best half-hearted participants in marriage and
women are lucky to get them.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:

ON BOOZE AND BALLOTS

The decade of the 1970s is not the first time that American women have rallied
and organized against the threat of male irresponsibility. There was a similar
movement in the late nineteenth century, which, like today's anti-ERA and anti-abortion movements, drew on a constituency of middle-class housewives. This was the
temperance movement, which at its peak mobilized nearly 200,000 women into the
Women's Christian Temperance Union's campaign to close saloons and outlaw all
"ardent spirits." According to historian Barbara Epstein, few of the women who
became temperance crusaders were in a position--socially or economically--to have
had direct contact with the disruptive effects of drink; alcohol was a symbolic
issue, like abortion or ERA, a vivid reminder of women's vulnerability within
marriage.
Epstein writes:
In nineteenth century America women--in some ways women of the middle
strata specifically--were quite dependent upon marriage.
Few women
could find any alternative to it that would bring any degree of material or emotional security--or respectability ....This meant that women's
dependence upon men, their vulnerability to men, was extreme. The man
that a woman married at twenty might turn out to be kind, responsible,
and financially successful; or he might turn out to be a drunken brute
and a failure at business. Talking about temperance was a way of
talking about these issues without attacking men (temperance literature always blamed the alcohol, not the man) and without criticizing
the structure of the family (which was much too dangerous--or simply
unthinkable--at a time when for the vast majority of women, there was
no realistic alternative) (1981b).
Like today's pro-family crusaders, the temperance activists saw themselves
protecting "Christian values" and the sanctity of the home, as well, of course, as
the security of women. The difference--and it is a decisive one--is that when women
organized to protect their status as wives in the nineteenth century they had no
trouble making common cause with the feminist movement of their time. The late
nineteenth century suffrage movement was equally dedicated to "home values,"
including temperance, and proposed to use the vote only to extend such values into
the untidy domain of civic life. Aside from favoring women's entry into professions
which could be represented as extensions of motherhood (like social work), the mainstream suffrage movement did not question the division of the sexes into breadwinners and homemakers and took pains to demonstrate that the ballot would not
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compromise women's ability to cook, sew or comfort her work-weary provider.
So the
temperance movement made common cause with the suffrage movement and vice versa,
around a shared commitment to "Home Protection" and a perception that "whatever
breaks down the home, hurts woman most, because she is most dependent upon home
affections for her happiness" (Epstein, 1981b).
One hundred years later, feminism itself could be portrayed as one of those
pernicious forces, replacing the demon rum, which ''breaks down the home."
Feminists have tended to see this as either a vicious distortion or a misperception
based on the unfortunate overstatements of a radical minority.
But in our time, it
is mainstream feminism which has embraced the goal, symbolized by ERA, of financial
independence for women. That goal was too radical for late nineteenth century
feminism, and it has proved to be too radical for an influential minority of women
in our own time.
For insofar as financial independence is a legitimate and honorable status for some women, financial dependence becomes--unfortunately--less honorable for other women.
In a battle over matters which are largely voluntary (like
whether men should marry, remain married or share their earnings with their wives)
cultural legitimacy is the paramount stake. By simply asserting women's right to
enter the labor market on an equal footing with men, feminism undercut the dependent housewife's already tenuous "right" to be supported.
If some women can "pull
their own weight"--as a resentful husband or a female follower of Phyllis Schlafly
might reason--then why shouldn't all of them?
So, in our time, the women who mobilized to "protect the family," the spiritual
descendents of temperance activists, parted company with the granddaughters of the
suffragists.
Instead of there being one movement to represent women in a hostile
and uncertain world, we have two--the feminist movement and the antifeminist movement.
It is as if, facing the age-old insecurity of the family wage system, women
chose opposite strategies: either to get out (figuratively speaking) and fight for
equality of income and opportunity, or to stay home and attempt to bind men more
tightly to them.
From the vantage point of the antifeminists, the crime of feminism lay not in hating men, but in trusting them too well.

THE FAR RIGHT CONNECTION
But the twentieth century clash over women's rights--and men's obligations-involves much more than a strategic disagreement among women over the issue of
economic security. The women quoted above as antifeminist leaders are also ranking
functionaries in America's New Right, for whom the issues of marriage and male
responsibility share space on a list which includes such concerns as the need to
"re-arm" America, check the tyranny of big government, and impose the values of
seventeenth century Puritanism on a sinfully errant mass culture. Onalee McGraw
is a consultant to the right-wing Heritage Foundation, which is dedicated, among
other things, to expanding U.S. military power, eliminating welfare and promoting
nuclear power.
Kathleen Teague is the executive director of the American Legislative Exchange Council, which is opposed to gun control, occupational health and
safety regulations and the "abuses" of organized labor.
Phyllis Schlafly, the
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most prominent antifeminist organizer and spokeswoman, had been an activist on
the far right for at least two decades before it re-emerged, with fresh aspirations
for state power, as the New Right.
Whether Schlafly was a dues-paying member of the John Birch Society--a semisecret right-wing organization notorious not only for its virulent anti-communism,
but for its attacks on Republican stalwarts and its overt racism and anti-SemiIn 1960 Robert Welch praised her in the society's
tism--has yet to be established.
Bulletin as "a very loyal member of the John Birch Society."
Later she denied
membership, but it is a matter of public record that the society promoted (and in
some cases distributed) her books and that she, in turn, spoke at Birch-sponsored
It was this affiliation that crippled Schlafly's career as a mainstream
events.
Republican but which also, not entirely inadvertently, helped launch her as the
In November, 1972, both the Birch Society and
nation's leading antifeminist.
Schlafly's newsletter flagged the ERA--which was at the time solidly backed by the
Republican Party--as a major new political target, and within a few months, Phyllis
Schlafly emerged as the leader of a national campaign to stop the ERA. The major
themes of the right-wing assault on feminism were latent in far-right anti-Communist
ideology before feminism reappeared as a political force in America. And the argument that clinched the anti-feminist effort--that women had to defend themselves in
the face of male revolt--had been spelled out on the far right well before Phyllis
Schlafly took it up.
The right had of course always been committed to upholding the trinity of "God,
Flag and Family" (the title of the Birch Society's annual public rallies), with
family defined as the union of a strong and reliable male with a fecund and patriotically self-sacrificing female.
In the calculus of the right, flag and family
have never been independent variables: A threat to one is a threat to the other.
Communism would abolish the family, and conversely, any loosening of traditional
sex roles would weaken our defenses against Communism. So you did not have to
believe in the natural inferiority of women, or in the necessity of their confinement to the high-tech purdah of American middle-class kitchens, to see that there
was something menacing about feminism. When the far right first caught sight of
the women's movement, they saw--predictably--red.
It was obvious, for example, to
Birch Society commentator Alan Stang that the feminists who demonstrated at the 1969
Miss America Pageant were Communists, not only because of their ties to the New Left
(which were easy enough to uncover), but because of their sinister insistence on day
care for children. This was a dead giveaway of the feminists' ulterior motive:
the collectivization of society and the enslavement of everybody by a totalitarian
communist government.
The simple, obvious point of course is that the conspirators aren't
just trying to destroy the family. They are also trying to take control
of American children, who would be the cannon fodder in the total dictatorship they are trying to impose (Stang, 1969:
39).
It was well within the parameters of old-fashioned anticommunist paranoia to
see feminism as a threat to the American way of life.
What was more innovative was
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to present feminism as a threat to women, and this argument--which established the
basis for the anti-ERA fight--was laid out in John Birch Society literature in 1970,
two years before the ERA became a national issue. The article was entitled
"Women's Lib:
They're Spoiling Eve's Great Con."
It starts from the feminist
premise that women can do anything men can do. The trick was to make men believe
otherwise--that women are weak and helpless--and this was "the biggest Con Game,
and the most ancient, which one section of humanity has ever imposed on another,
since Eve invented it."
What the poor victims derived from being conned was not
clear, for, with the least stirring of female independence "the boys would catch on
and demand liberation for themselves. Which is exactly the calamity these rampant
females in the 'Liberation Movement' are going to precipitate" [her emphasis].
Only
the illusion of feminine helplessness kept men in their place, and the illusion was
wearing thin:
I fear that men are beginning to suspect that we women conned them through
the centuries.
I fear they are asking themselves--to women's terrible
hurt--why they should support an able-bodied woman who can earn a good
living too, and why should a man give his ex-wife alimony and childsupport checks, when she is just as capable, if not more so, of rolling
up her sleeves and getting on the 8:30 bus of a morning for an arduous
day in the factory or office? (Caldwell, 1970: 27)
To protect herself in the face of imminent, if not ongoing, male rebellion, a
woman "should refrain from going out into the market places with mediocre abilities."
For, "once she has earned a paycheck...she is practically doomed."
The woman who
had proved her wage-earning ability would only attract "the weak sisters among the
men, who subconsciously realized that here was a girl who would earn a living for
them."
For the women whose premarital existence was tainted by the experience of
paid employment, the only hope lay in persuading men that this lapse had only been
"a stop-gap before marriage," and in swearing, "Never again to earn money outside
the home.. .Never again to be independent.
In short, she should play the Big Con
Game with her husband as shrewd and intelligent women have done for centuries"
(Caldwell, 1970:
27).
The right's appeal to women, like its appeal to men, is class specific:
directed to the woman who is a member of the middle or upper-middle class and whose memFor the
bership depends on a contractual relationship with a man of that class.
affluent male (and, indirectly, his wife) the right has always offered a program of
economic self-interest:
lower taxes, fewer regulatory obstacles to the predatory
conduct of business, measures to restrict the perceived tyranny of labor, etc. The
inspiration which helped transform the "old right,' as represented by the John Birch
Society, to the "New Right," as represented by Schlafly's STOP-ERA and a host of
single-issue organizations with "pro-family" sympathies, lay in the realization that
it was possible to appeal directly to affluent, but dependent women.
The feminist
movement, which looked from the right like a vast mobilization of women on the left,
provided an example of what women could do as a political force. And women's sense
For the
of economic insecurity provided the anxiety around which to mobilize.
affluent man, the right offered a way to hold onto his class privileges in the face
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of encroaching communists, criminals, workers, etc.

For the affluent women, the

right offered a way to hold on to a man.
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THE CONSERVATIVE PROGRAM IS A WOMEN'S ISSUE
Mimi Abramovitz, DSW
Hunter College School of Social Work

ABSTRACT
The Conservative program strikes deeply at the
institutions that support the economic independence
and security of women. This paper reviews social
welfare budget cuts, the relaxation of affirmative
action and workplace health and safety rules, and
the social issues agenda of the New Right for their
impact on women's economic, social and political
It describes how the Reagan Administration's
status.
economic recovery program victimizes women, especially minority women. Not only is the "feminization"
of poverty intensified, but women are sent from the
paid labor market back to unpaid labor in the home,
aided and abetted by the social issues agenda of the
New Right. The Administration's domestic program is
analyzed in the context of its broader strategy for
It is
coping with the current economic crisis.
viewed as part of a long range plan to redirect capital into the private sector by redistributing income
upwards and weakening the political power of women,
minorities and organized labor whose empowerment and
demands for an improved standard of living have become too costly for business and government.

The social welfare
The conservative program is a women's issue.
cuts, the relaxation of workplace protections and rights and the
social issues agenda of the New Right, all strike deeply at institutions that support the economic independence and security of women.
They also reverse gains that women, along with minorities and organized labor have fought for and won since the 1930s.
The domestic features of the conservative program, to be discussed here, are best understood as part of a broader strategy designed to combat the deepening economic crisis facing the United
Like Nixon, Ford and Carter before him,
States since the mid-1970s.
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Reagan is trying to promote economic recovery by directing larger
amounts of capital into the private sector. Known as Reaganomics,
(1) tax and spending policies that redistribute
the plan includes:
income upwards from the poor and middle classes (Pear, 1982c) and
(2) efforts to curb the political power of women, minorities and
organized labor, whose empowerment and demands for a better standard of living have become too costly for business and government
(Weisskopf, 1981; Campen, 1981).
Few today deny that Reaganomics benefits the "haves" at the
expense of the "have-nots." Less widely understood are the ways
in which the conservative program undermines the economic and social condition of women. This paper argues that women are primary,
but not exclusive, victims of the Administration's strategy to cope
with a seriously troubled economy. Part I examines how social welfare budget cuts promote an upward redistribution of income by lowering the standard of living of many women. Part II explores how
the relaxation of anti-discrimination, affirmative action, workplace
health and safety rights, along with the social issues agenda of the
New Right weakens the political power of women, minorities and organized labor, and reinforces patriarchial values and institutions.
SOCIAL WELFARE BUDGET CUTS
Reaganomics includes both supply-side tax cuts and domestic
budget cuts. Both redistribute income from the poor and working
class to wealthy individuals and large corporations. The tax cuts
intentionally favor the wealthy whom it is believed are most likely to save and invest. Social welfare cuts reduce the economic
resources of the poor, in hopes that larger amounts of capital will
flow into the private sector.
Indeed, Wall Street and many politicians see domestic cuts as
the best way to cut government costs, but also to limit the federal
government as a competitor with private enterprise for investment
capital believed to be scarce (Friedman, 1981; "Why Wall Street
The cuts, it is argued,
Worries," 1981; "Why Moneymen Worry," 1981).
will reduce government spending and shrink the federal deficit. A
smaller deficit in turn limits the need for federal borrowing to finance it, causing interest rates to fall and making more and cheaper
money available for investment by private corporations. That is,
less government spending will make room for more private economic
activity and greater profits.
Whether or not social welfare cuts actually stimulate more
private economic activity, they are lowering the standard of living
of the poor. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reported recently
that more than half of the 16 million families living near or below
the poverty line will lose some income as a result of Reagan's budget
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cuts (Crittenden, 1981). When spending cuts are combined with supply-side tax cuts, the CBO predicts that by 1985, the net effect of
the Administration's economic recovery plan will be to reduce the income of the poor while increasing that of the well-to-do (Pear, 1982c).
This upward redistribution of income helps lower women's standard of living by (a) furthering the "feminization" of poverty and
(b) channeling women from the paid labor market back to unpaid labor
in the home.
The Feminization of Poverty
Women are especially victimized by the upward redistribution of
income achieved through domestic tax and spending cuts as they are already overrepresented among the poor and working poor. The 1980 Report
of the National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity observed that
"the feminization of poverty has become one of the most compelling social facts of the decade." It predicted "that by the year 2000, the
poverty population will be comprised solely of women and their children"
(National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity, 1981).
In 1980, women were twice as likely as men to be poor, and femaleheaded households were five times as likely as two-parent households
to have incomes below the official poverty line of $8414 for a family
of four. One fourth of white female-headed families and half of those
headed by minority women fell below the poverty line (U.S. Bureau of
the Census, 1980c: 27).
Older women are the fastest growing poverty group in the country.
While only 59 percent of the population over 65 is female, 72 percent
of the elderly poor are women. The poverty rate for women over 65 is
60 percent higher than that for men of the same age (U.S. Bureau of
the Census, 1979, 1980b).
Even among the 51.1 percent of women over 16 who work, the risk
of poverty is high. The 1981 median income of women ($11,591) employed
full-time and year-round was 60 percent that of men ($19,173) (U.S.
Bureau of Census, 1980c: 19-20).
Despite equal opportunity laws, this
gap has widened since 1965 when women earned 65 cents for every dollar
earned by men (NASW, 1980).
Moreover, fully-employed women with oneto-three years of college earn less, on the average, than men who have
not graduated from elementary school (U.S. Women's Bureau, 1980).
Throughout the post-war period unemployment among women of all races
has exceeded that of men. It is greater for minority women, who are
twice as likely as white women to be jobless (U.S. Department of
Labor, 1980a: 67-80).
Given this "feminization" of poverty, it is not surprising that
the majority of social welfare recipients are women. In recent years,
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80 percent of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1980a: 1), 70 percent of Food
Stamp (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1980: 16), 66 percent of
Supplemental Security Income (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1980d: 358),
Social Security (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1980b:
127-128), Medicaid (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1980a: 7), and Public
Housing (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1980a: 5), 45 percent of CETA
(Title VI) (U.S. Department of Labor, 1980b: 174) and 35 percent
of Unemployment Compensation (U.S. Department of Labor, 1979b: 56)
recipients were women.
All of these programs, on which millions of women rely for minimum levels of income of food, shelter, clothing, jobs, and health care,
were cut sharply in Reagan's fiscal 1982 budget and are likely to be
cut further in 1983. 1
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) originated in 1935
to help maintain and strengthen family life. By 1981 this $11 billion
program provided cash benefits to 3.5 million families, more than 80
percent of whom were female-headed. Although benefits vary widely by
state, the average AFDC family receives $271 a month or $3,253 a year
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980d: 354).
The fiscal 1982 budget lowered AFDC expenditures by $1.2 billion
or 11 percent (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981c). Since entitlement funding by law cannot be reduced by lowering appropriations,
these savings were achieved by tightening eligibility requirements,
lowering benefit levels, reducing work incentives and otherwise restricting and restructuring the program. As a result, nearly 700,000
recipients are expected to lose their benefits or have them reduced
(Weinraub, 1981a, 1981c).
If fiscal 1983 proposals to convert AFDC
into a state administered block grant and/or further lower its support
are accepted the program will shrink even more.
The current Food Stamp program was enacted in 1964 to feed the
needy and aid farmers by using up surplus agriculture products.
In
1981, it subsidized the purchase of food by 22.5 million low-income
persons, or 7.8 million families (Pear, 1981a; Roberts, 1981).
Again,
rather than reduce funding directly, program rules were changed to cut
$1.7 billion of the $16.4 billion Food Stamp program in 1982. Tighter
eligibility standards and denial of aid to boarding house residents
and strikers forced one million people off the program (Congressional
Quarterly, Inc., 1981b).
Nearly all the remaining recipients had
their benefits reduced.
If plans to defederalize food stamps succeed,
even greater contractions can be expected (Raines, 1982).

1.

At the time of this writing, the Fiscal 1983 budget was stalled
in Congress.
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Changes in school lunch and other food programs further assaulted
food budgets of the poor. Three million children and 400 hundred
schools dropped out of the school lunch program after $1.4 billion in
cuts raised food costs ("Still Cutting School Lunch Corners," 1981).
Pregnant women lost out when the $1 billion Supplemental Program for
Women, Infants and Children (WIC) was capped (Congressional Quarterly,
Inc., 1981c).
Medicaid enacted in 1965 to finance the purchase of medical services by the poor and working poor served 18.3 million people and cost
of $18.5 billion in 1981. The fiscal 1982 budget reduced Medicaid payments to the states by $1 billion and another $2.1 billion cut was requested for 1983 (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981e).
Women and
children will be especially hard hit. Although two-thirds of Medicaid
recipients are women and 36 percent of households enrolled in the program are female-headed, 65 percent of all Medicaid payments go to a
minority of elderly recipients in nursing homes and hospitals (U.S.
Bureau of Census, 1980a: 7; Weinraub, 1981b).
The states are less likely to reduce aid to this minority of program recipients, leaving women
and children to take the brunt of the cuts.
Support for other health care programs also fell when the Administration converted many of them into state administered block grants and
cut them by 25 percent across the board. Fiscal 1983 budget proposals
intensify this trend (Raines, 1982).
Ironically, health care cuts,
like many others may cost the federal government more than it saves. A
1978-1979 Harvard study found that for each $1 spent on prenatal care,
$3 was saved in hospital costs because fewer babies were born at low
weights (Burros, 1981).
More recently the New York City Task Force on
Adolescent Pregnancy reported that "for every dollar spent on Family
Planning, three are saved from other human service programs" (Brozan,
1981).
Until the Reagan cuts made $11.6 billion fewer federal dollars
available for public housing and subsidized rents, these programs served
2.4 million families, two-thirds of whom were female-headed (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1980a: 15). Fiscal 1982 cuts sharply limited the construction of new public housing units, reduced Section 8 low-rent subsidies, restricted eligibility for public housing and raised rents
from 25 percent to 30 percent of family income (Congressional Quarterly,
Inc., 1981b).
Proposals for 1983 redirect federal housing aid from the construction of low-income housing units to "vouchers" which aid individuals to
secure shelter on the open market ("Panel Urges Shift in Housing Policy,"
1981; Pear, 1982d).
Critics fear that families who qualify for vouchers
because of their low income, may have no place to use them due to discrimination against poor, minority and female-headed families, housing
shortages and/or high rents (Pear, 1982d).
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Elderly women, who are 72 percent of the aged poor, face cuts in
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Social Security and Medicare benefits, as well as a loss of Food Stamps. Although the Administration
failed to eliminate the $122 minimum Social Security payment for
current recipients, it succeeded for those eligible after January
1982. About 75 percent of those affected are women, almost 90 percent if survivors and dependents are included (Miller, 1981). The
Administration suggests they apply for SSl, a public assistance
program for the aged, blind and disabled poor whose already low
monthly benefits were also cut (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981d).
But analysts predict that many will not (Miller, 1981).
The Administration also wants to lower retirement benefits for
1.4 million Social Security early retirees, the majority of whom are
women (Weaver, 1981; Miller 1981). Although temporarily postponed,
these and other changes in the Social Security program are under review by a task force appointed to investigate the solvency of the
Social Security Trust Fund.
Medicare cuts increase the cost and reduce the availability of
health care services to the aged by limiting federal reimbursement
for both hospital and physician services (Congressional Quarterly,
Inc., 1981d).
Backburner plans exist to replace Medicare with a
voucher to be used for the purchase of private health insurance or
enrollment in a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO).
Since vouchers
may not cover all HMO costs, this promises to further restrict the
ability of the aged to secure necessary health care services (Demkovich,
1982).
The fiscal 1982 and 1983 budget cuts cannot be taken lightly,
even though the Administration's political support seems to be waning.
Indeed, the conservative legacy of Reaganomics may outlast Reagan's
presidency. From the outset, the Administration made its antipathy
to entitlement programs clear. In the Spring of 1981, David M. Stockman,
Director of the Office of Management and Budget stated:
The idea that has been established over the last
ten years, that almost every service that someone
might need in life ought to be provided and financed by the government as a matter of rights is
wrong. We challenge that. We reject that notion
(Rosenbaum, 1981b).
Since then tax revenues have been lowered and entitlement programs
restructured in unprecedented ways and amounts, leaving domestic programs smaller and more vulnerable. Eligibility restrictions now limit
social programs to the poorest of the poor, while lowered benefit levels increase both program and recipient stigma. Both smaller and weaker constituencies and heightened stigma make social welfare programs
more difficult to defend against future cuts.
So does the transfer of
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federal responsibility for social welfare to the states which have historically been unresponsive to the needs of minorities and the poor
and whose currently ailing treasuries leave little room for change
(Herbers, 1981).
If these and other plans succeed in undermining the
concept of entitlement, social welfare programs will be even more vulnerable to future attacks.
Moreover, as was noted above, many social welfare cuts were made
by enacting new laws rather than merely reducing program funds.
Since
cuts made by lowered appropriations can be restored more easily than
those achieved through statutory change, the recent cuts are more likely to persist.
The combined effect of increased vulnerability to future cuts and statutory change suggests that the impact of Reaganomics
may be difficult to reverse (Abramovitz and Hopkins, 1982).
Channeling Women From Paid Labor Back to Unpaid Labor in the Home
The social welfare cuts not only further the "feminization" of
poverty but they encourage women to leave paid work for unpaid labor
in the home. Although the Administration holds that economic recovery
requires an increased work effort by all, the call seems to be aimed
primarily at men. Many features of the conservative program actually
discourage paid employment among the 44 million working women who are
nearly 50 percent of today's labor force (U.S. Department of Labor,
1980a: 6, 9).
Regulating women's labor force participation to solve other problems is not new. Indeed, women frequently have been called upon to
work and sent back home on an as needed basis (Grossman, 1981).
It
is well known that during World War II, when more women were needed to
work in the defense plants,the federal government subsidized day care
centers and Rosie the Riveter became a wartime heroine. Immediately
after the War, when the returning soldier needed work, the nurseries
were closed and Rosie the Riveter was displaced by the "feminine mystique."
Sharp economic fluctuations also create strong pressures for and
against women's employment. This helps explain the rapid growth of
the female labor force in the generally prosperous years following
World War II.
The simultaneous expansion of social programs, fast
food chains, laundramats and other commercial domestic services employed
many women and helped to free others for paid labor outside the home
(Rothchild, 1981).
But in periods of economic difficulty when the economy cannot use
all available workers or when cheap and available (i.e., unemployed)
labor helps keep wages from rising, forces often combine to channel
women back into the home. Back in the home they raise children, keep
employed husbands ready for work and stabilize the family system
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(Sokoloff, 1974: 14-15). Moreover, their child care, housekeeping,
food preparation, health care, teaching, counseling and other services,
previously paid for by the government or private enterprise, command
no wage at all. This unpaid labor of women lessens the charge upon
industry for male wages and lowers the cost to government of providing
comparable services (Gardiner, 1978).
The savings are not inconsequential. The market value of women's domestic labor is estimated at onequarter of the GNP (Kreps, 1971: 67-69) or one-half of the income of
her employed spouse (Kreps and Clark, 1975: 72).
The Administration's economic recovery program discourages
women's paid employment through policies that (a) increase unemployment rates of all workers, especially those in the public sector,
(b) weaken work incentives contained in income maintenance programs,
and (c) intensify women's household responsibilities by shrinking
social services that free them for paid work outside the home.
Greater Unemployment. Reaganomics includes expansionary supplyside tax cuts but also restrictive monetary policies which seek to
squeeze inflation out of the economy by inducing a recession. Because women are not employed in industries most sensitive to swings
in the business cycle, their unemployment rates do not increase as
fast as those of men during recessions.
But Department of Labor employment data (payroll and household surveys) suggest that during
recessions women employed in manufacturing industries 2 and blue
collar occupations, lose their jobs disproportionately, the 1980
recession excepted. Minorities and youth are similarly vulnerable
in these recession-sensitive industries (Bowers, 1981).
The attack on big government also increases female unemployment
as large numbers of women have found work in the public sector since
the early 1960s (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1980d: 279, 320). Although
the final figures on public sector layoffs are far from known, in
the fall of 1981 the National Association of Social Workers reported
that 7,000 Health and Human Service workers and 1,000 from the Community Services Administration were scheduled to lose their jobs. So
were thousands of state and local government employees.
In Massachusetts,
for example, 40-60 percent of the school social workers, 20 percent of
those in the Department of Public Health and many employed by private
agencies dependent on state contracts have already been laid off (NASW,
1981).
Women lost still other jobs when 300,000 CETA public service slots
were eliminated. Low income women trying to move from welfare into the
labor force held close to 45 percent of these jobs (U.S. Department of
2.

In 1979, 30.6 percent of all workers in manufacturing were female
(U.S. Department of Labor, 1980a: 151, 159).
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Labor, 1979a: 42; 1980b: 177).
CETA cuts also mean fewer services for
women as CETA workers staffed many rape crisis centers, battered women's shelters, day care and senior citizen programs.
The Administration's argument that public sector cuts release employees for work in the more productive private sector is belied by
mounting unemployment rates, but also business's response to the cuts.
Early on, The Wall Street Journal reported that despite newspaper ads
exhorting New Jersey's businessmen to hire 16,000 displaced CETA workers, "only 18 employers offered a mere 20 job leads."
The private sector, says the business press, "has been slow to come to the rescue"
(Lubin, 1981).
Weakened Work Incentives. Ironically, the conservative program
also discourages women's employment by relaxing work incentives built
into income maintenance programs. Until now, AFDC mothers who worked
kept the first $30 of earned income and one-third of the remainder.
Moreover, welfare agencies deducted itemized work and child care expenses before the AFDC benefit was calculated. To save dollars, the
fiscal 1982 budget limited the $30 and one-third formula to the first
four months of work and replaced itemized work and child care expenses
with a flat $75 deduction. As a result, many employed AFDC mothers
are left little better off than those who do not work (Rosenbaum,
1981a). Proposals for 1983 worsen this disincentive to work. The University of Chicago reported that while "last year's changes reduced the
income differential between working and non-working welfare recipients,"
the proposed 1983 changes "would make it clearly more profitable for
most poor people to rely entirely on welfare and food stamps than to
work at the low wage jobs available to them" (Pear, 1982b). Likewise,
work incentives are threatened in the 1983 Food Stamp program proposals
(Pear, 1982a).
While discouraging paid employment, AFDC regulations now permit
states to re-introduce "workfare." Workfare requires welfare recipients
aged 15-65 (except mothers of young children and full-time students) to
"work-off" their benefits without additional pay. Clients who refuse
Workfare is neither new nor known
assigned jobs can be denied benefits.
to be effective. Not only are many AFDC clients unsuitable workfare
candidates, 3 but both clients and workers have resisted the coercion
involved ("Workfare and the Work Ethic," 1981).

3.

In 1977, for example, 50 percent of AFDC clients in the nation were
at home as full-time homemakers or were incapacitated. Of the 27 percent already in the labor force, 15 percent were employed, 11 percent
were actively seeking work and one percent was awaiting recall from
layoffs (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1980a: 2).
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More Household Responsibilities. Whether they work or not, women
carry the primary responsibility for children and housework. The time
Although the gap has declined somewhat, it is
involved is enormous.
estimated that women spend over 25 hours a week doing unpaid domestic
Social
labor compared to 10 hours for employed men (Stafford, 1980).
service programs reduce the household burdens of women, enabling them
to combine work and family tasks more easily. Thus, today's cutbacks
also effectively discourage women's employment.
Day care services are clearly most critical. Over 8 million children under age 6, or 45 percent of all preschoolers had a working mother
Fifty percent of single mothers of children under age 6 were
in 1981.
Even though day care is currently available
employed (Grossman, 1982).
to only a minority of these women, the Administration did not spare child
care centers (Twentieth Century Fund, 1975; U.S. Bureau of Census, 1980:
The 25 percent cut in Title XX funds will shrink day care
360, 403).
centers by one-third, leaving 700,000 current users with no place to go.
Other children will be withdrawn due to higher fees and/or curtailed
services. The elimination of CETA jobs, 25 percent of which were in day
care centers, also deprives an estimated one million working mothers
and their children of needed services (Pear, 1981a; Bedell, 1981a).
Meanwhile, the maximum $75 child care deduction for employed AFDC
mothers falls far below day care costs, estimated by the government
to be $30 per child per week (Pear, 1981a; Bedell, 1981a).
The work disincentive is clear. A New Jersey mother of three
had planned to take a full time job as a sales clerk in a women's
department store, but had to forgo it when her neighborhood day care
center closed. "The closing of the center," she told the New York
Times, "will just make me stay home and collect welfare" (Pear,
1981b).
Food program cuts will make it more difficult for low-income
mothers to provide nutritional family meals. Shopping for a nutritional diet on a poverty income already requires ingenuity beyond
the capabilities of a skilled dietician. Fewer food stamp dollars,
more expensive school lunches, lowered WIC funding can only make it
more difficult. The daily per capita intake of key nutrients by the
poor, already below that of the non-poor, will fall (U.S. Bureau of
The deferred social costs of poor nutrithe Census, 1980d: 132).
tion will show up in poor school performance, more illness and greater
health care expenses years from now. More immediately, these problems
will intensify the work women must do in the home, making employment
more difficult to seek or sustain.
Less obvious is the likelihood that food program cuts will adversely affect local economies and increase the time and cost that
daily shopping takes. Food Stamp purchases now account for 35 percent
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of the food sold in the poorest neighborhoods, reports John Loeb,
chairperson of Hillmans, a Chicago supermarket chain. Loeb predicts
that food stamp cutbacks will force many small neighborhood groceries
With fewer neighborhood stores to shop
to close (Rosenbaum, 1981b).
at, shopping will take longer and/or travel and child care costs will
be added to the already high cost of food. A New York Times reporter
recently accompanied a welfare mother through a typical day. She observed that:
The 40 year old mother scoured advertisements for the
coupons she clips, picked through bins of damaged
goods at bargain stores for clothing for her children
and walked more than a mile for a bargain on detergent (Rule, 1982).
Mothers of the millions of children denied school lunches will also
have 4to spend more time and money preparing lunch and assuring nutrition.
Medicare and Medicaid cuts increase the cost f and decrease
Since
access to medical services (Pear, 1981a, Hildredth, 1981).
mothers and wives traditionally care for family members who become
ill and arrange for medical care, these cuts too will intensify women's household responsibilities. This is compatible with the Administration's philosophy. Prior to becoming Secretary of Health
and Human Services, Richard Schweiker stated that, "Medicare could
save money if more people were looked after at home" (Rothchild,
1981).
Similarly, public housing cutbacks which reduce the stock of
low-income housing and raise rents promise to increase women's work
in the home. Affordable housing for the poor already is scarce,
since each year one million low-income units disappear due to rent
inflation, condominium conversions and the abandonment of older
buildings (Congressional Budget Office, 1981). A smaller housing
stock, discrimination against poor, minority and female-headed
households (Pear, 1982d), and the growing unwillingness of many
landlords to rent to families with children (Institute for Social
Research, 1980), will make finding a suitable place more burdensome. In many families, women will absorb this time-consuming
task along with that of managing a household budget shrunken by

4.

The Department of Agriculture reports that needy children rely on
school lunch programs to supply one-third to one-half of their
basic nutrients compared to one-quarter for children of the middle
class (Brody, 1981).
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newly raised rent 5 and caring for family members whose physical
and emotional health may suffer due to increased dangers and health
hazards that typically accompany poor housing.
Finally, reduced community health and mental health services,
citizen centers and social service programs used by families under
stress can only increase women's "emotional work." As stress among
women themselves grows, the social service cuts leave them with few
or no places to go for relief.
RELAXING GOVERNMENT PROTECTIONS
If channeling women back into the home undermines their economic
security and challenges their economic independence, the Administration's systematic relaxation of civil rights, affirmative action and
workplace health and safety regulations risks lowering women's standard of living and eliminating needed protections against the dangers
and inequities of living and working in a capitalist economy. This
"de-regulation" of the workplace, along with the domestic budget cuts,
promises to reverse many political and economic gains fought for and
won by organized labor, civil rights organizations and women's liberation groups since the 1930s.
Social welfare benefits and government protections strengthen
the political power of women, minorities and organized labor. They
provide both a minimum level of economic security and a sense of entitlement. Perhaps more significantly the fight for these benefits
and protections, over the years, gave rise to trade unions, civil
rights groups and women's liberation organizations. These groups
pressed for a larger share of available resources and politicized
the process of income distribution through collective bargaining
and government and tax and spending programs (Weisskopf, 1981).
While the economy grew and prospered, it was not difficult to
accommodate the claims of all classes. Moreover, meeting them helped
assure the social peace. But since the economic crisis surfaced in
the mid-1970s, demands for a rising standard of living by empowered
groups have become too costly for both business and government to
meet. To reduce corporate costs and limit resistance to the entire
conservative program, social welfare programs and government regulations are under attack; and the political strength of women, minorities and organized labor is being curbed (Weisskopf, 1981).
The
weakening of civil rights, affirmative action and workplace health
and safety laws is a step in this direction.
5.

The New York City welfare mother described earlier, pays $110 of
her $370 AFDC check for rent in public housing, leaving her $2.55
in cash plus $1.28 in food stamps a day for each member of her
family of three (Rule, 1981).
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Among the first to go were provisions of Executive Order 11246
which outlaws discrimination by employers receiving federal contracts
and requires approval of affirmative action plans prior to receipt of
federal funds. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCCP),
which previously covered companies with 50 or more employees and contracts of $50,000 or more, now exempts firms with fewer than 250 employees and contracts of less than one million dollars from these
affirmative action standards. Nearly 4,000 of 17,000 companies doing
business with the federal government will no longer have to report on
women and minorities in their work force or show plans for corrective
action if they are underrepresented. Larger contractors must still
affirm they are equal opportunity employers, but less often and in
abbreviated form (Shribman, 1981; Hunter, 1981; Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981f). In addition, the budget of the OFCCP was cut by
20 percent further limiting the agency's ability to enforce its rules
(Stasz, 1982).
These and other changes substitute voluntary compliance for government enforcement of anti-discrimination policies and reduce fears
of losing a federal contract or facing a law suit among employers who
discriminate. The exemption of government contractors from affirmative action rules, contends Karen Nussbaum, director of Working Women,
a national organization of office workers, "will exempt hundreds of
thousands of employers from compliance, lessen hiring and promotional
standards and cut back protections against sex discrimination" (Stasz
1981).
Redress for victims of sex and race discrimination will be more
difficult now that the budget of the Equal Employment Opprotunity Commission (EEOC) has been cut by 12 percent (Stasz, 1981). Plans also
exist to freeze the filing of new lawsuits and the issuance of new
guidelines; to remove restrictions on employer use of pre-employment
and biographical histories; and to require complainants to present
proof of their employers intent to discriminate (Affirmative Action
Coordinating Center, 1981). If approved, such changes will effectively nullify a host of laws passed to ensure equality of employment
in the U.S.
Workplace rights are also jeopardized by efforts to weaken both
the standards and the enforcement power of the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA). While not well enforced, OSHA
regulations did establish a legal right to a safe and healthy work
environment and stimulated unionization around the nation ("Deregulating Workers Health," 1981). Occupational health hazards are
commonly associated only with "mens" work. But many women are employed in industries with higher than average injury rates and work
day losses. Almost two million women work in the fifty industries
where a substantial number of hazardous substances are commonly used
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("Facts About Women Workers," 1979). Moreover accidents, infections,
chemical poisoning, and physical dangers are common in the hospitals,
offices and laboratories where women traditionally are employed
(Stillman, 1977).
Nonetheless, Secretary of Labor Donovan, hopes to exempt thousands of manufacturing firms from routine safety inspections, concenSome of the
trating only on those with above average injury rates.
most effective enforcement procedures, such as surprise visits and
fines for hazards, will be limited (Bedell, 1981b).
The Administration's outright assault on these government protections makes more sense when it is remembered that women, minorities
and organized labor are being asked to bear the brunt of the economic
recovery programs. If production costs of business are to be lowered
by cutting the standard of living of workers, minorities and women,
their resistance to cutbacks must be forestalled and delegitimized.
Current policies are having this effect. High rates of unemployment
and fewer social benefits to rely on make these groups more vulnerable.
Joblessness becomes a more effective mechanism of employer control of
labor and weakens the bargaining power of unions as the recent contract
negotiations in steel, rubber, automobile, airlines, printing and trucking industries demonstrate (Raskin, 1982).
Civil rights and women's groups have also been placed on the defensive leaving them less able to protect their constituencies. Rather
than continuing to identify and combat institutional sexism and patriarchial practices in new arenas, the National Organization of Women,
the National Abortion Rights Action League, and other women's organizations must devote scarce resources just to protect previously won
rights. They are fighting to enact the ERA and against the loss of
Medicaid abortions, the constitutional amendment banning all abortions,
erosion of gay and lesbian rights and the Family Protection Act.
Since these issues constitute the core of the social issues agenda of
the New Right, its role in supporting Reaganomics, both practically
and ideologically, needs to be understood.

PROMOTING PATRIARCHY:

THE AGENDA OF THE NEW RIGHT

The New Right's program which favors economic retrenchment and
military build-up supports the Administration's economic recovery
policies that redistribute income upwards and redirect capital into
the private sector. It's social issues agenda, yet to receive full
attention by Reagan, also reinforces the Administration's assault on
the rights of women, minorities and labor. Not only does the New Right
encourage domestic cutbacks, but it legitimizes them by arguing that
"big government" and the gains women have made are threatening to the
stability of American family.
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The social issues agenda of the New Right is embodied in the
Human Life Amendment (HLA) and in the Family Protection Act (FPA).
The Human Life Amendment seeks to reverse the 1973 Supreme Court
decision legalizing abortion in the early months of pregnancy.
It states that "the paramount right to life is vested in each human being from the moment of fertilization without regard to age,
health, or condition of dependency." If it succeeds, abortion
will be murder in the eyes of the law and "women's bodies, health,
work and even lives," would be subordinated to "fetal survival"
Not only could doctors and hospitals refuse to
(Copelan, 1981).
do abortions, but many forms of contraception such as the IUD and
diagnostic procedures such as amniocentesis could become illegal.
The FPA, a melange of provisions intended to "protect" the
American family was first introduced into the Senate in 1979 by
Paul Laxalt, a leader of the Moral Majority and twice chair of the
Reagan for President Committee. The FPA was re-introduced to Congress in 1981 by Senator Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa) who stated the act
"marks another major step in the vital process of strengthening
the traditional family structure in America and minimizing the
harmful Federal intrusion in our nation's churches, schools and
families" (U.S. Congress, 1981, S6344).
For the New Right, the traditional two-parent family is "the
bedrock upon which our whole nation as well as our society is based"
(U.S. Congress, 1979: S13579). Not surprisingly, it sees the rise
of female-headed families, teenage sex, unmarried couples, open
homosexuality and greater employment and autonomy among women as
Seeking political support from sectors of the white
problematic.
middle class who may feel that these changes threaten their traditional values, the New Right claims that the family is "breaking down"
rather than restructuring itself in response to changing economic
conditions. According to Congressman McKay from Utah, the family as
a societal "keystone" has been slipping.
... and America has been reaping the results of the
Predictably aimless children raised in
slippage.
fragmented homes--often become aimless adults.
Many become social deficits, costing society vast
sums of money, time and talent spent on programs
designed to clean up the mess that failed homes
left behind (U.S. Congress, 1980: H4527).
The FPA strives to strengthen the American family in various
ways. All involve reducing government involvement in family life.
One way the FPA hopes to strengthen the family is to increase parental authority. To this end the Act, (a) bans federal funds for
any program or organization that gives contraceptive devices or
abortion services to any unmarried minor, unless the parent or
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guardian is notified; (b) permits parental review of textbooks
prior to their classroom use, (c) cedes federal responsibility
for monitoring child abuse and wife abuse to the states and (d) redefines child abuse to exclude corporal punishment applied by a parent or someone authorized by the parent to perform this function
(U.S. Congress, 1981, S6324-S6344). By strengthening parental authority over children and weakening child abuse and wife abuse laws,
the FPA creates support for a more authoritarian, male dominated
household.
The New Right also hopes that less government intrusion in
family life will strengthen it by promoting family cohesion. Explaining the need for the FPA, Senator Laxalt stated, "it is becoming increasingly apparent that the federal government itself, although ostensibly aiming at helping the family, is often working
counter to its best interests" (U.S. Congress, 1979: 513549).
Government involvement in family life is "frequently disruptive,!'
Laxalt argued, citing that federal health and welfare programs reduce interaction between elderly parents and children and encourage
placement of aging relatives in nursing homes away from their families. Likewise, federal aid to schools has removed parents from
their children's learning process.
Therefore, the FPA replaces reliance on government programs
with reliance on one's own family or the market. For example, it
offers a $250 tax credit for families who care for aging relatives
at home instead of placing them in a nursing home and a $1,500 tax
deduction for establishing a retirement fund for a non-salaried
spouse, an incentive for women to remain in the home. In these
ways Senator Laxalt suggests that the FPA encourages family members,
....
to decide crucial issues for themselves instead
of leaving them to government. Parents will be encouraged to stay with their children, to actively
participate in their children's educational, moral
and religious upbringing. Children will be encouraged to care for their aged parents. All generations
will be encouraged to live together and share living
experiences, enriching the lives of each member (U.S.
Congress, 1979: S13550).

These means of strengthening the family assume that and/or provide incentives for women to be in the-home. Who else will supervise children's educational, moral and 'religious upbringing and care
for aging parents. Jepsen confirmed this expectation when he told
Congress that,
...with the eroding away of the values of the man-wife,
the mother-father, sister-brother relationship, the
family as a basic unit, there is also the eroding away
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of the value and the beauty of women being a mother and
homemaker (U.S. Congress, 1981: 56328).
Still another way the FPA seeks to support the traditional family
is to restrict information about other ways of living. It is disturbed by new broader definitions of the family when they extend its
meaning "to include anyone and anything from group marriage to homosexual and lesbian couples who want to adopt children" (U.S. Congress,
1981: S6327). The Act bans federal funding for educational materials
that "denigrate, diminish or deny role differences between the sexes;"
and to individuals or programs that "present male or female homosexuality as an acceptable life style."
However, schools may "limit or
prohibit the intermingling of the sexes in any sport or other school
related activity" (U.S. Congress, 1981: S6326).
The FPA also denies
federal funds to Legal Aid Programs that litigate cases dealing with
divorce, gay or lesbian rights, abortion and school segregation.
(Not
discussed here are other ways in which the FPA attacks the civil rights
of minorities). Combined with the Human Life Amendment and the New
Right's general opposition to social welfare programs, the FPA makes
it clear that the New Right not only wants women back in the home, but
defines the family in traditional patriarchial terms --comprised of a
dominant male breadwinner and a passive female wife and mother. As
Laxalt says, the FPA will cause a "rebirth of the American family."
With just a little help-just removing the governmental
barriers and allowing the traditional family roles to
reassert themselves--I am convinced that we will see
a renaissance of the family and the resultant gains for
all Americans (U.S. Congress, 1979: S13550).
The rationale for the FPA, including its patriarchial underpinnings
has been widely publicized in Wealth and Poverty (1981) written by
George Gilder, New Right and supply-side theorist.
In addition to
arguing that biological differences between the sexes condition social
role behavior (Gilder, 1981: 89, 164-165) Gilder, blames the gains women have made for the problems faced by American families today.
For example, Gilder argues that because "men make the sacrifices
necessary to reach the higher reaches in the American economy chiefly
to support the wives and families," when "the wives earn more, the men
feel a decline of urgency in their work and a loss of male nerve and
drive" (Gilder, 1981: 180). Employment by women is also responsible
for rising divorce rates and other social problems. When women accept
full-time work, Gilder maintains,
...both husbands, and wives suffer new strains of pure
fatigue together with tension over the change in formerly
settled sex roles. These strains are not an illusion as
is attested by an increasing body of census statistics
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that show a sharply rising rate of divorce and
separation after wives submit to full time work
responsiblit2 (Gilder, 1981: 17).
(emphasis added)
When marriage fails, Gilder continues, "the man often returns to
the more primitive rhythms of singleness.
On the average, his
income drops by one-third and he shows a far higher propensity
for drink, drugs and crime" (Gilder, 1981: 90).
Since women's
employment causes divorce, it implicitly is responsible for this
male degeneration.
Similar consequences obtain when women rely on social welfare
benefits. This Gilder asserts, "destroys the father's key role
and authority." Unable to feel "manly in his own home" he "turns
to the street for male affirmation."
In the street men "find an
atmosphere that does not make the larger and deeper claims of
familial and sexual love which are hard for men to meet without
a sense of male dominance (Gilder, 1981: 164).
Nothing, Gilder
observes, is so destructive to male confidence, authority, sexual
potency, respect from his family and motivation to work than "the
growing imperious recognition that when all is said and done his
wife and children can do better without him."
The man has the
....gradually sinking feeling that his role as
provider, the definitive male activity from the
primal days of the hunt through the industrial
revolution and on into modern life has been largely seized from him; he has been cuckholded by the
compassionate state (Gilder, 1981: 140).
(emphasis added)
The implication of both these views and the provisions of the
Family Protection Act is that if women would just return to their
traditional roles in the family, sacrifice essential social services
and newly won rights, stop working, stop demanding control over their
bodies and stop pursuing sexual and sex-role freedom, their families
would be happy, would restabilize and male productivity would not decline.
Indeed, women are being asked to bear responsibility for the
economic crisis that neither business nor government can resolve, by
"taking up the slack" through acceptance of stereotyped sex roles and
economic dependency. By encouraging the belief that family problems
and the current economic crisis are the fault of individuals, the New
Right "blames the victim."
In so doing, it diverts attention from the
underlying causes of the problems faced by each and provides an ideological rationale for the Administration's economic recovery program.

CONCLUSION

The Conservative program is consistently anti-women. It undermines their economic independence and security, abolishes painfully
won rights and protections, and subscribes to the view that a woman's
place is in the home. This is not the first time that sexism (the
unequal treatment of people on the basis of sex) and patriarchy (the
acceptance of male supremacy) have contributed to a definition of
women's labor as marginal to the economy. 6 Both posit differences
between the sexes that inevitably determine the roles and behaviors
of each. Together they define women as inferior, subordinate and dependent.
These "biology-as-destiny" arguments condone violence
against women, permit women to be relegated to accessory and dependent roles in the family and the economy and to be denied full and
equal rights in society. They encourage the channeling of women out
of the labor market into the home and/or into low-paid, low status
often part-time "women's" jobs.
Although consistently anti-women, the Conservative program contains numerous contradictions. If implemented as planned, it cannot
fulfill its own stated objectives. The budget cuts, meant to reduce
the federal deficit, promise increased federal costs as cuts in one
area produce new needs and expenditures elsewhere. Not only is the
government-induced recession raising unemployment compensation and
welfare costs, but public sector cutbacks are making more women eligible for welfare and other income maintenance programs.
Meanwhile,
massive military expenditures and supply-side tax cuts deflect funds
needed to offset the mounting federal deficit.
Likewise, the Administration's program for protecting the
family actually threatens its viability. Cuts in income maintenance,
food, health, family planning, housing and social service programs
can only generate greater economic pressures, more child care responsibilities, increased care for the aged and an intensification of
women's household management tasks. Unwanted pregnancies, child and
wife abuse and certainly more family stress can be predicted.
In
today's economy, weakened social welfare programs, subject many
American families to greater economic distress and possible dissolution (National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity, 1981: 38).
Similarly the Administration's belief that an
effort by all is needed to stimulate production is
its programs which discourage women's employment.
sector, the elimination of CETA jobs, and weakened

6.

increased work
contradicted by
A shrunken public
affirmative action

Likewise, the labor force participation of minorities is marginalized using racial and/or ethnic distinctions.
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programs will remove literally thousands of women from the labor
force and prevent others from entering it. Loss of day care centers,
a smaller AFDC child care allowance and lowered benefits for employed
AFDC mothers are causing many welfare mothers to stop working. Likewise, income maintenance and social service cuts, by requiring women
to spend more time caring for family members and managing their households, will prevent them from looking for or sustaining full-time
work. At home, women will once again provide, without pay, services
similar to those they previously delivered as government and private
sector employees.
Loss of workplace safety and anti-discrimination protections
can only lower women's employment opportunities and status.
Those
who remain at work, will be promoted less often, occupy more parttime jobs and continue to be concentrated in low-paid, low-status,
dead-end women's occupations.
These contradictions "make sense" once it is recognized that
the domestic budget cuts and the regulation of women's labor force
participation is part of a broader plan. To cope with the current
economic crisis, the Administration is:
(a) directing larger
amounts of capital into the private sector through tax and spending
policies that redistribute income upward; and (b) trying to curb
the political strength of women, minorities and labor to restrict
them from increasing their claims upon social resources and/or resisting policies that undermine their standard of living.
The social issues agenda of the New Right, reinforces the Administration's social welfare strategy pragmatically. More importantly,
it justifies it ideologically. By arguing that a woman's place is
in the home, and blaming women for the problems faced by both the
family and the economy, it diverts attention away from the underlying
causes of each. In so doing, the conservative program fails to
recognize that the re-emergence of feminism in the late sixties was
a consequence not a cause of economic change and that as a result,
feminism cannot be made to disappear.
To the extent that the Administration's program is implemented,
many women, minorities and workers will suffer badly. Perhaps they
will also resist. Signs of both are appearing as more people fall
below the poverty line, and as the militance of organized labor,
civil rights organizations and women's liberation groups re-surfaces.
The time may be right for these traditionally isolated groups to
submerge their special interests and join forces against the conservative assault which jeopardizes them all. Should this occur, it may
be the conservative program's most serious contradiction of all.
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DEFEMINIZING SOCIAL POLICY
David Stoesz, DSW
Hood College

ABSTRACT
Social policy initiatives by the evangelical right and neoconservative movements are reversing liberal programs that have benefitted women.
This represents
an attempt to defeminize social policy.
Essential to this transformation are theoretical interpretations of economics and sociology which, combined with religious conservatism, portend the restoration of patriarchal culture.
The ideology guiding the
defeminizing of social policy is so pervasive as to suggest that regaining ground
lost will be exceedingly difficult for those promoting social services for women.

INTRODUCTION
On February 18, 1981, President Reagan sought to reassure the truly needy
that the social safety net was still in place.
Those who through no fault of their own must depend on the
rest of us, the poverty stricken, the disabled, the elderly,
all those in true need, can rest assured that the social safety
net of programs they depend on are exempt from any cuts
(1981:A9).
Underlying this conservative principle is a meticulously constructed ideology that
far exceeds the ambitions of traditional conservatism:
to limit the influence of
government in social affairs.
The ideology of the New Right as a synthesis of
religious fundamentalism and conservative social science, seeks to reverse one
of the more pronounced ventures of liberalism--the reduction of women's dependence
on patriarchal institutions.
Conservative thought intends to reestablish traditional roles for women by
subverting government mandates to achieve equality for women in the private
sector and cutting social service programs in the public sector. Drawing from
theology, sociology and economics, conservative scholars add an important measure 1
of legitimacy for what is a carefully orchestrated attempt to defeminize social policy.
This paper is an examination of the theoretical and philosophical perspectives of the
New Right based on the literature of that movement.

1
The term, "defeminize," means to diminish rights and benefits assigned to women
in order to reduce sexual inequality. Such action increases the power and influence
of men, thereby increasing sexual inequality.
Margaret Masson of Hood College provided invaluable assistance in clarifying this, as well as other parts of this paper.
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THEORETICAL BASES
Current attempts to defeminize social policy originate in two social movements,
the evangelical movement and the neoconservative movement.
The religious right
Among the
endeavors to reestablish traditional values through political activity.
fundamentalist groups lobbying for a "national righteousness," Albert Menendez
(1982) includes such groups as the Christian Voice, the Moral Majority, Catholics
for Christian Political Action, Religious Roundtable, Library Court, and The Christian Embassy. Conservative moralist, Jerry Falwell, as an example, has assembled
a formidable grass-roots organization, the Moral Majority, Inc., which he describes
as "pro-life," "pro-traditional family," "pro-morality," and "pro-American."
The Moral Majority has touched a sensitive nerve in the American
people.
Many Americans are sick and tired of the way their government has been run. They are tired of being told that their
values and beliefs don't matter and that only those values held
by government bureaucrats and liberal preachers are worthy of
adoption in the area of public policy (Falwell, 1981:17).
In 1980 this message proved persuasive enough to result in the election of several
senators representing the New Right.
Taking traditional conservative positions
favoring free-enterprise economics, limited federal spending, and a strong national
defense, the New Right distinguishes itself by including morality in the political
gospel. As in the cases of the Equal Rights Amendment and abortion, this represents a frontal assault on issues vital to feminists. Reactions to liberalization
of rights for women by the New Right is less than charitable. Jeremiah Denton,
for example, during a hearing on marital rape, retorted, "Dammit, when you get
married you kind of expect you're going to get a little sex" (Peterson, 1982:A2).
A more sophisticated critique of liberalism has come from the neoconservative
movement.
With the assistance of well-financed think-tanks, noted scholars representing theology, economics and sociology provide intellectual authenticity to
conservative thought (Steinfels, 1979).
Theoretically, neoconservatives contend that initial dislocations precipitated
by urbanization and industrialization no longer pose threats to the social order
as did the Great Depression.
Under an advanced, "democratic capitalism," a
self-correcting economic order emerges that reflects "the infinity of human pressures,
desires and inventiveness.
It is truly protean" (Johnson, 1980:58).
Government,
in this formulation, is little more than an interference in the natural order of things.
Reducing the role of government in social affairs is a premise of neoconservatism--its
dismissal accomplished through conservative, anti-feminist, interpretations of economics and sociology.
Described in Fortune as "a bona fide conservative revolution," the adoption
of supply-side econ-omic theory by the Reagan administration involves stable moneysupply growth, tax cuts, spending cuts and regulatory reform (Ehrbar, 1981:47).
A hypothetical configuration proposed by Arthur Laffer, supply-side economics
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promised to rejuvenate business by reducing taxes to the extent that "the private
sector can be relieved of its onerous tax rates without requiring cuts in publicUnder the shepherding of David Stockman,
sector services" (Gilder, 1981:180).
however, "supply-side theology" 2 was uncovered as a euphemism for "trickledown" economic theory (Greider, 1981:46-47).
A less conspicuous- -but no less significant--component of supply-side economics
Unfettering the private sector, and thereby eliminating the
is regulatory reform.
incipient totalitarian tendency of big government, is accomplished by weeding out
In an analysis of
meddlesome obstructions, such as affirmative action policies.
problems in higher education, for example, John H. Bunzel of the conservative
Hoover Institution, targets affirmative action as "government's attempt to bring
about social change through elaborate regulatory mechanisms, heavy-handed investigatory techniques, and a frequently undisguised built-in adversarial bias"(1980:
410-411).
Speaking candidly in a publication of another conservative "think tank,"
the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Midge Decter complained,
My own pet passion among current issues is affirmative action.
It is not only
This is a policy that must be struck down.
unpopular in itself--going against the American grain; people
recognize that affirmative action has done a great deal to ruin
the working habits in the country by creating a very debilitating
cynicism.
The message is that somehow working hard and achievPeople can't stand this idea (1981:47).
ing is a kind of fake.
The sociological contribution to defeminizing social policy emphasizes sex roles
Biological determinism is evident in the works
as a prime force in human relations.
On the relationof George Gilder, effete literateur of the neoconservative movement.
ship between work and sexuality, Gilder speculates,
A man who feels affirmed sexually by his work environment, and
his relation to other men and women in it, will produce more than
a man who finds his job sexually erosive and confusing ...Sexuality
is our principal way of perceiving and relating to people, and these
relationships are more fundamental, psychologically, than our response
to anything else--goods, money, ideology, or law (1975:97).
This sexual reductionism ignores the influence of discrimination in creating socioeconomic disparities between men and women as well as between whites and blacks.
Writing of black male poverty, for example, Gilder suggests that, "These men lack
the motivation conferred by familial demands and the strength imparted by familial
Putting men in harness and women in the home is a logical
support" (1981:134).
consequence of Gilder's gonad theory.

2
Semantics aside, an important fusion between theology and economics can be found
in the works of Michael Novak, most notably in Toward a Theology of the Corporation
(American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. : 1981).
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The importance of sex roles in conservative ideology is due to reliance on the
family as "another safety net." In making a logical extension of the residual conception of social welfare, Rudolph Penner of the American Enterprise Institute argues
that "there has always been a private safety net that supplements public programs
and it is the intact family." Considering the intact family as part of the safety net
of social welfare has enormous implications for several social problems, particularly
unemployment.
To the extent that intact families have two or more wage earners,
"On average,"
they are better able to weather periodic bouts of unemployment.
claims Penner, "members of intact families who experience unemployment fare reasonably well .. ." (1982).
When men are still considered the principal wage earner, this formulation functions to displace responsibility for solving the unemployment problem from the economic system to secondary wage earners in families: women who are expected to
meet the economic needs of a family by periodic participation in the labor force.
For this reason conservatives would prefer to omit or reduce the significance of
women in computing the unemployment rate; as President Reagan complained,
Part of the unemployment is not as much recession as it is the
great increase in the people going into the job market, and ladies,
I'm not picking on anyone, but because of the increase in women
who are working today and two-worker families and so forth (sic)
(Molotsky, 1982:37).
On the other hand, reliance on families, and particularly women, to absorb
the impact of unemployment has functional utility only so long as women do not
compete with men for jobs.
Herein is the significance of combining conservative
economics and conservative sociology.
Admonishing women to stay home in traditional sex roles, except when unemployment of the primary wage earner requires participation in the labor force, guarantees that women will not develop work histories that
make them competitive with men.
The consequences of this logic are then used to
justify sexual inequality. "Most of the differences in pay between men and women,"
notes Gilder,
derive from the fact that women between the ages of twenty-five
and fifty-nine are eleven times more likely than men to voluntarily
leave work, and the average woman spends only eight months on
a job compared to almost three years for a man (1981:130).
Conceivably, conservatives could attempt to redefine the unemployment rate to
account for the effect of multiple-earner families, further eroding the rights of women
3
to make valid claims on an economic system that already discriminates against them.
3

Such an event would not be unprecedented.
In the late 1970's conservative theoretician Martin Anderson (1980) suggested that the number of families below the
poverty line would drop if in-kind benefits were given a cash-equivalent value and
added to income maintenance benefits.
By 1982 the Census Bureau calculated that
the number of poor families could decrease as much as 42.3% if the market value for
food, housing and medical benefits are added to income benefits (New York Times,
April 18, 1982).
This type of market-equivalence analysis has been a powerful
weapon for the conservative assault on human service benefits.

THE RESTORATION OF PATRIARCHAL CULTURE
The intention of those opposed to liberally-inspired programs that benefit
women is the reestablishment of a traditional social order consistent with the sexist
values held by the religious right and neoconservatives.
The reinstallment of
patriarchal culture serves to "restratify" the social order along lines established
by "traditional--i.e. patriarchal-sex and family relations" (Washington Area Study
Group, 1982:106-7).
As Marvin Harris (1981) notes, this conservative impulse
becomes imperative as disadvantaged groups scramble for what jobs are available
in a tight labor market.
Women and blacks, in
Sawyer's analysis of recent
Between 1970 and 1980 the
exceeded that of black men
ing chart.

particular, have been pitted against each other, as Kathy
Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics data shows.
percent increase of the working population for women
in four major occupational areas, as shown in the follow-

Percent Increase of the Working Population from 1970 to 1980
Officials & Managers
Women
Black Men

Professionals

7.8
1.3

11.3
.6

Craftworkers
3.0
2.2

Technicians
12.4
.9

Because most of the increase in employment for women was found among white, as
opposed to black women, Sawyer concluded that "blacks, especially men, express
resentment that white women are reaping greater benefits than they" (Sawyer,
1982:A10).
For conservatives needing to reaffirm an economic system that tends to discriminate against marginal workers in a time of chronic stagfiation, the only logical
response is to prioritize the claims that some groups would make on the economic
system (Greider, 1981).
Given a choice between blacks and women, the conservatives
select women for sacrifice because women allegedly can rely on familial social and
economic supports.
Justification for this choice has come in the form of a conservative depiction of
a natural order which identifies the family as a fundamental institution. The foundation for this is found in To Empower People by Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus
(197,i;, a. analysis financed by the American Enterprise Institute that spawned a
number of works. Berger and Neuhaus posit the family as a mediating structure,
like neighborhood, church and voluntary association; all struggling against the
oppressive tendencies of modernity, embodied in mega structures, such as government and business.
Through a subsequent publication, Michael Novak (1981:5)
accomplished an ideological sleight of hand by reclassifying business as a mediating
structure, leaving only government for reproach.
In so doing, the family as private
institution became portrayed as an "endangered species" continually threatened by
intrusive government.
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Most any government initiative relating to the family has become suspect,
even those considered innocuously supportive by most standards. 5 A particular
target for government-associated programming has been day care for children.
Brigitte Berger chastises "child care bureaucrats" for usurping from the family
Gilder
"its most recently rediscovered function, the care of children" (1979:8-9).
is alarmed at the possible evolution of the "child care state" where parenthood has
Subsequent budget reductions in
been expropriated by government (1975:162).
employment-geared programs, like child care, serve to drive women back into the
home, reducing family need for, or dependence on, the "friendly intruders" of
Operationalizing conservative theory by reducing
government (Berger, 1980:160).
program benefits for women results in enormous pressures for women to stay home,
thus reinforcing institutional sexism.
CONSEQUENCES FOR CLIENTS AND PRACTITIONERS
Perhaps most remarkable about conservative ideology has been the rapidity
The execution of conservative policies rivals
with which it has been dispatched.
It is as
the Great Society in speed of delivery and the New Deal in its impact.
if Gilder's philosophy were instituted outright:
The attempt of the welfare state to deny, suppress and plan
away the dangers and uncertainties of our lives--to domesticate
the inevitable unknown--violates the spirit of capitalism but also
the nature of man ... In order to succeed, the poor need most of
all the spur of their poverty (Gilder, 1981:253,118).
Both clients and professionals have become casualties of conservativp ideology.
For clients of social services the consequence of this is a brutal confrontation
The hardest
with a reality against which they had been only partly protected.
impact is felt by indigents and the destitute, for example shopping bag ladies
(Rousseau, 1981).6
5
For example, Michael Balzano, in Federalizing Meals-On-Wheels (American Enterprise
Institute, 1979) criticizes government involvement in that program, preferring that
it be turned over to mediating structure organizations.

6These women experience a reality that David Stockman later came to appreciate as
Noting that corpoa disappointment in calculating budget cuts for social services.
rate and military interests resisted budget cuts while social service beneficiaries
were unsuccessful, he grudgingly acknowledged that "'weak clients' suffer from
Consider comments by two women:
their weakness " (Greider, 1981:52).
Certainly
Try to get work I guess.
I don't know what I'll do now.
not getting anywhere sitting on my ass, pardon me, with the welfare
and social security. What work? At my age I haven't the vaguest.
I'm almost fifty and that isn't easy after twenty-five years of not working, raising a family. I'll try to collect unemployment insurance, of
Very interesting situation. Maybe I'll come
course, I haven't worked.
I just know the area around here. Like a cat or
back to the hospital.
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For clients who are able to participate in the labor market, at least marginally,
the result is apt to be more haphazard work with less likelihood that temporary,
part-time work will lead to full-time employment, or that full-time employment in
lower-skilled jobs will lead to a career that moves upward. Instead, women will
move in and out of the job market, and once in it, laterally. Fewer women will find
employment the way to independence, thus, increasing their dependence on male
breadwinners. For some women this will mean being trapped in a stifling and perhaps
dangerous, relationship with little chance for exit (Shields, 1981).
A lifestyle independent of government or a male breadwinner will be reserved
for women who forego motherhood. If conservative policies continue to destabilize
family life, women will be encouraged to avoid marriage as well. These independent
women will find the transition from independent careerist to traditional female roles-wife and mother--very costly, and perhaps unaffordable. The dilemma for career
women considering traditional roles may be as psychologically stressful as that of
women who find developing a career so difficult due to the absence of employment
supports, such as child care. In both instances life is bifurcated; patriarchal culture stifles personal growth by allowing only one road for individual development.
Conservative ideologies have singled out human service professionals, notably
social workers, as evidence of the evils of liberalism. No longer portrayed as
benign "do-gooders" conservative theoreticians depict human service professionals
as agents of the state, often working against other social institutions. For example,
Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus, in defense of the family, contend that
when the rhetoric of children's rights means transferring
children from the charge of families to the charge of coteries
of experts ...that rhetoric must be suspected of cloaking vested
interests--ideological interests, to be sure, but, also and more
crudely, interest in jobs, money and power (1977:20).
Irving Kristol, described as "patron saint of the new right," views self-interest
as the prime motive of human services practitioners.
The prime promoters and beneficiaries of government intervention
are the social scientists, social workers, urban planners, academics
and bureaucrats who make up the ever-expanding "new class." They
get paid for running the programs they promote, and relish the
accompanying power. The fact that their programs don't work never
stops them (Goodman, 1981:203).
6

dog I come back, rotate toward it when I'm uncertain, I guess (p.37).
Before I came to the shelter? Oh, starving. I didn't eat for weeks.
I paid the rent at that hotel with one check and they robbed my eating
money. So, I had a room, a tiny room and I stayed there. It was
cold. They didn't have steam, nothing, because the furnace broke.
It's a cold winter. I just stayed in bed all day. After a while I was
too weak to go out or even bathe. When the others found me they put
me right up in the shelter (p. 45),.
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And, in what may be the most clever of semantic distortions, Gilder labels social
welfare programs that over-insure people against socio-economic risks as "moral
hazards" (1981:105-113).
NEOLIBERALISM
Advocates for social reform have little reason to believe that redress against
the defeminization of social policy can be obtained through the political process.
Indeed, conservative doctrine has so thoroughly permeated the Democratic party,
the traditional reserve of liberalism, that an ideological mutant has evolved, neoliberalism.
Though not yet a fully-developed ideology, in its present form neoliberalism shares features of neoconservatism.
Most importantly, neoliberalism
emphasizes economic policy over social policy (Rothenberg, 1982).
To the extent
that neoliberals emphasize investments in production capital over social capital,
their ideology mirrors supply-side economics.
In so doing, they disregard social
injustice as the consequence of an economic system that must be restructured if
life opportunities are to be made more equal for all populations.
By relegating
social issues as subordinate to economic issues, neoliberalism makes it that much
more difficult for feminists to find social policy as a vehicle for social reform.
Instead, social policy becomes the instrument for furthering institutional sexism.
CONCLUSION
The current conservative trend is not a transient political phenomenon that is
likely to collapse soon.
A review of conservative ideology shows that it is a
carefully-constructed and well-integrated system of propositions derived from
theology, economics and sociology.
The resulting synthesis is reasoned, however
archaic, prescription for a society beset with a variety of problems.
That the costs
for addressing these problems is borne disproportionately by women is testimony
to the power still reserved in patriarchal institutions.
The absence of a strong and
coherent response by liberals is further evidence that there is little reason for expecting a quick reversal of the present trend to defeminize social policy.
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ABSTRACT

The recent setbacks imposed on the feminist movement by the forces of the New
Right have led women to an increased understanding of the importance of power in
maintaining male dominance. Although men exercise power over women in a variety of
ways, a review of the findings of social psychology indicates that almosL all types
of power derive from men's activities in the public sphere. The exercise of power
has become a part of the male gender role and a primary source of men's identity
and self esteem. The feminist movement's challenge to men's exclusive hold on the
public sphere and its efforts to appropriate the sources of male power for women
have provoked a massive retaliation from conservatives which is reflected in the
policies of the Reagan Administration.

The aim of the modern feminist movement is to increase the social, political,
and economic power of women. Feminists have increasingly come to understand that
their efforts have locked them in a power struggle with the forces of male dominance
(Eisenstein, 1981; MacKinnon, 1982). While the far right has never been sympathetic
to feminism, in the last two years the women's movement has met a formidable opponent
in the Reagan Administration. Policies which seek to limit women's reproductive
freedom, abolish affirmative action programs, and increase women's economic dependence on men directly attack the programs women have won through years of struggle.
Despite admitting women to segments of the power structure, such as the United
Nations and the Supreme Court, which have until now been closed to them, the Reagan
Administration is in the main advocating policies which are directed at restoring
*The authors wish to thank Roberta Till-Retz of The University of Iowa Labor Center
for her assistance in gathering information for this article. Portions of this
paper also appear in a somewhat different form in A. Kahn, "The power war: Male
response to power loss under equality." Psychology of Women Quarterly, in press.
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the traditional structure and values of American society and which are rooted in
The massive cuts in social welfare proand sustain capitalism and patriarchy.
grams, for example, are widely recognized as an attempt to reinvigorate capitalism
at the expense of the poor. Since these programs primarily benefit women and their
children, who constitute a majority of the poor, this also increases women's economic dependence on individual men and reinforces patriarchy.
In seeking to reestablish traditional values, the Reagan administration claims
to have the support of a large portion of the population. Certainly a substantial
number of voters are concerned about the declining reward for work, the instability
of the nuclear family, threats to U.S. military superiority, the lack of respect for
Indeed,
human life, and competing definitions of right and wrong (Miller, 1982).
many feminists may share these concerns.
Whether the Reagan Administration seeks only to reestablish traditional values
of work, family, and nationalism, or whether it has consciously set out to restore
the losses which have been inflicted upon patriarchy, the effect on women is the
same. It is the thesis of this paper that such conservative policies will, if fully
enacted and established within our legal system, reinvigorate patriarchy by reversing
the gains women have made and by further reducing women's power.
The distribution of power between men and women is, thus, at the heart of conservative social policies. To understand how these policies affect women, it is
important to understand power relationships between the sexes as they currently
exist and how the feminist movement has threatened to change them. To successfully
oppose conservative policies feminists must understand the dynamics of power and
what power means to men. Accordingly, this paper reviews the findings of social
psychology about power relationships between men and women, recent changes in these
relationships, and the Reagan Administration's efforts to counter these changes by a
return to the traditional power relationships of patriarchy.

POWER RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SEXES
One common definition of power is the control of resources and social instituitons which enables one person to change the behavior of another (Cartwright,
1959; Kipnis, 1976; French & Raven, 1959; Sherif, 1980; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959).
There are multiple bases of power with the six proposed by French and Raven (1959)
frequently considered basic:
Reward power refers to the ability to mediate rewards such as money, food,
promotion, and affection in order to obtain behavior change. Since men are more
likely to work outside the home and are paid more than women, men have more monetary reward power than women. Personal rewards such as friendship, affection, and
sexuality, while used by women, are equally available to men.
1

For the purposes of this paper, patriarchy is defined as a political structure that
promotes male privilege by curtailing women's choices about their sexuality, childrearing, mothering, loving, and laboring (Eisenstein, 1981: 14).
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Coercive power refers to the ability to mediate punishments such as fines,
demotion, injury, and disapproval to change another's behavior. Since men are, on
the average, larger and stronger than women, and more often hold positions of
authority than .women, men typically possess more coercive power.
Referent power refers to the ability to get another to change behavior because
the target of influence likes the powerholder, identifies with the powerholder, and
wants to be like him or her. While referent power is appropriate for use by both
women and men, in fact, it is probably possessed more by men, since masculine
traits are typically valued more than feminine traits (Broverman et al., 1970).
Expert power refers to influence over another because one possesses superior
skills or knowledge. It is a common observation that men have more expert power
than women. Feldman-Summers and Kiesler (1974) were unable to find a single area
in which women were rated as more expert than men.
Legitimate power refers to influence exerted because the influencer feels he
or she has the right to influence and the target feel obliged to comply. Such
perceptions come about as the result of elections, laws, or socialization in which
people believe it is right for one person to lead and another to follow. In our
culture men are socialized to believe they have the right to influence, and this
has been supported by language, laws, and institutions which provide the male with
privilege.
Information power refers to the ability to change behavior through persuasion
and the presentation of information. The traditional male life pattern, which has
led to a greater likelihood of men receiving a higher education and working outside
the home, has resulted in men's greater use of informational power.
Most of men's power over women derives from their activities in the public
sphere. Their greater access to higher education, employment, and the political
and legal systems has conferred on them the money, authority, and influence that
are the bases of power. Women, on the other hand, have traditionally been blocked
from participation in the public sphere and have been confined to a private sphere
of child care, housework, and emotional support. Changes in education and the
structure of the economy over the past three decades have allowed women into the
labor force but only, for the most part, in low status, low wage positions. Men
continue to hold most of the wealth and positions of authority in the society and
to assert and strengthen their power in their interactions with women both in
public and in private.
The everyday, nonverbal behavior of men clearly demonstrates the greater
power that they possess. Henley (1977), Frieze and Ramsey (1976), and others have
shown that sex differences in daily behaviors such as posture, eye contact, touching,
and interpersonal distance are identical to power differences: Men, nonverbally,
behave in a dominant, superior fashion by having a relaxed posture that takes up
much physical space, maintaining little eye contact, touching women frequently, and
maintaining a large personal space. Other researchers such as Unger (1976; 1979),
Meeker and Weitzel - O'Neill (1977), and Lockheed and Hall (1976) have shown that
sex differences in behaviors such as self-disclosure, group participation, conformity,
and aggressiveness can all be attributed to men's greater power rather than any
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inherent differences between the sexes.
For purposes of this consideration, perhaps more important than the fact that
men have more power than women is that they use their power to control and dominate
women and thus maintain their power. They do so by ignoring or devaluing the
accomplishments of women (e.g., Deaux and Taynor, 1973; Massengill and DiMarco,
1979), by denying women access to skills, jobs, and information (e.g., Levitin,
Quinn, and Staines, 1971), by withholding rewards (e.g., U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1976), and by physically abusing women (e.g., Roy, 1977).
The importance of power to men can be understood in purely rational terms-power helps in accomplishing one's goals. But why is power over women so important?
The most popular conception stems from the observation that the young male child
is reared primarily by women (e.g., mothers, grandmothers, female babysitters,
female elementary school teachers). The boy perceives women as controlling and
dominating him and, unable to identify with the female, he develops a life-long
need to escape female domination and power and to demonstrate his own superiority
(e.g., Dinnerstein, 1976; Horney, 1967; Farrell, 1974; Lederer, 1968). Most who
hold this view argue that fathers and other males should take a larger, more active
role in childrearing. While expanding the traditional male role may be highly
desirable, two additional sources of male's desire for power over women are likely
more germane. First, power is a central part of the male gender stereotype, and
second, the use of power has certain metamorphic effects.
Power and Masculinity
A content analysis of the male gender stereotype shows that power and
influence are key components. Men are perceived as more aggressive, not easily
influenced, very dominant, very skilled and worldly, acting as leaders, and rough
(Broverman et al., 1970). These traits exemplify the French and Raven bases of
power. The typical picture of women is one of weakness and powerlessness. Furthermore, research by Ellis and Bentler (1973) suggests that men see themselves
as more masculine to the extent they do not possess stereotypically feminine traits.
This, of course, is well captured in the phrase, the "opposite sex." Therefore,
it should come as no surprise that a key component of many men's identity is to be
more dominant and powerful than women. As Jessie Bernard (1974) pointed out,
power, especially coercive power, is the one sex difference "most jealously insisted
upon by men."
The importance of male power over females is illustrated by Komarovsky's (1976)
research on male college seniors in which she found that the inability to present
a powerful masculine image was a source of great anxiety. Male power, especially
male power over females, appears to be central to many men's definitions of themselves. With power they are men; without it they are no better than women. Men's
need to have power over women, paradoxically, gives women what Pleck (1977) calls
masculinity-validating power over men. By acting less powerfully than men, by
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letting men win, drive the car and flex their muscles, and by telling men how big,
strong, and masculine they are, women validate a man's masculinity.

Metamorphic Effects of Power
But men value power so highly and guard it so carefully not only because they
have incorporated power into their self-image, but also because of what Kipnis
(1976) calls the metamorphic effects of power use. He argues that the successful
wielding of power changes the perceptions powerholders have of themselves and of
the targets over which they exercise power. Since men have so much more power than
women, they are more subject to these metamorphic effects. To further understand
men's reactions to a loss of power we must understand these metamorphic effects.
Kipnis argues that people who have power use it to obtain things they want.
To the extent that they use directive and controlling power, the powerholders
tend to attribute the behavior of others to their own exertion of power rather
than to the other person's volition, thus devaluing the target of power and his or
her products. The powerholder then attempts to maintain a social and psychological
distance from this inferior target of power.
This pattern of control, misattribution, devaluation, and segregation can be
clearly seen in men's behavior toward women. Falbo and Peplau (1980) and Johnson
(1974) have shown that men use more directive and controlling forms of power than
women, and many studies have shown that males view their own behavior in a more
egotistical fashion than females (Levine et al., 1976; McHugh et al., 1975;
Stephan et al., 1976), taking more credit for their success than women and attributing their failure more to external causes. Observers of both sexes tend to
believe the performance of a woman is due more to external circumstances than the
comparable behavior of a man (Deaux and Emswiller, 1974; Feather and Simon, 1975;
Feldman-Summers and Kiesler, 1974). Likewise, the devaluation of women and their
products is well-documented (Deaux and Taynor, 1973; Goldberg, 1968; Massengill
and DiMarco, 1979; Pheterson et al., 1971).
Kipnis also argues that the successful wielding of power will lead the powerholder to possess higher self-esteem than the target of power. If one has few
resources one will have few wants satisfied. On the other hand, if one has much
power, that power can be used to satisfy one's desires. The powerholder is likely
to be praised, flattered, and to have his or her wishes carried out, however
trivial they might be. Having desires met and receiving flattery cannot but make
one feel good, especially in comparison with those low in power. One would therefore expect that men, having more power than women, will receive more flattery
and have desires met more frequently. Women, lacking power generally, will receive
less reinforcement and consequently feel less good about themselves. In addition
the power attempts of women are often appeals of helplessness and Johnson and
Goodchilds (1976) have shown that using helplessness to get one's way results in
lowered rather than raised self-esteem. Thus, having more power than women, and
using this power, frequently leads men to feel better about themselves than women.
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By having and using power, male self-esteem has become based, at least in part,
on power.

THE EFFECT OF POWER LOSS
Although men currently have superiority to women on all of the bases of
power, as suggested previously, women's current surge for equality can be understood as an attempt to increase their own power. Taking courses in self-defense
and assertiveness replaces the power of helplessness with coercive power;
returning to school provides informational and expert power; fighting through the
courts and the legislatures to end sex discrimination results in women's gaining
legitimate power; gaining abortion rights gives women legitimate power over their
own bodies.
As women gain power men lose power. In some senses the loss is in concrete
terms. For example, when women take jobs previously held only by men, men no
longer have exclusive access. In other cases, male power becomes less usable,
as when women learn self-defense techniques by which male coercive power is met
with counterpower. The negative relationship between male and female power can
be seen in the research of Winter, Stewart, and McClelland (1977). They found
that the greater the power motivation of the husband, the lower the wife's career
level.
In a world of male dominance, the question becomes how men respond to this
loss.
If Kipnis's analysis of the metamorphic effects of power is correct, and if
power is deeply imbedded in the male gender role, it is an idealistic and vain
hope to picture men suddenly denied this power stepping back quietly. Even with
the best intentions, men, whose views of themselves and of women, whose behaviors
and feelings of self-worth, are tied to their possession of power over women,
are not going to respond positively to the loss of that power. Feminists argue
that men are drunk with power; however, based on this analysis it might be more
accurate to say that men are drugged with power, and wittingly or unwittingly,
are likely to be addicts. They shape their experience in terms of a stereotype
in which power, especially power over women, is central, and the use of this
power has led them to feel important and to devalue women. Power has become the
key ingredient in male self-esteem and, for many men, the definition of being a
man is tied to possession and use of power.
As such it is unlikely men will hand over their power, for to do so will mean,
for many men, to hand over their image of themselves as a man and the basis for
their self-esteem. A man beats his wife and refuses her a career outside the home
not because he particularly enjoys those activities in their own right, but because
such actions protect a masculine lifestyle in which he feels like a man, and
because of the metamorphic effects of power lead him to believe he has the right
to do so. Thus, an anticipated power loss will likely meet with strong resistance.
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CONSERVATIVE POLICIES AND WOMEN'S POWER

During the decade of the 1970s women advanced their struggle for increased
power and control over their own lives from the personal to the political arena.
Through courts and legislatures women sought changes in discriminatory laws and
the enactment and enforcement of laws which require equal treatment. And they
won. The 1973 Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion, the passage of the
Equal Rights Amendment by Congress and a majority of state legislatures, the 1971
child care income tax deduction, the prohibition of sex discrimination in education by Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and the rapid adoption of
no-fault divorce laws, among many other changes, legitimized women's quest for
equality and represented some real advances in power for women by increasing their
options regarding marriage, reproduction, education, and employment.
Recognizing women's potential political power, President Carter actively
supported the ERA and appointed record numbers of women to federal office. He
included three women in his cabinet, elevated 28 women to federal judgeships,
and appointed women to an unprecedented 22 percent of top level governmental positions (OURSELF, December 1980: 4). Between 1973 and 1982 women also increased
their representation in Congress from three to four percent and in State legislatures from six to ten percent and saw the election of four female governors
(Alligood, 1974: 541; Joseph, 1982).
Although implementation and enforcement of the new laws followed more slowly
and women remained grossly underrepresented in government, they had begun to turn
the apparatus of the state to their own uses. However, as O'Brien has noted, "as
far as women are concerned, even a modest reformism is perceived as revolutionary"
(1981: 162), and the prospect of a state supported revolution against male privilege provoked a massive retaliation from the right. Turning Carter's liberal formulations of family policy and women's rights on their head, the right mobilized
large amounts of money and volunteer labor around family issues as part of a broader
conservative agenda (Eisenstein, 1982).
Once in office the Reagan Administration moved quickly to disempower women
through budget cuts, regulatory changes, and the appointment of anti-feminists
to important executive posts (Schafran, 1981). Much of Reagan's domestic program
vividly illustrates the reassertion of male power and traditional gender-role
stereotypes. Since economic independence from men and reproductive freedom are
essential to women's ability to control their own lives and, thus, to women's
equality and power, the counterattacks in these areas have been particularly
virulent.
Economic Independence
As the prior analysis has shown, female access to previously all-male domains
in the world of work threatens not only male power, but male self-esteem. Since

employment, education, and money provide the bases for almost all forms of power,
affirmative action and anti-sex-discrimination legislation directly threaten traditional masculinity. By promoting equal access to male jobs, positions of authority,
and wages, such programs actually diminish male power and force men to alter their
perceptions of themselves as superior to women. Furthermore, having equal access
to jobs would provide women, ultimately, with equal reward, coercive, expert, and
informational power. Therefore, it is critical to male dominance to dismantle such
programs. Accordingly, under the Reagan Administration, Federal affirmative action
programs have been gutted and deprived of enforcement funds, as have efforts to
combat sex discrimination in employment and education. In the last year, seventyfive percent of government contractors have been exempted from affirmative action
guidelines; the budgets of the main enforcement agencies, the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, have been
slashed; and severe limitations have been imposed on back pay awards (Wall Street
Journal, April 21, 1982; New York Times; June 29, 1982; Working Papers, January/
February 1982).
While the dismantling of affirmative action programs places stumbling blocks
in the path of women's economic advancement, conservative initiatives have also
diminished educational and training opportunities for women. Cutbacks in CETA,
WIN, and student loans restrict the choices available to women in education,
training, and, eventually, in employment. For example, half of CETA participants
have been women and CETA jobs have helped staff community programs important to
women such as day care, rape crisis, and spouse abuse centers (Joseph, 1982;
Schafran, 1981). These public service employment jobs have been eliminated and
special job training targeted at women faces an additional 60 percent cut in fiscal
year 1983 (AFL-CIO American Federationist, February 1982: 14-15).
Poor women have experienced a double burden due to cutbacks in social welfare
provisions for AFDC, Food Stamps and Medicaid and in job training which offered
them an opportunity, however slim, of escape from economic dependence on men or
the state. Already cut, WIN is scheduled to be replaced by a workfare program
in which welfare recipients will be forced to take low wage, high turnover, deadend jobs or lose their benefits. Since three to four times as many recipients
are cut off welfare for failure to meet workfare's stringent requirements as find
jobs, the main effect will be a further narrowing of poor women's already limited
economic alternatives (Dollars & Sense, February 1982: 6-8).
Finally, the Reagan Administration is eliminating women's jobs directly by
reducing government employment. Women constitute one-half of government employees
and since most are in lower status, lower seniority positions, they are hit particularly hard by these cutbacks. Over a half million state, federal, and local
government jobs have already been lost (Dollars & Sense, January 1982: 3-5). At
the federal level, these reductions in force, or RIFS, following civil service
rules, have led to ludicrous situations in which government executives are paid
high salaries for filing and performing other secretarial chores while the women
they have replaced are out of work (New York Times, July 16, 1982).

Although discouraging women from employment advancement and training seems
counter to the conservative emphasis on self reliance and the work ethic, it is
consistent with a policy that sees working women as the cause of economic problems
and family instability (Eisenstein, 1982). The founder and president of the
Christian Broadcasting Network summarized the conservative case against working
women at a New Right "Family Forum":
Deficit spending.. .put an intolerable burden on the American
people. So it became necessary for women to enter the work force
not because they wanted to but because they had to. Twenty-five
million children under school age are dumped into day care centers
by their mothers. Teenagers come home and there's no one there,
so they think, "How about a little marijuana and a little sex."
When mother gets home she's tired, and squabbles with her husband.
They get divorced, the children lose their role models, there is
more rebellion in the schools and homosexuality and the children of
divorce get divorced themselves (New York Times, July 28, 1982).
In conservatives' eyes, the panacea for social problems is to force women back into
the home.
Reproductive Freedom
As George Gilder (1973) and others have pointed out, male access to selfperpetuation through reproduction is controlled by women. Women's freedom to
have children if and when they want represents not only the freedom to fit children comfortably into other aspects of their lives, and hence increase their
power, but also greatly limits male prerogative. In the past women could not,
in fact, exert as much deliberate and effective control as they do now. The
unrelenting drive by conservatives to limit women's reproductive freedom can, in
part, be understood as an attempt to limit women's power over themselves and over
men.
Although conservatives have accused the Reagan Administration of dragging
its heels on social issues, its close ties with conservative leaders Paul Laxalt,
Orrin Hatch and Jesse Helms reflect its sympathy for proposals such as a human
life amendment and the Family Protection Act. In keeping with the New Right aim
of forcing women back into the home, this legislation would restrict women's control over reproduction and restrain their participation in public life by reviving
stereotypes of masculine and feminine behavior.
The Family Protection Act (S.1378; H.R. 3955) is billed an attempt "to foster
and protect the viability of the American Family". Protecting the family, according
to the New Right, means limiting women's options. The Family Protection Act constrains women's reproductive choices by restricting sex education in the schools and
limiting teens' access to birth control. Further, in a systematic effort to restore
traditional gender roles, it removes the ability of Legal Services to handle
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divorces for its client (two thirds of whom are women), restricts federal initiative

in spouse abuse legislation, eliminates prohibitions against sex discrimination in
education, and blocks federal funds for education materials which "do not reflect a
balance between the status role of men and women, do not reflect different ways in
which women and men live and do not contribute to the American way of life as it
has been historically understood".
In seeking to legislate sex differences the Family Protection Act attempts
to insure unequal spheres for men and women with men dominating and in control
of women. Indeed, conservatives know that if stereotypical distinctions of masculinity and feminity can be maintained, men will retain their tremendous power
advantages. As long as men define themselves as masculine by not adopting behaviors
thought characteristic of women, and women define themselves as feminine to the
extent they do not possess behaviors believed typical of men, patriarchy will
flourish.
The attempts by the Reagan administration to limit women's economic and
reproductive freedom and to reestablish the traditional family are rather subtle
but effective efforts to reinvigorate patriarchy. Nowhere in the rhetoric of the
Reagan Administration are women, power, or patriarchy mentioned; yet, the effects
reveal the motive. These policies and their successes demonstrate that men do not
have to rape, batter, or verbally abuse women to assert male dominance; simply advocating social policies in the name of capitalism, private enterprise, and traditional family values can serve equally well.
CONCLUSZON

Deceived by the apparent willingness of men to grant women more power and
choices in education, employment, and reproduction in the early 1970s, feminists
underestimated patriarchy's significance to the political and economic system
and how deeply it is ingrained in both women and men. As has been graphically
demonstrated, what the state gives it can also take away and with startling speed.
Lacking a firm political and economic base of power, women have had to rely on
information and persuasion to defend their gains. Abandoning this unsatisfactory
strategy, women are now looking to exercise their power of numbers, to increase
their representation in government, and to take revenge on their political opponents.
If there is anything to be learned from men, it is that to use power is to
gain it. Feminist organizations and women's groups must confront issues of vital
importance to all women such as day care, women's health, reproductive freedom,
parental leave and equal wages on all appropriate fronts. As has been shown, women
cannot rely only on laws and goverment but must exercise their power of numbers
and enforce their legal rights in order to gain more favorable educational and
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employment conditions, the necessary services to enable them to combine employment
and family, and more reliable means of reproductive control.
Women must also exercise their power in personal interactions and reject stereotypical feminine behavior, refuse to validate men's "masculinity" in traditional
ways, and support those whose behavior breaks the bonds of dualistic gender roles,
often at great personal cost. Feminists have learned that they cannot press women's
concerns in isolation from one another and that they need the validation and support
of their sisters in what appears to be a bitter fight (Eisenstein, 1982; Gordon and
Hunter, 1977-78; MacKinnon, 1982). They must also learn not to underestimate the
resistance to women's gains and the pcwer of patriarchy.
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WORKING WOMEN'S MARGINALIZATION IN DENMARK:
TRADITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
SOCIAL AND LABOR MARKET POLICIES*
Jennifer G. Schirmer
Center for European Studies
Harvard University

ABSTRACT
Although it cannot be said that women's marginality in the labor market in Denmark
from the 1960s to the present was 'planned' in any formal sense, the premise
behind social and labor market policy measures, such as daycare and maternity
leave, that women primarily serve as part-time service workers to increase
economic growth, indicates a form of assumed and prescribed secondariness for
women. By engaging the market and the family on strictly traditional terms, the
social policy and labor market measures enacted to encourage women's entrance into
the labor force in the late 1960s serve to institutionalize women's marginality
within the Danish welfare state and labor market. The irony is that women now
consider themselves primarily as workers and are organizing to overcome this structured impediment.

Social policy measures of any country are based on beliefs and assumptions
about social relations between genders, the family and household, and their
connections to the labor market. Additionally, these measures are often presented
as rather neutral post hoc achievements built on economic development. Notwithstanding, any unequal consequences of social policy measures cannot be understood
unless both the underlying assumptions of gender--established over many decades
and remaining implicit--and the ability
to achieve economic progress with the
aid of social policy--as both a progressive and disciplinary instrument--are
examined and made explicit.
It is this close interconnectedness of social and labor market policy and
the persistent assumptions of gender roles in the face of major economic, social
and demographic changes which can be illustrated by looking at the central role
social policy played in bringing cheaper, marginal, part-time female workers
into the labor market of the Danish welfare state in the late 1960s. By the mid1970s and into the 1980s, these women workers, consistently denied better wages
and positions, had come to constitute a central part of the economic planning
commissions's strategy to increase the GNP. I shall argue that although there is
*I would like to thank Lars Nrby Johansen and Finn Valentin for their
valuable comments.
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no formal planning per se, by engaging the market and the family on strictly
traditional terms, these social and labor market policies serve to institutionalize
women's marginality within the labor market and provide the state with cheap,
flexible labor. With social policy measures a means by which the state regulates
and directs the nature and length of women's participation in the labor market,
women are not only held in reserve during economic crises but they are also
1
channeled into marginal sectors of the economy during all phases of the economy.
The General State of the Economy in Denmark
Between 1958 and 1973-74, as in all Western economies, there was rapid and
sustained economic growth, high employment levels and relative price stability
in Denmark. With the formation of the Common Market and the free trade zone,
Denmark was able to finance the balance of payment deficit and become part of the
international market.
Agriculture was overshadowed by specialized export-oriented
businesses, small-crafts firms and service industries (Hansen, 1974:149, 171-5).
The major structural change in the Danish economy at this time, however,
was the expansion of the state:
in 1960, it controlled 25 percent of the national
income; by 1972, it ruled with 50 percent. There was an explosive growth in the
social, health and education sectors, with the social sector alone making up
41 percent of the state budget in 1973-74 (Arentoft et al., 1977:44-5). By 1972,
the state was the largest employer with 540,000 or 24 percent of the total labor
force, against industry's 300,000 workers (Hansen, 1974:176).
With the unexpected economic setback of the 1973-74 oil embargo, felt in
all Western industrial economies, direct expression of the crisis came with high
unemployment, the undermining of real wages with inflation, increased taxes and
value-added tax (VAT),
and the intervention of the state in the 1975 and 1977
labor negotiations involving work stoppages (Borchorst et al., 1977:21).
Additionally, the economic difficulties and assumptions of gender roles
were reflected in women's higher unemployment rates and in the increasing
transfer of reproductive services such as daycare from public to private settings.
Social policy thus became a more obvious means by which to stabilize the economy
and direct the labor force.
As the crisis first developed in the building and construction sector and
then spread to low-paid, work-intensive industries, such as textile, clothing and
furniture in 1974-75 (Arentoft et al., 1977:61-62), men's unemployment rate remained higher than women's until 1977 when this was reversed.
(See Tables A and B.)
Women in the Workforce
With the expansion of small firms and the public sector, employers,
including the state, were faced with an immediate labor shortage in the mid-1960s,
and were forced to view the utilization of women as the best solution to their
problems.
iThis work is based on 18 months of anthropological fieldwork in Copenhagen
between 1976-78, funded by the Danish Marshall Fund. An exemplary sample of 100
working women in both the public and private sector was selected.
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Table A
Registered Unemployed as Percentage of Total Workforce by Gender 1973-1980
Men
Women
0.5
1.1
1973
1974
2.5
0.5
3.9
5.8
1975

1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

5.5

(Tilrsoversigt, Danmarks Statistik 1981:82)

Table B

Women's Workforce Participation and Unemployment Rates 1960 and 1973-1979
Women as Percent of
Women as Percent of
Total Workforce
Total Unemployed
1960
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

30.8
40.6
40.9
41.1
41.5
42.2
43.0
43.7

24.4
28.7
32.0
38.0
44.9
48.2
52.3

(Borchorst 1981:57)

Between 1950 and 1980, the labor force of Denmark increased to 2.6 million
out of the total 5 million Danish population, with the female labor force doubling
in size from 34 percent to 43.7 percent (Foged, 1975:21; Danish Equal Status Council,
1980:19). The single largest gain among female workers was among married women
whose participation in worklife rose from 18 percent in 1960 to 61.5 percent in
1977, with over 54 percent working part-time (Nielsen, 1979:95). By 1979, 65.7
percent of married women and 54 percent of unmarried women worked in the labor
force, while men's work frequency stabilized between 79.3 and 81.4 percent
(Borchorst, 1981:7). (See Tables C and D.)
Foged argues that the dominating tendency in female labor between 1960 and
1971 was the shift of women from private reproduction to that of public reproduction. One half of the women who entered the labor force were publicly employed,
with 200,000 more women employed in 1971 than in 1960. This means that three
women were absorbed by the state for every one man (1975:21 and 29).
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Table C
Economic Activity Rates by Gender and Marital Status 1950-1979
Men
Women
Married Women
Unmarried Women

1950
1960
1970
1972
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

87
84
77
81
81
80
81
81
81.4
79.3

34
45
56.7
57.6
59.2
61.5
65
65.7

51.2
53.5
55.2
55.4
56.7
58.5
60.8
60.9

44
52
52.5
51.8
52.5
53.4
54
53.5

(Kjeikegaard, 1976:132 and 133; Tilrsoversigt, Danmarks Statistik 1981:77;
Borchorst, 1981:65 and 67)
Table D

Year

Women Working Part-Time
Total Number of
Part-Time Workers
Women Working
as Percent of
Part-Time
All Women

1967
1970
1972
1974
1976

249,100
306,700
346,700
402,697
452,870

28.9
30.8
36.3
41.1
43.1

Part-Time Workers as
Percent of all Married
Women
41.2
44.7
46.2
53.0
54.3

(Nielsen 1979:95)

Nielsen has estimated the increase in percentage differences between 'male'
and 'female' occupations between 1950 and 1975 by dividing reproduction (social
and educational sectors, business and officework, service and cleaning jobs) from
production (agriculture, manual labor and transport), with women's participation
in production decreasing from 50 percent in 1950 to 35 percent in 1975 and increasing in reproduction and service from 43 percent to 65 percent respectively
(1979:143).
(See Table E.)
Despite this increase of government bureaucracy and service jobs and the
seeming upgrading of 'female' professions into desk jobs (along with the social
democratic promises of equality for women through economic independence), the
kinds of jobs women have been offered and their placement in the labor market
follow the same, dual gender-determined labor market pattern of traditional lowwage, low-status 'female' work at the bottom of the hierarchy in both the public
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Table E
Labor Force Participation by Gender and Economic Category
Women
Men
Service and
Service and
Production
Reproduction
Production
Reproduction
1950
1960
1975

58%
39%
35%

43%
62%
65%

85%
75%
66%

15%
25%
34%

(Nielsen 1979:143)

and private spheres (Danish Equal Status Council, 1980:13). Women workers are
concentrated in relatively few occupational fields, with 83 percent in job categories which employ between 80-90 percent women (Kjerkegaard, 1976:414; Knudsen
et al., 1977:9).
One could argue that with the increase of public reproductive work and the
retention of domestic tasks in these jobs (such as cooking, cleaning, waiting,
routinization, welfare and childcare) (cf. Wilensky, 1968), women have been transformed into an ideal labor supply for segments of the economy that demand low
labor costs, flexible schedules and part-time workers. These low-productive
and highly competitive occupational areas which often cannot afford to pay high
wages, need and, indeed, foster instability of worklife (cf. Sherman, 1972;
Bluestone, 1972).
(In fact, it is questionable which came first, the structural
demand for 'unstable labor' or women's 'instability' (cf. Lockwood, 1958).)
Indeed,
I would argue that the high demand for part-time work (in 1970, 46 percent of
married women wanted to work part-time) should be interpreted not so much as
testimony to women's 'willingness' but to their difficulties in combining work,
children and household responsibilities.
With close to 90 percent in 1979 of all
part-time workers women and 43.6 percent of all working women part-timers, and
with spouses of working women (regardless of the number of children) spending at
most one-half hour a day (versus women's two to three and a half hours a day) on
domestic responsibilities, part-time work must be seen not only in terms of
women's double burden but also women's marginality in the labor market. By
planning for increased part-time work among women (against the cries of the
Unskilled Women Workers' Union), women's marginalization in the labor market and
the traditional division of labor in the home is cemented and indeed, institutionalized (Borchorst, 1981:34-45).
For the foundation for such an economicsocial policy is women's 'willingness' to perform the double burden.
These traditional assumptions of 'female' work and the double burden are
reflected in the social and labor market policies enacted to encourage women to
enter the workforce. The Danish Economic Planning Commission Report No. I of
1968, left little doubt that married women provided a potential and more important,
a flexible, labor force:
The labor market's largest marginal group consists of married women. The
group is also one of the most flexible, such that even small changes in
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the relevant background variables give comparatively powerful results
in married women's willingness to seek and maintain employment in the
labor market (Kongstad et al., 1976:5).
These "small changes in the relevant background variables" were equal pay
measures, vocational training programs, paid maternity leave extensions, and an
increase of daycare centers--all to bring more women into the labor market. Moreover, the Labor Ministry had requested in 1964 that all institutions ease married
women's entrance into the labor market by offering part-time work. Other "incentives" offered were changes in the pension law in 1969 which attempted to allow
men to receive their widow's pension. The change in the tax law in 1972 which
allowed husband and wife to be separately taxed was of much importance as an
earning incentive, although to this day, men are allowed all other deductions,
besides personal, such as for property and capital gains (Kongstad et al., 1976:5).
The divorce law was also changed in the late 1960s with limitations placed on
alimony payments in relation to the length of marriage (i.e. ten years or longer).
This was an expression that marriage was no longer insured, life-long dependence
for women, and encouraged them to enter the labor force. As one female sociologist
at the Social Research Institute wrote:
In 1965, the Women's Commission was established. It was clear from the
then Prime Minister J.O. Krag's opening speech what the most important
goal of the efforts for equality was: Women should be working in great
numbers in the labor market so that the GNP could thereby be increased.
There was a lack of labor power and the country's only labor force reserve
was married housewives. One wert so far in one's attempt to motivate
this group to go out to work that women's desire to work part-time to
a great extent became accepted (Berlingske Tidende, November 24, 1975).
These institutional measures were thus instituted to encourage women to enter
the labor market and provide precisely the kind of labor needed for economic advance: marginal, part-time, non-unionist service work that married, middle-class,
semi-skilled women could perform--such as the 50 percent of women who entered the
public sector. Indeed, between 1970 and 1987, according to the forecasts of the
Economic Planning Commission, this new workforce would work part-time with an
increased annual rate of productivity per worker in the private sector (from 3
percent in 1950s to 4 percent in 1960s to 4.75 percent in 1970s) "as the result
of improvements in education and training" (PPI and II passim; Boserup, 1975:16-19).
It is clear that the expansion of the Danish economy between the mid-1960s and 1975
was to depend critically upon the 'willingness' of married women to combine parttime or fulltime jobs with domestic responsibilities.
These measures have meanwhile provided the state with a means by which to direct women's tie to the labor
market, especially when they have small children.

Daycare

2

Daycare is a good example of a social policy measure extended in the 1960s
to encourage women's entrance into the labor market.
Daycare is rightfully seen
2

Reform:

For an elaboration of these reforms, I refer you to my book The Limits of
Women, Capital and Welfare, Cambridge:Schenkman, 1982.
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as a necessary service to enable couples and single parents to combine both family
and work life equally. However, when an economic-social policy rests on the
assumption of a needed workforce which is 'willing' to take on the double burden
(although couched in terms of 'equality'), then these daycare centers become a
means for directing women's tie to the labor market. It releases women into the
labor market on a conditional basis by primarily serving not the interests of
children or women (although it does lessen the burden), but of capital.
The availability of daycare, for example, has to a high degree influenced
the extent of women's employment when they have small children. Despite the
tremendous increase in the number of women entering the labor force in the 1960s
and 1970s (61 percent of women between 15 and 64 with children under 7 years of
age), the expansion of daycare has not met anywhere near the need for daycare
provision. Even in Denmark, which has one of the most developed daycare systems
in Scandanavia, there were altogether 70,000 children in 1977 without needed daycare (Politiken, July 28, 1977).
A woman often must reserve a space long before
she is pregnant or quit working altogether when she has children--in spite of the
'provision' of dayeare services.
This lack of space has been magnified with cutbacks in social services, the transfer from public to private daycare, and the
increasing dependence upon part-time workers4 in Denmark since 1976.
Additionally, the price of daycare has influenced women's employment
patterns. With free daycare only provided to single parents in the low-income
brackets, the rate of payment is generally decided at the state level according
to the economic ability of parents who earn below a certain minimum. For example,
a free place in daycare is provided to those who earn under $5,000, or "almost
nobody alive", as one female daycare worker toid me. However, the costs, provision and building of daycare facilities are decided at the individual municipal
level (with state subsidies).
This means, as my research in Denmark shows, that
costs of daycare may not differ significantly among municipalities although wages
and salaries do.'
Cutbacks in personnel and closings of daycare centers in
particular neighborhoods now during the recession also reflect class differences
and influence the work frequency of women workers of different classes.
Finally, although daycare is usually presented as a positive necessity for
women to combine family and work, it can also be a Catch-22 and a tool for labor
discipline against women in times of economic recession. If a woman becomes
unemployed (which is likely now with rates among insured male workers 10 percent
and 17 percent among women in 1979, Borchorst 1981:61) 5 , she is expected to keep
31n 1982, three out of ten daycare workers, 95 percent of them women, work

part-time (Information March 5, 1982).
4

For example, in one working-class municipality where the average taxable
annual income is $10,000 and monthly rent is $350, daycare costs $58 a month,
while in an upper middle-class municipality where the annual income ranges up to
$50,000 and housing costs between $150,000 and $200,000, daycare costs $63 a month.
5Unemployment figures only include fulltime and part-time insured members of
union funds (one can belong to a union fund without joining the union) as well as
non-insured persons who register with employment offices for unemployment compensation. The unregistered unemployed--such as women who work part-time, who work
seasonally, or who are non-organized--are thus not counted as unemployed. For
example, non-organized married women who lose their jobs are counted as housewives
in labor statistics (OECD 1976:8; Knudsen 1970:73).
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her children in daycare so she can be "available for the labor market". If she
takes her children out of daycare because she can't afford it, and then can't
get them back in when she is offered a job because of lack of daycare spaces, and
must turn down the job offer, she then loses her unemployment benefits and cannot
be offered work for five weeks. If after this period she still cannot accept work
due to lack of childcare (for lack of funds), she loses her benefits for good and
is considered "unemployable" and no longer part of unemployment statistics. This
legal Catch-22 also applies if she refuses night or shiftwork because of childcare
responsibilities. However, even if she doesn't take her children from daycare (so
as not to lose her benefits), it has now become state policy to save money by
refusing childcare to the children of the unemployed after a 14-day warning. In
principle, this rule applies to both genders, but it is nearly always the women
In one
who are held responsible for children and it is they who are disciplined.
case in which a male brewery worker was denied job offers for five weeks because
of lack of childcare, his 'quarantine' was revoked and unemployment compensation
reinstated after his ombudsman estimated that lack of childcare was grounds for
refusing job offers (Information October 31, and November 8, 1977).
Some politicians (both Left and Conservative) believe the Labor Ministry's
interpretation of "to be available for the labor market" has become stricter than
the law intended and has become "a political smear campaign" against women. "As
it stands now," one female Parliament member said, "the unemployed must jump for
the jobs which in reality means it is discriminating against women. If they can't
get their children cared for, they must say no to the job offer and be quarantined.
The head of the employment agency within the Labor Ministry claims that his interpretation of the law is "simply administrative" (Information November 3 and 8,
1977).
Also, despite his acknowledgement of needed daycare for the unemployed,
the mayor of Copenhagen has stated that "it is ahe parents' own fault" if they
take children out of daycare (or have been forced to!) when the mother becomes
unemployed and later need a place again when she is offered work (Politiken
October 26, 1977).
The ideology behind the unemployment stipulation that women must keep
children in daycare which they can no longer afford without a job in order to
look for a job, imposes a form of economic and social discipline that, in the
end, makes women accept underpaid, and often part-time work in order to cope with
the double burden.
Limited daycare hours are also used as labor discipline. With most daycare
centers open during normal working hours (from about 6 or 7 am until 5:30 pm at
the latest) and not located near places of work (such as hospitals, factories or
offices where most women are employed), women are forced to rush to daycare before
work hours and often to shop during lunch breaks. As one militant assemblyline
electronics worker told me, "The union tells us women with children to tell the
employer we will come an hour later because daycare doesn't open till 6:30 am.
How in the hell can I come an hour later with unemployment as high as it is?"
women
Daycare as an economic-social policy gives the illusion of change:
are 'integrated' into the labor market and some children cared for. Yet women,
given the assumption of their 'willingness' to perform double labor, are provided
with a 'service' which not only conditionally through constraints of availability,
price and location of daycare, 'releases' them to fulfill the demand for part-time
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work, but also disciplines them by virtue of their double burden. Daycare in
this context thus becomes both a progressive and disciplinary instrument for
economic growth.
Maternity Leave
Maternity leave is another social reform extended during the 1960s to encourage more women to take outside employment. Although all working women can
demand a 14-week leave at 90 percent pay before taxes, white-collar and professional women, because of their stronger unions, also have, the option of five
months at half pay. The self-employed women and 'helping wives' in small shops
receive four weeks at 90 percent before taxes; there are no benefits for students
or apprentices. This means that women who have the most tiring jobs have only
six weeks' rest before they must return to work. It is, according to one Danish
social worker, as though these latter groups had "better health, easier births,
or children who sleep more". What is clear is that with income-related benefits
(above a certain minimum), the welfare state can be a very different experience
for working-class women than for middle-class women.
However, with employers having to pay 10 percent of the cost plus train a
substitute, some are opting either to fire or not hire many women. For example,
one woman lawyer told me, "Although the Finance Ministry official asked me in my
interview if I had children, I got the job because the other applicant was pregnant which put her out of the running immediately since it meant she'd use her
leave right away."
A woman architect also told me, "If a man is married, he is
stable; if a woman is, she is just the opposite. I was passed over for a job
because I'm 28--an age, I was told, when if a woman doesn't have children yet,
she will have them soon enough."
Even the highly trained, professional women, such as architects, veterinarians, journalists and lawyers, are either the first fired or are only offered
temporary part-time positions with low wages in order for employers to avoid
paying maternity leave. Female journalists, for example, earning 80 percent of
their male colleagues' wages, have an unemployment rate three times higher than
male journalists (14 percent versus 5 percent) (Levende Billende, 1976/1977).
As one unemployed female architect told me, "unemployment is higher for
women than men because it is women who get pregnant and employers ask at interviews 'are there children?' 'how are they cared for?' 'If your child is ill, who
will stay home?' One has to be fulltime plus overtime, although we are now only
offered part-time work. It is just plain bad working conditions we women have and
we must organize."
Maternity leave can also be used as wage discipline by preventing women
from asking for raises or promotions. One female journalist at a leading newspaper told me she was discouraged by her union representative from asking for a
raise: "He told me, 'You've had maternity leave twice now. Don't get too pushy'."
One woman head of a department in a large bank found she had been demoted in her
position by one of her ten male subordinates during her five-month leave, and was
placed in another department by herself.
Maternity leave can also be used as a form of fertility control. One law
firm was asking women to sign a promise not to have children in order for them to
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Table F
Reasons for Unemployment among Female Metalworkers of KAF Division 5
All-Male Metalworkers'
Women's Division,
Union Copenhagen Percent
Copenhagen Percent
Reasons for Firing
Unemployed
Unemployed
Illness
Lack of Work (laid-off)
Unionizing
Workplace shutdown
Rationalization
Children's Illness
Pregnancy

10
68
7
12
18
---

21
50
3
26
15

2
5

(KAF's Afdeling 5 Unders~gelse "Arbejdsl6shedens Karakter og Virkning" 1977:12)

avoid paying maternity leave. None of the women would promise. "One doesn't
even think of asking a male applicant if he will have children.
It is most often
a mutual decision, you know," a female lawyer told me angrily.
In a study by the Metal and Iron Division of the Women Workers' Union (KAE)
on their unemployment patterns, 5 percent of its workers were shown to have been
fired for pregnancy, even though employers and union leaders deny that this occurs
(1977:12). (See Table F.)
One female journalist summed it up:
"Mary employers feel (and this is very
shortsighted) that it is right that children must be born and someone must pay for
the benefits. But the women who have these children they'd rather not hire; they
say 'another employer should hire them, not me'.
Many women thus feel it is so
embarrassing (as in the past) and now are fearful to have to go and tell their
employer that they are pregnant.
It has become almost a criminal matter and the
women are blamed for getting pregnant!"
It should be noted, however, that even if some employers were open to
hiring women, the economic constraints for many small, low-capital firms (such
as law and architecture), where replacement and re-training are costly, do not
allow it. Thus, within the context of an economic-social policy which does not
fully cover the costs of reproductive labor and thus only conditionally releases
women with a double burden, maternity leave can in many ways force women into
part-time work and in times of recession be used against them through unemployment.
Conclusion
Daycare and maternity leave illustrate
the close interconnectedness of
social policies and the labor market within Denmark in the last 15 years. It is a
policy which has resulted in women being formally equal yet structurally marginal,
structurally marginal yet central in their marginality.
Women are defined as
ephemeral, short-term 'nonworkers' yet they are encouraged to enter sectors central to economic growth as permanently part-time, marginal workers who work more
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cheaply than men. The centrality of their higher labor output for needed economic
growth was planned by an economic planning commission with social policy measures
more or less consciously directing these women workers--ideologically 'suited'
(i.e., 'willing') and appropriately burdened with domestic responsibilities for
part-time work--into sectors hitherto known as marginal to production. Social
policy measures are then used to control and discipline these workers without a
direct confrontation.
Social policy measures, to be sure, have not been entirely repressive or
progressive; it is the form and context out of which such measures arise, the
structural economic conditions and assumptions of social relations upon which they
are based, that determine what is positive and negative in policies vis-a-vis
human needs. Thus, within a welfare state in which the capacity to counter the
inequities of economic advance depends upon the very strengthening of that
economy and conversely, the strengthening of that economy depends upon social
policies, the ambiguities of such measures become understandable. Reforms tied to
the requirements of capital and the 'needs' of a traditional family will inevitably
encourage women's 'marginality' and women's double labor. Within this prism of
social and labor market policy, often enshrouded in terms of equal opportunity,
lies a double impediment for women: not only are they exploited by traditional
gender roles but also their marginalization and double labor is institutionalized
in the very framework of social policies 'enacted for their own good'.
The irony is that these social policy measures have encouraged women workers 6
in Denmark to view themselves as 'workers' first, with a high tendency to unionize
and take direct actions, such as wildcat strikes. This prescribed marginality may
result in women workers developing an awareness of their centrality to economic
growth and deliberately trying to overcome this double impediment. This is when
such social and labor market policy becomes a political force.
6

1n 1973, women represented only 25 percent of all insured workers in
Denmark. By 1979, 42 percent (or scarcely 2 percent below their 43.7 percent in
the labor force) were insured.
(One can be insured, i.e., belong to a union fund,
without belonging to a union.) Women's union membership within the central
confederation of unions (LO) rose 85 percent between 1973-79, with their portion
of the membership increasing from 30 to 41 percent (Borchorst 1981:61).
One of
the reasons given for women's rising union and union fund membership is that with
their rising unemployment, they want to be able to receive unemployment benefits.
Women thereby see themselves now as a permanent part of the workforce.
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OUR OWN WORST ENEMES:

WOMEN OPPOSED TO WOMAN SUFFRAGE

Jeanne Howard
Illinois State University

ABSTRACT
Opposition by women to a movement which identifies itself as for women is not
new.
In the late 19th and early 20th century female anti-suffragists organized to
oppose "the burden of the ballot."
The writings of the "antis" (as the female anti
suffragists became known) demonstrate an allegiance to class over gender, a sense of
powerlessness beyond traditional roles and a fear of change.
Exploring this early
anti movement may give us a better understanding of the women opposed to the contemporary woman's movement.

Can any reasonable man or woman deny that there is some impelling reason for the fact that woman suffrage is the only woman's
movement that has ever been opposed by women organized for that
purpose? (Mrs. A. J. George, 1915).
A significant obstacle to the progress of the contemporary women's movement is
conservative opposition by women themselves. This opposition to a movement identifying itself as representing women serves to fundamentally discredit the claims of
those seeking reform in the name of all women.
As the quotation from Mrs. George indicates, opposition by women to a cause
which seems to benefit them is not new. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries
women also organized in opposition to the women's movement, as represented by woman
suffrage.
Then as now, opposition stemmed from three closely related perceptions:
that the rapid social change occurring in the nation was a threat to families and
to the traditional function of women; that women had more in common with, thus more
allegiance to, members of their own class than with all members of their gender; and
that women were powerless outside their own narrow sphere. Class allegiance, fear
of change and the sense of limited power are apparent in much of the anti-suffrage
literature written by women.
ANTI ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP
Organized resistance by womer to their
own enfranchisement began almost concurrently with the woman suffrage movement. The strongest opposition to the suffrage
came from the highly industrialized states experiencing a flood of immigration and
rapid urbanization. The first and most active organization was the Massachusetts
Association Opposed to the Further Extension of Suffrage to Women. Founded in 1890,
it continued its fight against sutfrage through October of 1920 when the battle was
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clearly lost. For many years it served as an unofficial national association, distributing materials, organizing chapters and cataloging arguments against women
Its newsletter The Remonstrance chronicled the efforts of the antis for
suffrage.
thirty years.
Ultimately associations were formed in twenty six states, but with varying
levels of activity. The Southern Women's Anti-Ratification League, led by a group
of wealthy and influential Southern womer, organized late in the struggle. Massachusetts and New York had the most consistently active organizations.
The National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage was formed in 1911.
It was
first headquartered in New York but was moved to Washington when the passage of a
federal amendment seemed possible. Its weekly publication, The Woman's Protest,
(which became The Woman Patriot during World War I) described the "antics" of the
suffragists, the danger of suffrage to home, family and state and inroads made on
American democracy by dangerous foreign influences from abroad.
Its masthead read
"For Home and National Defense, Against Woman Suffrage, Feminism and Socialism" (The
Woman Patriot, July 1918).
The national organization was represented at state hearings on suffrage and lobbied actively against the federal amendment. It is difficult to determine the number of women engaged in the anti movement.
The Massachusetts organization claimed a peak memberslip of 41,635. In 1919 The Woman Patriot
claimed a membership of 600,000 woman in -he national organization.
Whether membership entailed active work for the cause or merely inclusion on an anti mailing list
is not clear. While degree of involvement may not be ascertained, we can assume
that a significant number of American women were interested in the message of the
anti-suffragists.
Leadership
Women who led the anti movement were often of high social station, the wives of
wealthy businessmen or politicians, the daughters of important families.
One of the
earliest remonstrances, a petition of 1,000 names submitted to the U.S. Senate, was
organized by the wives of General Sherman and Admiral Dahlgren.
The names of the
leaders often appeared in social registers. Prominent antis were often middle-aged
women with histories of service in charity and civic reform.
An early leader of the Massachusetts organization was Mrs. J. Elliot Cabot.
She was a president of Boston's prestigious Mayflower club, chairman of the Volunteer Aid Society and one of Massachusetts' first
women overseers of the poor. She
served as president of the Massachusetts anti association in 1897 and was on the
Executive Committee until her death in 1902.
Caroline Fairfield Corbin was the president of the Illinois Association Opposed
to Woman Suffrage throughout its seventeen year existence.
She was a charter member of the Daughters of the American Revolution and traced her ancestry to passengers on the Mayflower. Her husband, Calvin R. Corbin, was an important Chicago
wholesaler.
Caroline Corbin authored num-rous tracts and pamphlets linking suffrage
to socialism and defending the importance of women in the home.
Alice Hays Wadsworth was a younger anti leader. She was president of the
national organization until the passage of the federal amendment by the U.S. Senate
caused her to resign in despair. She was the daughter of statesman John Hays and
wife of Republican senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr. of New York. While Mrs. Hays had
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particularly direct political
connections, many of her anti colleagues came from
families of wealth, influence and political
power.
The antis were not reluctant to use the resources and influence of their husbands, fathers and male friends. Several anti authors had husbands who were active
in the male anti-suffrage movement. Anti speakers and writers relied heavily on
arguments proposed by men in opposition to female suffrage.
They welcomed the
organization of male anti-suffrage leagues.
Some.anti organizations had male members and the Massachusetts organization initially had a male treasurer.
Anti publications often had male contributors and sometimes had male editors. While the
antis perceived their organizations being by and for women, they were anxious to appear united with men in the cause.
The anti movement was one of reaction, expanding and contracting as the suffrage movement did. It used public education and polite lobbying to further its
cause. At all times antis were careful to be ladylike in their requests that the
gentlemen of the legislature protect them and the nation from woman suffrage.
Early in the movement the antis submitted petitions, presented testimony to
congressional hearings (often delivered by a male representative to preserve the
dignity of the ladies), circulated newsletters and pamphlets and wrote to newspapers. As the suffragists gained momentum the antis became more visible and vocal.
They solicited membership, participated in debate, held rallies,
testified
in their
own behalf and urged conservative women to labor for the cause.
Suffragist writings portray antis as unenlightened, insensitive women of privilege or dupes of the liquor industry.
Stanton and Anthony's History of Woman Suffrage describes them as women who "have dwelt since they were born in well-feathered
nests and have never needed do anything but open their soft beaks for the choicest
little grubs to be dropped into them" (Anthony and Harper, 1902: xxv).
While early suffrage leaders noted the political efficiency of the antis, later
suffragists felt
their work was insignificant in preventing suffrage.
Carrie
Chapman Catt did recognize the importance of the antis as a symbol:
"Probably the
worst damage that the women antis did was to give unscrupulous politicians a respectable excuse for opposing suffrage, and to confuse public thinking by standing
in the lime light while the potent enemy worked in darkness"(Catt, 1923:273).
Whatever their view of anti effectiveness, the suffragists seemed unable to recognize
that the antis were capable of deep personal conviction to the anti cause based on
careful reflection on the suffrage question.
A MOVEMENT OF FEAR
The wealth of writings by women engaged in anti-suffrage work reveal that women
who resisted the "burden of the ballot" were involved in a personal battle. These
were women tenaciously clinging to traditional roles and patterns of behavior. They
viewed their functions as wives, mothers and keepers of the home as increasingly
threatened by the range of progressive movements it the turn of the century. From
their earliest
remonstrances to their
final
pleas, they defined the importance of
the traditional woman to the welfare of the state.
The earliest recorded remonstrance by a womar set the tone for anti-suffrage
arguments for the next fifty
years.
In 1871 Cathzurine Beecher (of the noted abolitionist Beecher family) stated:
"A large majorit; of American women would regard
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the gift of the ballot, not as a privilege conferred but as an act of oppression,
forcing them to assume responsibilities belonging to a man, for which they are not
and cannot be qualified; and consequently, withdrawing attention and interest from
the distinctive and more important duties of their sex" (Beecher, 1871:5).
The belief in woman's greater power in the home (and her limited power outside
Indeed, the antis often seemed to be deit) is a common theme in anti literature.
fending their critical importance to society. In Why Women Do Not Want the Ballot,
the point was often made:
"The family is the safeguard of the State, and the granting of the suffrage to women tends to weaken this mainstay of the nation by bringing
into it elements of discord and disunion" (M'Intire, 1894:6).
Such emphasis on the home and family served to validate the worth of the women
who guided them. If the nation's families were its mainstay and if only women had
the innate ability and expertise to guide them then the role of the traditional wife
and mother was an essential one. Despite their emphasis on woman's place in the
home the antis were not opposed to all progress for women. In their charitable and
philanthropic activities, their commitment to higher education and a broader career
choice for women, in their work for reform for the women and children of the slums
they were sometimes difficult to distinguish from the moderate suffragists. Most
applauded the expanding opportunities for women in society. An 1895 essay expresses
this paradoxical sentiment:
We antisuffragists yield not one iota to the prsuffragists
in our belief in woman's capacity for advancement in every
direction; in her right to receive the highest education,
to demand wages equal with men, to work as physician, lawyer,
minister, lecturer or whatever profession she chooses. We
wish no curtailment of a woman's sphere except in the direction of suffrage (Wells, 1885:2).
What was it about woman suffrage which led the antis to oppose it so vehemently
when they supported, at least tacitly, other gains? To the antis the extension of
suffrage was far more than the next logical step in the steady march of increasing
opportunities. Part of their fear undoubtedly stemmed from the contentions of the
suffragists about the far-reaching changes suffrage would ensure.
Initially suffrage had been one of many rights sought by the women's movement. It evolved to become the pre-eminent right, and was seen as a means to achieving all
others.
Thus,
suffrage was a symbol for both suffragists and antis of major change for women.
To
the antis it represented a dangerous readjustment in the relationship between the
sexes. They feared the extension of suffrage would lead to the loss of protection
and special privilege which women of their station enjoyed. Suffrage was seen as
the tip of the feminist iceberg, leading to a vastly different society from the one
traditional women knew, valued and felt comfortable in.
In late anti writings and speeches, socialism and feminism with their call for
fundamental changes in marriage and the home were commonly identified as tied to
woman suffrage.
But even in early writings the fear of a rapidly changing society
is expressed:
This woman movement is one which is uniting by cooperating
influences, all the antagonisms that are warring on the
(By this I mean) spiritualism, fr'ee love,
family state.
easy divorce, the vicious indulgences consequent on unregulated

-466-

civilization, the worldliness which tempts men and wouen to avoid
large families often by sinful methods (Beecher, 1871:3).
An 1895 essay articulates the fears of antis repeated over the next 25 years: "When
motherhood is spoken of with contempt, when a homelife is considered too dull to be
endured, when the ambition of the intellectual life becomes so warped . . . what is
to become of the future?" (Scott, 1895:4).
The self-worth of the antis was hardly enhanced by the pust by some suffraaists
for the economic independence of women.
Such comments as Carrie Chapman Catc's "I
believe the day will come when every woman who does not earn her own living will be
considered a prostitute" were a serious affront to those who gained their identity
from their unpaid labor in the home. (The Remonstrance, 1910:4).
Economic independence for women was only one of the changes called for in the
early 20th century.
The antis viewed the world outside their doors as one of confusion, near chaos.
The influx of foreigners, the growth of socialism abroad, the
clamoring of women for a change which antis so feared contributed to their sense of
confusion.
And whether suffrage was symptom or cause of this turmoil, the antis
wanted it halted. Suffrage had come to symbolize all the fears of women during a
period of change and perceived conflict in America.
This fear, untempered by any
sense of commonality with all women, or any sense of potential giin, led to organized public protest by women against their own enfranchisement,
Because suffrage
was seen as so dangerous and because the anti movement was one o:: reaction based on
fear, anti women used any and all arguments to defend their right not to vote.
Some
arguments seem to stem from deep conviction. Others seem based on expediency.
The
result was a collection of objections which never coalesced into a coherent ideology.
ARGUMENTS OF THE ANTIS
The arguments used by women antis remained remarkably consistent over the nearly 50 years of the movement. While they were modified somewhat in tone (and the
states' rights argument was added only when the Federal Amendment seemed possible)
the essence of anti statements of opposition was largely the same from Catharine
Beecher's remarks in 1870 to the last issue of The Remonstrance in 1920.
The
thousands of words of women's remonstrance can be summarized in ten arguments.
1. Men and women are ordained (by God or nature) to operate in separate
spheres, each with specialized expertise, each superior in his/her
own realm.
The attempt to enter into the sphere of men contradicts the will of God or the
increased specialization of function which is the hallmark of the higher species.
Crossing over to the opposite sphere is destructive to both. Early anti arguments
focused on divine order, i.e. that God had purposefully designated separate functions for men and women. Later arguments borrowed from science:
When there is specialization, there comes to be greate7 and greater perfection; nowhere is progress accompanied by a dilfusion of
force, but always by a concentration of effort in special directions. So, since the first development of the sex, has specialization of the male and female types gone on; men have grown more
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womanly. Are we alone of all nature to forcibly destroy the
work of untold ages? (Scott, 1895:3).
Thus by divine or natural design women were not suited to vote. Often antis did
concede some women might be suited for suffrage, but women as a whole were not. Inferior when invading the sphere of man, woman was superior in her own realm. For
while some could perform men's roles, no man could perform a woman's. Stated
Caroline Corbin:
While it may be granted that woman has the physical capabilities
to cast a ballot, man has not the physical ability to bear and
nourish children. If . . . he demands of her that she participate
in those external and general duties such as labor for the support
of the home . . . while he cannot relieve her of those most necessary offices and duties which nature demands of her, he commits
a palpable and monstrous injustice (Corbin, 1887:1,2).
2. The imposition of the ballot is burdensome and destructive.
The women who opposed suffrage felt if it were granted they could not fail to
vote. Voting meant becoming knowledgeable about a vast array of issues previously
peripheral to woments lives.
The antis claimed they would be duty bound not only to
drop their ballots in the box on election day but to become involved in government;
attend party caucuses, participate in primaries, perhaps even sit on juxies and run
for office. That such activities would impair their duty to their chileren and
charitable work was obvious to them. The Dahlgren-Sherman petition stated:
- We feel that our present duties fill in the whole measure
of our time and ability and are such that none but ourselves
can perform.
- (Suffrage) cannot be performed by us without the sacrifice of
the highest interests of our families and of society (Dahlgren
and Sherman, 1872:1).
3.
Woman suffrage would lead to the doubling of the ignorant, vicious vote.
Strong class identification and suspicion and disdain for the lower classes was
apparent in anti writing. A major contention was that woman suffrage would double
the power of the poor.
The antis had no doubt the poor would vote as a block. The
regularity of the appearance of this argument underscores the fear of the growing
masses of immigrants and their influence on American society which was prevalent in
American thought.
The antis sometimes admitted the major problem with suffrage was
that all women, not just the good and moral would be allowed to vote.
This would
require all "good" women to vote to counteract the ignorant vote. Beecher, like the
antis who followed, feared the vote of ". . . the most degraded and despised who
would like nothing more than to insult and oppose those who look down upon them with
disgust and contempt" (Beecher, 1871:10).
The antis consistently equated the poor, the black and the foreign born with
depravity and viciousness.
They felt even those women who might be suited to vote
should forego the privilege to protect society from the effect of extending the
franchise to multitudes of unfit women. An 1885 essay illustrates the canger of
extending the franchise with a personal anecdote from charity work:
I had occasion one winter to be connected with some work in tha
North End. The women were too careless and wretched in their
condition to be here described . . . many a one spoke of the time

-468-

when she could vote as the only vengeance left her to exercise
upon the wealthy classes . . .
Once let the great mass of uneducated women be added to the
great mass of uneducated men voters and the state will slowly
shake under the varying demands made upon it for bread, work,
money, leisure . . . (Wells, 1885:3).

The antis seemed largely oblivious to the plight of poor and working class
women.
They saw little
connection between their own lives and those of women with
even less power.
The president of one anti-suffrage organization wondered "
why is it that when women have so much justly to complain of, as workers outside the
home, there is so much difficulty in obtaining women helpers in the home . . .
(Corbin, 1910:2).
4. The vote has no value without the power to enforce it.
The antis were much concerned with women's physical and emotional unfitness to
vote. The essence of this particular argument was that each vote must be backed by
force. If the majority could not exert force on an unruly and ignorant minority,
social order could notprevail. Women, clearly, could not back up their votes with
force. The result? Mrs. W. Winslow Crannell left little to speculation: "To
imagine a government unbacked by the physical power to enforce its laws, is to
imagine an anomaly, or something which must of necessity develop into anarchy"
(Crannell, 1896:3). Is woman willing to do all the ballot requires? Is not the
voter really a militiaman on inactive duty? Woman must realize all her responsibility if granted suffrage. "The ballot box, cartridge box, jury box, sentry box, all
go together

. . . (Bissell, 1911:147).

The antis speculated, especially in early writings, about the possibility of a
measure supported by a majority of women voters and a minority of men. Could men be
compelled to comply, especially if this was a move toward war? The fact that such
speculation contradicted earlier claims that women would vote along class lines
rather than as a block did not seem to concern the antis.
5. Women will be corrupted by the ballot.
The antis argued that although woman was superior in her own realm this was as
much due to protection from the vicissitudes of the world outside as to her superior
moral character. Mrs. Clara Leonard feared if women were given the vote and allowed
to hold office "all the intrigue, corruption and selfishness displayed by men in
political office would also be displayed by women" (Leonard, 1884:3). Caroline
Corbin stated the case even more forcefully. Women were noble only within the
boundaries of home and family.
"Emancipated from these restraints, the intensity of
their nature often betrays them into surpassing depths of depravity" (Corbin,
1887:3).
The antis sometimes expressed the fear that the excitement, the seeming progress and challenge of the woman suffrage movement would lure women away from home
and family. A female journalist concluded "that the majority of women have hurt
themselves and hurt themselves very cruelly (in suffrage states).
By perverting
the most tender of feelings to a hard and practicable political use, they have been
less fitted to guide the children growing to manhood and womanhood in their state"
(McCracken, 1903:5). Not only were women corrupted in the political realm, but
political involvement cost them their effectiveness in child-rearing as well.
Furthermore, woman suffrage's intimate ties with socialism and free love meant
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social problems such as juvenile delinquency and illegitimacy would be on the
rise.
Despite dire warnings, the antis feared love of excitement would overcome love
of home and women would forego their divinely appointed duties with devastating consequences. As Mrs. Corbin put it, "Woe betide the land which thus offers its
political trusts as premiums for childless women!" (Corbin, 1887:5).
6. Women can and do have influence without the vote because they are free of
political affiliations and partisan commitments.
That women have more power without the vote was expressed in two ways. First,
woman's real power lay in shaping the attitudes of future citizens, "the hand that
rocks the cradle rules the world" notion. Second, women would be better received by
those in political power if their motives were above reproach. In a letter to a
Boston paper one anti stated, "The influence of women standing apart from the ballot
is immeasurable. Men look to her (knowing she has no selfish, political interests
to further) as the embodiment of all that is trueist and noblest" (M'Intire, 1W4:7).
The antis cited the great improvement in the status of women gained without the
ballot and the alleged superiority of women and child protection laws in nonsuffrage states as evidence. The best advantage of mobilization for change outside
of politics was that "the state gets all the benefits of its best women and none of
the danger of its worst" (Bissell, 1911:,147).
This method, then, more effective for women and less dangerous to society was
much preferred to the extension of suffrage. And the antis had no doubt that men
in politics would work for women's interests if only women would keep their place.
Argued the Woman's Protest in 1913, "Suffragists claim that women suffer from unjust laws. If this is so, the remedy for the woman who feels this is to point it
out, and every legislature will be ready to correct such injustice" (Bronson,
1913:151). Such naivete may reflect the antis perception of themselves as extensions of their husbands, brothers and sons. They were content in their belief that
they could influence their men whether they were in the home or in the legislature.
7. The family and not the individual is the unit of representation.
The antis viewed with deep distrust the individualism they perceived as being
promoted by suffragists.
To them the family, not the individual was the basic element of society. They believed a woman's true interests lay with her family and
did not perceive commonality with women across class. As one anti put it:
Our trouble lies in calling women a distinct class, and in regarding the question from the point of view of an individual
rather than of the whole state and nation. The men and women
of a given stratum of society form one class together; for men
and women living together, whether in tenements or palaces are
not antagonistic or even indifferent to each other's welfare . . .
The whole agitation is founded on a misapprehension of the social
unit, which is not the individual but the family" (Sedgewick,
1902:2).
In the anti view fathers, sons and husbands represented women at the ballot box
while women represented men in the schoolroom and at the hearth. Women suffrage
would be either superfluous (because women would vote exactly as their men did) or
dangerous (because if women voted differently from their men disharmony and strife
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would result).
Better for the anti woman to influence the holder of the ballot
than to vote herself.
8. The extension of suffrage may result in the loss of special protections
women enjoyed.
Subsumed in this argument are a cluster of related ideas, some of which build
on those previously stated. First, the antis contended women were adequately protected. Thanks to the solicitude of right thinking men and the force exerted by
women standing apart from politics, the position of American women was enviable.
This contention exemplifies the upper-middle class and upper-class orientation of
the antis.
Their satisfaction with their legal protections showed a vast indifference to the plight of poor and working women, even though they sometimes claimed to
represent them. In an address to the Republican National Convention a prominent
anti leader stated: "We assert that women today are so protected by laws made by
men, that they have nothing more to ask for legally" (Crannell, 1896:2). And such
protections had come without the ballot - proof that men of goodwill would protect
their women.
But men were not of such goodwill they could be expected to protect women who
left their sphere.
A second contention was that women clamoring for more power
risked losing the chivalrous attention of men.
They wondered, 'ill
man continue to
feel the same responsibility for woman's welfare when women have the ballot and can
vote for themselves?" (Chittendon, 1911:138).
A third contention was that the power gained by the ballot could not compensate
for what would be lost. The antis were fond of comparing the protections granted
women and children in suffrage and non-suffrage states. Invariably they found
evidence of poorer working conditions, fewer juvenile courts, less progressive child
labor laws, less temperance progress and fewer protections for women.
A comnon
theme in the literature was the futility of the ballot in helping the working woman.
The antis argued that vast opportunities existed for women wishing to work. Virtually every field was open to them. In many states they were granted special protections.
If there were discrepancies in the wages of man and women doing the same
work, this could be attributed to women's short time in the labor force on their way
to marriage.
When wage differences were truly discriminatory the ballot could not
be a remedy, for only the law of supply and demand could affect wages.
The ballot,
then, might not only fail to improve the wages of working women but cost them their
shorter work days, mandatory breaks and other considerations.
More feared than the losses to working women were the potential losses to nonworking women.
Author Holly Seawell outlined the privileges women stood to lose.
Without suffrage:
The wife upon her marriage does not become responsible for any
debts owed by her husband before marriage; the husband before
marrying becomes responsible for every debt owed by his wife before marriage . . .
A wife is not responsible for her husband's debts . . .
A married woman is entitled to keep her own earnings, a married
man is not . . .
The woman seeking divorce from her husband can compel him . . .
to give her alimony . . .
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She can compel her former husband to provide support for her minor
children.
A woman may have millions, yet (except in suffrage states) she owes
her husband no maintenance (Seawell, 1911:44-49).
9.
The woman suffrage movement is a minority movement. The majority of women
should not be forced to have the ballot.
Suffragist and the antis agreed the majority of American women did not actively
seek suffrage. They recognized large numbers of women were apathetic about the
issue and that some were adamantly opposed.
The suffragists felt the resistance
of other women stemmed from "the narrowness and isolation of their lives" (Anthony
and Harper, 1902:xxii).
The antis felt resistance was due to careful reflection on
the issue. As the President of the Massachusetts anti-suffrage organization stated:
The great majority of women who have thought deeply enough about
the question of enfranchising their sex see in it a menace to
society, while the great majority of those who have not thought
about it deeply are naturally opposed. Here is a danger signal
that men should not and will not ignore.
If the majority of
women demanded the ballot men would not withhold it from them,
even though they might have serious misgivings about its expediency. But when only a very small fraction of women demand
the ballot, while the great majority do not want it, the granting of the demand would be the rankest injustice (George, 1915:10).
This "forcing on the majority the whims of the minority" theme was carried over to
arguments against a federal amendment.
10. Woman suffrage is inextricably tied to revolutionary social movements and
threatens the social order.
The final anti argument is perhaps the most important. The antis attempted to
link woman suffrage with a variety of feared social movements such as socialism,
communism, free love and easy divorce. They saw in the woman suffrage movement the
symbol of a fundamental change in the relationship between men and women, and ultimately, in the entire social order. While all anti arguments were used throughout
the movement this one became the predominent one in the latter stages.
Anti references to woman suffrage as a part of socialism and feminism are almost too numerous to cite. This linkage began early and continued throughout the
movement's history.
One of the earliest and most vocal spokeswomen on suffrage and
socialism was Caroline Corbin in Illinois.
In an early Remonstrance she claimed
"the founthead of woman suffrage is the revolutionary Socialism of Europe" (Corbin,
1892:2).
In April of 1914 the magazine exhorted its readers, "If you hold your
family relations, your home, your religion as sacred and inviolate . . . then work
with all your might against the companion, the handmaiden, the forerunner of
Socialism - Woman Suffrage."
And in July of 1915 The Woman's Protest declared:
"This is the real menace of woman suffrage - its diabolical alliance with socialism
and feminism."
The success of the federal woman's suffrage amendment was a bitter blow to the
antis. Near the end The Remonstrance raised the old fears one last time:
To those antis who believe that man's first duty is to the state
woman's to the home - that the home life of a nation is the
measure of its civilization and that our great need today is for

-472-

more home life and a better home life, the tragedy of the
federal amendment is great" (Balch, 1920:6).
Although defeated on the suffrage issue some antis continued in their struggle
to protect home and family.
The Woman's Patriot published into the 1930s, battling
against child labor reform, the establishment of the Women's Bureau, and the federal
government's involvement in maternal and child health care.
Most antis, like many
suffragists returned to the good works which had always occupied them.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONTEMPORARY WOMAN'S MOVEMENT
The antis strove to protect the status quo against the forces of change which
suffrage represented.
Their remonstrance represented their sense of women's limitations, their inability
to identify with women beyond their own class, and fear of
fundamental social change. They viewed themselves as a bulwark against the flood of
dangerous movements threatening the familiar and the comfortable. These were women
who could see no personal gain in the passage of suffrage and much loss.
While today's antis are typically not women of wealth and high social standing
they are women who hold to the traditional. They are women who have responded out
of fear of change, women who perceive they have much to lose if the Equal Rights
Amendment and other goals of the woman's movement are realized. Like their predecessors they are women who fail to see commonality in women's concerns, at least as
those concerns are articulated by the current movement.
Conservatism speaks to the deep fears of many in times of rapid social change.
If women are to unite in a movement which represents all women it is essential that
the movement respect the depth of feeling of women who take comfort in traditional
roles, who fear change and who feel unprepared for a significantly changed society.
This respect is the precursor of common perception. Until it exists we will continue to have two women's movements, diametrically opposed.
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ABSTRACT
The Hyde amendment, which has been in effect since 1977, restricts federal funding of abortions for Medicaid-eligible women "except where the life of the mother would be endangered if a fetus were
carried to term."
It has virtually eliminated federally financed abortions and the undue hardships it places on poor women foreshadow
contemporary developments in abortion politics today for all women.

INTRODUCTION
In the 1973 landmark case of Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court guaranteed a woman's right to choose abortion.
But the
High Court decision left the abortion issue far from settled.
Since
that time the courts and legislatures have been engaged in countless
judicial and legislative battles between the "pro-choice" forces and
the liberal philosophy they represent on the one hand, and the antiabortion forces and New Right conservatism on the other.
The antichoice philosophy of the "right-to-life" movement has been summed up
by spokesperson Louise deVoto, who said, "in every woman there is a
force that wants to reproduce, to fulfill womanhood.
It makes it
easier if you don't have a choice."
In the Fall of 1982 the Supreme Court will hear five appeals involving laws in Missouri, Virginia, and Akron, Ohio.
It will rule on
the constitutionality of abortion restrictions ranging from parental
consent for minors to hospitalization requirements for second-trimester abortions to 24-hour waiting periods.
The 1978 "Akron Ordinance"
was designed to serve as a national model for local regulation of
abortion, and, among other things, required a physician performing an
abortion to "counsel" the patient by informing her that the procedure
"can result in severe emotional disturbances" and by telling her that
"the unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception."
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Even if these restrictions are upheld, however, none of these
cases would allow the court to overturn the 1973 Roe v. Wade
decision. A woman's right to terminate a pregnancy in the first and
second trimesters would still be guaranteed by the Constitution.
This is the fundamental premise which the anti-abortion movement
wants Congress to reconsider.
The Hatch amendment (S.J. Res. 110), sponsored by Senator Orrin
Hatch of Utah, has gotten further than any other proposed constituIt holds that "the right to
tional amendment to prohibit abortion.
abortion is not secured by this Constitution," and allows that either
a state or Congress has the right to "restrict or prohibit aborA "states rights"
the stricter law would have to be obeyed.
tions":
version of the Hatch amendment would leave the abortion question
entirely up to the states.
For many abortion foes, the Hatch amendment is unacceptable beSenator Jesse Helms' "Human Life
cause it does not go far enough.
Statute" (5. 1741) gives legal personhood status to a fetus from the
moment of conception, thereby outlawing abortion and some forms of
birth control.
The most extreme anti-abortion groups are supporting
interim step toward the ultimate goal--a
this bill as a strong
"Human Life Amendment" to the Constitution.
Senator Mark Hatfield has introduced a bill (S. 2372) which
would prohibit funding not only for abortion, but for abortion referral, training in abortion techniques, and federal insurance coverage
It also provides for direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme
for abortion.
Court from a district court ruling on any state law enacted on the
basis of this act.
He refers to this bill as providing a "fall-back
position" if the Senate fails to approve the Hatch amendment.
We already have one major piece of anti-abortion legislation,
Examining
which has been in effect since 1977--the Hyde Amendment.
its effects may be important for making political judgments about the
even more restrictive Hatch, Helms, and Hatfield proposals described
above. The amendment's author, Rep. Henry Hyde of Illinois, is also
In this paper I
the House sponsor of the Helms and Hatfield bills.
will describe the Hyde amendment and its observed and potential
effects on poor women, including illegal abortion, dangerous delays
The undue hardships
while funding is obtained, and unwanted births.
it places on poor women foreshadow the potential effects of the contemporary developments in abortion politics.
THE HYDE AMENDMENT
The Hyde amendment has been a rider to the Labor-HHS appropriaIt
tions bill since 1977, and is voted upon each year by Congress.
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primarily affects the Medicaid program (Title XIX of the Social Security Act), which uses combined state and federal funds to pay the
costs of medical care for indigent people.
The Hyde amendment
states that no federal funds shall be used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if a fetus were
carried to term.
In 1978 Congress restored federal funding of abortions "for the victims of rape or incest, when such rape or incest
has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public
health service; or in those instances where severe and long lasting
physical health damage to the mother would result if the pregnancy
were carried to term, when so determined by two physicians."
All restrictions were lifted temporarily in 1980, when a United Sates District Court ruled that to deny Medicaid funds to poor women was unconstitutional (McRae v. Harris).
The McRae suit was brought on behalf of Cora McRae, who was denied a Medicaid abortion in 1976, and
was continued as a nation-wide class-action suit on behalf of all women needing Medicaid-funded abortions.
Federal funding for abortions
resumed for seven months, until it was again restricted when the
Supreme Court, on June 30, 1980, upheld the constitutionality of the
Hyde amendment.
Currently no federal funding of legal abortion is
allowed except to save the life of the pregnant woman (Cates, 1981).
Since the Supreme Court decision went into effect in September,
1980, only nine states (Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan,
New York, North Carolina, Oregon and Washington) and the District of
Columbia iave continued to voluntarily pay for medically necessary abortions out of state and county funds in the absence of federal aid
(Jaffe, 1981); two states are currently under court order to fund Medicaid abortions.
Thirty-nine states, which performed 70 percent of
all Medicaid abortions in 1977, cut off Medicaid payments.
Eighteen
states adopted the Hyde language, and will pay only in cases of rape,
incest, or the determination of two physicians; sixteen states will
pay only in life-endangering situations.
Whatever the restricting
language used, the number of abortions paid for by Medicaid was
reduced by 99 percent following the passage of restrictive
legislation (Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1979; Jaffe, 1981).
Eighty
percent of the abortions now funded under Medicaid are to preserve
the woman's life.
Department of Health and Human Services data
indicate that if all states enact the language of the Hyde amendment,
the total number of abortions for the poor will decline by 70
percent, to less then 3,000 annually.
In fiscal year 1977, the year
before funding restrictions, one quarter of all abortions for the
poor were paid for by Medicaid (AGI, 1979; Lincoln et al., 1977).
The Hyde amendment presents women on Medicaid faced with an unwanted pregnancy with an unmet need for abortion, resulting in 1) a
return to illegal abortion, 2) dangerous delays while they obtain funding, or 3) unwanted births.
Since Medicaid does fund sterilization,
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the legislation might also affect birth control and sterilization
For example, women not eligible for Medicaid abortions
choices.
might avoid pregnancy by avoiding exposure to it through "voluntary"
That this might not otherwise have been the birth consterilization.
trol choice may in some ways constitute sterilization abuse (Handschu
et al., 1979).
Nine percent of all women in the
Who are the affected women?
United States of reproductive years are poor enough to be eligible
for Medicaid. Of these women, 57 percent are at risk of incurring an
Most of these women are young, white (52 perunintended pregnancy.
Most families
high school education.
some
only
have
and
cent),
receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid
are new to welfare, and most of the dependencies are caused by a
The families tend to be small and young (AGI, 1979).
crisis.
ILLEGAL ABORTION
Prior to its legalization woAbortion is not a new phenomenon.
men had exercised the option of terminating unwanted pregnancies at
It was esthe rate of approximately 1,000,000 per year (AGI, 1979).
timated that in New York City alone, 50,000 illegal abortions were
Studies on illegal aborperformed annually (Polgar and Fried, 1976).
tions (Bose, 1979; Cates and Rochat, 1976; Polgar and Fried, 1976) reveal that 80 percent of the women attempted to self-induce by oral ingestion, insertion of something into the uterus, or douche; only two
percent involved a physician and the remainder involved ordinary
Legalization of abortion in New York in 1970 resulted
"lay" women.
in a sharp drop in abortion-related deaths in New York compared to
states with restrictive laws, and maternal deaths declined more sharply in New York than in other states as a result of abortion legislaIn addition, the data from New York City hospitals (voluntary
tion.
and municipal) show a sharp drop in abortion-related admissions folSoon after liberalization of aborlowing legalization (AGI, 1980).
tion laws in the United States, reports of declines in newborns relinquished for adoption and rates of births to unmarried mothers occurFollowing legalization, safe and
red (Berger, 1978; AGI, 1980).
Without funding,
legal abortions replaced clandestine procedures.
women would
pregnant
poor,
more
that
risk
there is an increased
resort to these dangerous alternatives.
The consequences of a restrictive abortion law in Rumania in
1966 following many years during which abortion was legal and widely
used as the main method of birth control were studied by Teitelbaum
The most immediate re(1972), Wright (1975), and Berelson (1979).
sults were a rapid and large increase in the birth rate, and in the
rates of morbidity and mortality among women who had clandestine aborThe situation in the United States differs in that only pubtions.
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licly-funded abortions are affected, and that abortion is used here
These stuprimarily as a back-up method for contraceptive failure.
t
dies are significant in anticipating higher morbidity ra es among
these American women, due either to delay in obtaining private funding for abortion, or to delay in obtaining the determination by two
There is also
physicians of "severe and long lasting health damage."
some confusion among physicians as to what constitutes "severe" or
"long lasting."
DANGEROUS DELAYS
The literature abounds with studies indicating that for unwanted
pregnancies, abortion in the first trimester is the safest option available to women, and that denial of public monies for legal abortion will result in an excess of maternal death no matter what alternative is chosen (Petitti and Cates, 1977; Cates and Tietze, 1978;
AGI, 1980).
While Medicaid abortions account for 25 percent of all
abortions, they are associated with 35 percent of all abortion-relaRisk of death inted deaths (Bracken, 1978; Lincoln et al., 1977).
creased with gestational age, and restriction of public funds was
found to be significantly associated with a later gestational age at
Mortality in pregthe time of the abortion (DHEW, 1979; AGI, 1980).
nancy and childbirth is greater than that in legal abortion regardless of age or race, and delays in obtaining legal abortion (while
the woman attempts to raise money or to convince two doctors that she
will suffer severe and long lasting health damage) may mean exposure
to incresed risks of death associated with advancing gestational age
There is a 50-fold difference between abortions per(DHHS, 1980).
formed before nine weeks gestation and those performed at 16 weeks or
later (Berger, 1978).
Early abortion is an extremely safe medical procedure, but each
week of delay increases the risk of medical complications by 20 perFirst trimescent and the risk of death by 50 percent (AGI, 1979).
ter abortion is 12 times safer than childbirth, and if it is performed in the first eight weeks of gestation it is 25 times safer
In states where Medicaid cut(Cates, 1977; Cates and Tietze, 1978).
off has occurred, Medicaid women get abortions one to two weeks later
than affluent women, while there is no apparent change in the gestational period at which abortion is obtained in states which continue
In clinics which partially subsidized
to fund abortions (AGI, 1979).
abortions, women's own personal funds made up the difference between
the subsidy and the full cost of the procedure (Rubin, 1979).
UNWANTED BIRTHS
In
Unwanted births are another outcome of restricted abortion.
1972 there were 800,000 of these unwanted births (Schwartz, 1972).
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A study by Trussel et al. (1980) attempted to estimate the minimum
number of pregnant Medicaid-eligible women who would have obtained
abortions in the absence of the Hyde amendment and to compare this
It was determined that
figure with the actual number of recipients.
approximately 20 percent of the women who were unable to obtain
Medicaid-funded abortions carried their unwanted pregnancies to term.
A recent report from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) estimates
that five percent of the Medicaid-eligible pregnant women carried
their pregnancies to term. The estimated 9,000 women who continued
to term were primarily teenagers, probably because they were the most
likely to delay their decision until the second trimester of
pregnancy when abortion is less available and more expensive than
abortions obtained in the first trimester of pregnancy (Cates, 1981).
Unwanted children, and children born to women denied abortion
were more likely to be brought up in poverty, to be physically and emotionally abused, to suffer from malnutrition and to have their eduThey were also more likely to spend their formative
cation limited.
years without a father in the home and to show signs of emotional disturbance, learning and behavioral problems when they reached school
Babies born to teenagers (a high percenage (Dytrych et al., 1975).
tage of unwanted births) were more likely to be premature or low
Low birth weight in
birth weight than infants born to older mothers.
turn is a major cause of infant mortality and other childhood illnesThe incidence of post-partum psyses and birth defects (AGI, 1979).
chosis is much higher than that of post-abortion psychosis (Brewer,
1977).
Unwanted pregnancies tend to deepen poverty and lengthen dependancy (AGI, 1979).
FUNDING
The cost and benefits of the New York City experience indicate
that limitation of public funding for abortion leads to increased
health care costs because the alternatives of childbirth or complications from childbirth, hospitalization of low birth weight infants
and women with complications from illegal abortions, and support for
additional and larger families by AFDC and foster care may far exceed
previous expenditures for abortions (Robinson, 1974; AGI, 1980). The
actual impact of non-funding on the number of excess abortion deaths
would depend on the number of women seeking medical funds for abortion, on the proportion choosing to carry to term, on those choosing
illegal abortion, and on the delay encountered in obtaining other funAs public funds are restricding sources (Petitti and Cates, 1977).
ted, 5-90 annual excess deaths were estimated to result for women of
childbearing age in the United States, depending on what options were
The incidence of hospitalization of Medicaid-eligible women
chosen.
with abortion-related complications was greater after August, 1977
than it was in the earlier period (3. Gold et al., 1980) and the CDC,
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which monitored the effects of the cutoff, linked four deaths of
indigent women between August 1977 and February 1979 to the
unavailability of Medicaid financing (J. Gold and Cates, 1979).
Even before the funding cutoff, when the number of abortions funded under the Medicaid program had been increasing, the unmet need
for abortion services was still disproportionately high among Medicaid-eligible, poor, rural, non-white and teenage women (AGI, 1979;
The Hyde amendment has
Jaffe et al., 1981; Lincoln et al., 1977).
reversed a trend of slowly narrowing the gap between need and service
provision.
Although public attitude favors legal abortion (Granberg and
Granberg, 1980), in fiscal year 1977 one third of pregnant Medicaideligible women who desired abortions were unable to obtain them (R.
Gold, 1980).
With restrictive legislation, the unmet need of women
on welfare who want and need abortion services but who cannot get
The unhelp from federal or state government is expected to triple.
met need for publicly-funded abortion services among Medicaid-eligible women can be expected to rise from 31 percent to 79 percent,
and these women can be expected to increase their proportion of the
overall unmet need for abortion services from 23 percent to 44 percent unless they can pay for their own abortions without government
subsidy (AGI, 1979).
There was a relatively high rate of abortions among poor women
during the year before enforcement of the Hyde amendment, despite
their high level of contraceptive use. Contraceptive use increased
among women in poverty following abortion legalization, which contradicts the notion that poor women get pregnant out of wedlock in order
to receive welfare payments.
Abortion rates of poor women are higher
because they have more unwanted pregnancies (AGI, 1979).
Cates (1981) argues that the Hyde amendment has had a more profound effect on the funding source than on the number of abortions obtained by Medicaid-eligible women.
He found that 94 percent of the
180,000 Medicaid-eligible women with unwanted pregnancies obtained a
legal abortion; only five percent carried their pregnancies to term,
He
and only an estimated one percent resorted to illegal abortion.
concludes that although the Hyde amendment has been effective in nearly eliminating federally-financed abortions and in shifting the payment source for about one third of abortions from the public to the
private sector, it has had only a minor impact on the number of abortions obtained by Medicaid-eligible women who wanted to terminate
their pregnancies.
And what "private sector" means here is not the
vast assets of large corporations, but the meager resources of women
at the bottom of the economic scale.
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CONCLUSION
The major hope of the Hyde amendment's supporters was that it
would decrease abortions.
The major fear of those opposed to it was
that it would deny equal access to quality medical care for all women
regardless of socio-economic status.
If Gates is right, the effect
of this amendment has not been the intended one of decreasing abortion, but rather the unintended and unfair one of adding to the hardships of poor women.
If any of the Hatch, Helms, or Hatfield proposals succeed, we can expect to see greater economic burdens placed on
middle- and upper-class women because of illegal abortions (and travel expenses to those places where abortions are legal or available).
In addition, these women may face the prospects of dangerous delays
(while funding or illegal abortionists are sought), or of unwanted
births.
These women, who now enjoy relatively easy access to legal
abortion, would then begin to share some of the unfair burdens and
humiliations to which the Hyde amendment now subjects poor women.
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IN DEFENSE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION,
A RAPE CRISIS CENTER AS A CASE STUDY
Barbara Levy Simon
La Salle College

ABSTRACT
The prevailing wisdom of both the social science literature
and of social movement activists postulates that the institutionalization of social movements is a conservatizing tendency. "The
iron law of oligarchy," Robert Michels' concept, is invoked as the

rule of thumb for social movement transformation.
From my participant observation study of STOP, an urban

rape crisis center, I have drawn different conclusions. In that
case study, it appears that institutionalization undermines
oligarchy and conservatism, rather than contributing to them.
Employing Oberschall's resource mobilization theory of social

movement development, I suggest that institutionalization fosters

social change efforts at STOP by ensuring organizational stability
and resource availability. Second, I propose that institutionalization enables STOP to resist co-optation by providing its

participants with material, symbolic, and emotional rewards for

organizational loyalty. Finally, I conclude that at STOP institutionalization has inhibited the formation of informal elites, or
what Jo Freeman has termed the "tyranny of structurelessness."

As the New Right waxes powerful, the women's movement,
among many others, faces direct and indirect threats to its very
existence. To survive economic, political, and cultural attack,
feminism, I suggest, must become a complex of institutions with
multiple and deep roots. That long-maligned organizational form,
the institution, will yet prove to be a source of stability,
integrity, and democracy for the women's movement.
The radical wing of the United States women's movement,
since 1965, has generally focused on the negative dimensions of
institutions. For many socialist feminists and radical feminists,
institutions are suspect creations of an oppressive patriarchal
and capitalist society. The empowering and connective functions
are either overlooked or underestimated. As a consequence of this
selective perception, we have failed to explore the opportunities
for feminist expression, critique, and construction within existing
institutions. At the same time, we have, on the whole, failed to

make institutions of our own projects and networks.
Why have feminists responded in this way? One obvious
reason is that women have held little formal power historically
within the multiple institutions in which we have found ourselves.
As a result, our experience of institutions is a skewed one. The
barriers which institutions present have been much more apparent
than the potentialities which they promise. Many women infer from
their experience that most people, or at least most women, are
disempowered by institutions. Species is confused with genus.
Feminists misconstrue capitalist and patriarchal institutions as
being representative of institutions as a whole.
Another part of the explanation for the women's movement's
disregard for institutional possibilities has been its unwitting
internalization of the individualism embedded in the American ethos.
Protecting and enhancing the freedom and power of individuals has
been the central concern of most feminist organizati-on-since 1965,
with some radical feminist and socialist feminist exceptions.
Fears of collective tyranny and of the submergence of the individual
within institutions direct feminist attention to the restrictive
and inhibiting dimensions of institutionalization.
STOP, AN URBAN RAPE CRISIS CENTER
STOP is a fictitious name for an urban rape crisis center
which I have worked with and observed over an eight-year period.
During 1979 and 1980, I carried out a ten-month participant
observation study of STOP. Employing a case study approach, I
derived from this one example a set of observations concerning
the impact of institutionalization on STOP, the anti-rape
movement, and feminism in the United States. Like all case study
conclusions, my speculations require the corroboration of many
other examples before they can take on the authority of reliable
generalizations.
Pioneer Period:

1972-1974

Organized in the fall of 1972, STOP was the first U.S. rape
crisis center to provide services to rape victims "above ground"
in a city hospital. Other anti-rape groups founded in the early
years of this movement, from 1971-1973, chose to assist victims
using underground strategies which did not involve reporting rape
to the police or cooperating with the city hospital and district
attorney's office, as STOP's approach did.
STOP mushroomed quickly in size and reputation. Partly due
to the charismatic force of its founder and partly a circumstance
of its historical moment, STOP attracted more than seventy regular
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volunteers in its first year.
each with
committee
weekly in
group was
committee

Eight work committees were formed,

a cluster of subcommittees. By early 1973, a steering
of the eight committee heads was created. This met
sessions open to all members. No votes were taken as the
run by consensus. Few people other than the eight
heads spoke up in policy debates in this early period.

By August, 1974, the original core of eight leaders was
exhausted from the intensity of the demands of the first two
years. En masse, the eight left active membership at that point,
leaving a serious leadership vacuum in their wake. For seven
months, STOP struggled to find their replacements.

Agency Years:

1975-1977

A new steering committee congealed by March, 1975. These
volunteers secured STOP's first Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration grant, with which they hired a director and five
other full-time staff members. This director was a social worker with
administrative experience in mainstream social service agencies.
She quickly established systematic procedures for staff operations
and lobbied successfully for the replacement of the collectivist
steering committee with a more formally elected and representative
board of directors. The next year, in the spring of 1976, a second
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grant enabled STOP to
hire six additional staff people. At this time, more than one
hundred volunteers worked regularly with the staff in providing a
twenty-four-hour-a-day hotline, emergency room accompaniment for
rape victims, courtroom accompaniment, advocacy, and public education.
The Anti-Agency Years:

1977-1978

After two years of highly organized and director-dominated
administration, the staff mutinied and asked the director to resign.
She did so.
She was replaced by a woman with diverse experiences with radical
feminist groups and with a deep commitment to egalitarianism and direct
democracy. Unfortunately, this director did not have the administrative, supervisory, diplomatic, and fiscal skills required by someone
responsible for a staff of, by now, twelve people and coordinating
interorganizational relationships with the police department, two
hospitals, the city administration, the district attorney's office,
state legislators, federal bureaucrats, several foundations, and a
broad range of community and feminist groups. As a result, this
director was forced to resign by the volunteers who constituted the
elected board of directors.
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The Charismatic Bureaucracy:

1978-1980

Following a year of very problematic top leadership at STOP,
a director was hired who brought feminist and socialist principles,
administrative competence, and inspirational talent to the organization. Interviews with all twelve staff members and seventy-five
of the approximately one hundred active volunteers in 1979 revealed
a broad consensus that this new director stabilized, ordered, and
aroused STOP in the years between 1978 and 1980.
Her administration, indeed, constituted a "charismatization
of routine" at STOP, the inverse of the organizational process
Weber first identified,(Gerth and Mills, 1946:25 3 ) the routinization
of charisma. She appears to have maintained and expanded STOP's
daily routines and systems while concomitantly bringing magnetism,
vision, and accessibility to the organization's leadership.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION
The term, ,institutionalization," has long been a contemptible
concept to proponents of social change. The word is commonly
understood to be identical in meaning to co-optation, accommodation,
and conservatization. This is a confusion, I suggest, that is more
than a definitional error. It is an ideologic and strategic mistake,
with grave implications for the strength and stability of the women's
movement and organized Left in the United States. The institutionalization of a social movement organization should actually be considered
a necessity by advocates of basic transformation in America's economy,
political order, and social system.

Drawing from Blumer's (19692103) and Selznick's (1957:17)
ideas, I define institutionalization as the process of formalizing
a social movement organization's structure and leadership and of
solidifying participants' identification with the group. It is,
furthermore, the process by which a social movement organization
becomes a potent, visible, flexible, and durable body, a force to
be reckoned with by dominant institutions of social control and of
dissent.
My concept of institutionalization differs significantly from
that of the dominant model of organizational theory, the Weber-Michels'
model (Gerth and Mills, 1946t23-25). This model postulates that
organizations, as they age, become routinized and change in three
basic ways. They demonstrate, goal transformation in the direction
of conservatization, a growing preoccupation with organizational
maintenance at the expense of initial goals, and an increasing
concentration of power in the hands of a few (oligarchization).
For Weber and Michels, organizational structures and goals inevitably
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and linearly grow more conservative over time. Organizations become
less confrontational and more accommodating toward the prevailing
order.
Two of the three predictions of the Weber-Michels' paradigm
do not apply to the subject of my ten-month case study. Goal
transformation did not occur. The original goals - to abolish rape,
to provide services to rape victims, to transform the institutional
treatment of rape victims, and to empower women - remain central.
STOP's current literature, its budget allocations, and staff
assignments demonstrate the organization's allegiance to these goals.
Goal expansion, nonetheless,did take place. New social
change goals have been added to the organization's 1972 conceptions
of its purpose. For example, work with child sexual abuse has become
a major new dimension of the organization. This involves STOP with
intrafamilial relationships and child welfare systems,which work with
rape did not.
Goals concerning organizational maintenance have also been
added to original aims. Each year, for instance, the board of
directors and staff attempt to recruit a certain number of new volunteers
and to attract a certain level of private foundation support.
The third prediction, the Weber-Michels' prophecy concerning
oligarchization, does apply to the STOP example, yet in a much more
ambiguous fashion than their projection suggests. The organization
has increased the degree of internal democracy during its history
by formalizing procedures and processes of decision making and task
allocation and by creating additional checks and balances on staff
authority. For example, since 1978, the board of directors, made
up of volunteers elected for staggered, limited terms, makes all
budgetary decisions and reviews staff activities on a monthly basis.
Prior to 1978, paid staff had much freer rein to spend money and
decide on organizational priorities.
However, the significant expansion of the central staff
figure's responsibilites and power since 1972 does pose an ongoing
structural threat to the democratic processes of STOP. The crux
of the organization's current decision making dilemma is the
challenge of preventing oligarchical build-up without inhibiting
effective staff leadership. This challenge, I believe, is an inherent
and constant one in any social movement organization which commits
itself to democratic principles.
Influenced by my observations at STOP and by Zald and Ash's
perspective (1973:97-99) on social movement organizations' transformation, I question the Weber-Michels' assumption that institutionalization is, necessarily, a conservatizing process. At STOP, for example,
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the twelve members of the staff are each responsible to a particular
work committee of elected volunteers, in addition to being accountable
to the board of directors. These work committees conduct a formal
evaluation of the quality and direction of its staff member quarterly.
Such an evaluation process spreads the power to shape organizational
priorities to many more volunteers than in the earlier periods of
STOP's history, when either a small steering committee (1972-1974)
or paid staff (1976-1977) made crucial policy decisions.
Furthermore, I wish to extend the argument that institutionalization is not necessarily conservatizing and suggest that institutionalization is a process contributory to its resisting conservatism
and to its becoming a significant agent of fundamental social change,
provided that organizational leaders retain an egalitarian and
democratic ideology.
IN DEFENSE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Why is institutionalization crucial for a social movement
organization working to effect radical change? Indeed, are not
radicalization and institutionalization oppositional tendencies?
I define radicalization as a process of democratizing decision
making and of equalizing opportunities, wealth, power, and status
within a society or an institution. Can an institution be an arena
for democratic and egalitarian developments? Or are institutions
inherently elitist and inequitable, as the conventional wisdom of
the anti-institutional countercultures of the 1960's suggested?
An institution is a phenomenon molded by its environment,
time period in history, and its participants. There is nothing
inherent to an institution that is democratic or undemocratic,
egalitarian or inegalitarian. Radicals, liberals, and conservatives
can each build, maintain, take over, and destroy institutions. In
short, I conceive of an institution as an historically specific and
malleable cluster of values, rules, traditions, and actors, the
dynamics and structure of which may range widely on the political
spectrum. Therefore, a radical institution is not a contradiction
in terms, but one possibility, contingent upon the designs, dreams,
and actions of its participants.
The question of whether institutionalization and radicalization
are antithetical stems in part from the blurring of a Weberian
distinction that Richard Sennett (1980:20-26) has recently re-investigated, the distinction between authority and authoritarianism.
The former is leadership which a ruler derives from negotiations
with followers. The latter is leadership which a ruler presumes
without consulting the wishes of the governed. All institutions
create internal authorities. All do not, however, create internal
authoritarianism.
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For example, the four times in STOP's history (1975,1976, 1977,

and 1979) when complaints about staff usurpation of volunteer power
surfaced in the organizational newsletter or in committee proceedings,
formal inquiries were conducted by a team of staff and volunteers.
In three of the four cases, the staff person was fired and replaced
with someone more committed to democratic control of the organization.
In the fourth case, the staff person agreed to refrain from policy
making on her own.
Having suggested that institutionalization and radicalization
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, I will present my case for
institutionalization as an important condition of organizational and
societal radicalization. My argument has three parts. First,
institutionalization fosters social change by buttressing organizational
stability and resource availability
for social movement organizations.
Second, institutionalization enables STOP and feminism to resist
co-optation by providing its participants with material, symbolic,
and emotional rewards for organizational loyalty. Finally, institutionalization inhibits the formation of informal elites.
Organizational Stability and Resource Management
Bringing about basic change - in personality, in consciousness,
in relationships, in culture, in society, and in the economy is a cumulative and lengthy process. The inertial power of established
habits, customs, and attitudes ensures that social change is activity
extended over time, even though it often appears to be otherwise in
climactic periods of transformation.
To be a significant contributor to basic change, therefore,
an organization must sustain its vitality over time, through multiple
battles with prevailing institutions and ideas. Organizational
stability is a requirement for a social movement organization which
wants to make a serious dent in its surroundings. And organizational
stability hinges on the viability of an organization's leaders,
structures, ideology, membership, and resources. Institutionalization
is the process of creating stable and viable organizational patterns,
patterns needed for mounting long-term campaigns.
STOP provides examples of the interconnections among institutionalization , organizational stability, and organizational efficacy.
From 1972-1975, STOP volunteers met with local police and city officials
to urge them to transfer preliminary rape hearings from police precincts
to courtrooms. It required three years, many meetings, and continuity
on the STOP committee which works with the police to succeed in this
mission. Had STOP not had the organizational wherewithal to maintain
a stable police committee during this period, the subsequent success
in gaining permission for STOP workers to train all new police trainees
to respond to rape victims would not have occurred.
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An organization's ability to mobilize resources determines
its stability and strength. Anthony Oberschall (1973s27-29) suggests
that social conflict can be conceptualized as the clash between
discontented groups and ruling groups, each side acting as a mobilizer
of resources in pursuit of its groups' goals. The social control
activities of ruling elites are the same processes, structurally
speaking, of assembling and investing resources as those which
social movements use to overthrow the ruling elites. Both sides
compete for many of the same material and moral resources.
An organization's attempts to bring about structural change
are attempts to pool and allocate resources which formerly belonged
to the structure it is challenging. For example, press coverage
is one type of resource which peripheral groups and establishment
forces frequently battle over. STOP began to get sympathetic and
visible press coverage in 1975, only after several years of nurturing
contacts with newspaper, radio, and television reporters. An
institutionalized social movement organization, one with established
patterns of making decisions and dividing labor, is structurally
suited for the job of mobilizing such resources as press coverage,
money, commitment, skills, and vision. Had STOP not had the organizational capacity to assign the same two people to build relationships with press people over a three year period and to develop
cogent and appealing literature packets, the struggle to secure
sympathetic news coverage would have taken much longer or failed.
Success in the ongoing war between elites and the alienated falls
to that side which attracts and manages human and material assets
more skillfully. Institutions, therefore, are needed to mobilize
resources within social movements committed to moving beyond positions
of dissent to positions of power.

Oberschall (1973:162) proposes a "risk/reward ratio" for
estimating the likelihood of attracting and keeping participants
in a social movement organization. When a participant benefits
as much or more than he/she risks by taking part in the organization,
it is probable that he/she will remain active. However, if the

balance shifts, leaving the costs or dangers greater than the rewards,
the participant will disappear from organizational life. In situations
in which institutionalization results in the reduction of informal
exchange, negotiation, and recognition between line participants and
leaders, then organizational formalization threatens to undermine

organizational morale by creating emotional, physical, and procedural
distance between top and bottom levels of the group.

Yet, despite this risk, institutionalized organizations are
more able to assure participants of consistent rewards to offset the
risks they take as organizational advocates than are organizations
without routinized patterns of leadership selection, task distribution,
and policy making. STOP, with its reasonably stable funding base,
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good relations with the press, and relative longevity, offers
its staff competitive salaries and community visibility. To its
volunteers, it provides the prestige of working with a widely
respected organization and the opportunity to learn diverse skills
such as grantwriting, crisis counseling, and legal research.
Resisting Co-optation
Institutionalization is popularly assumed to be co-optation,
the process by which social movement organizations and their leaders
become neutralized as opponents through acceptance of material and
symbolic bribes from the ruling elites (see Ash,1972s23). It is
my observation that, in the case studied, the inverse is true, that
in fact institutionalization appears to be an important means of
resisting co-optation.
Perhaps the most commonly used way of co-opting a social
movement organization is to make it financially dependent on the
prevailing order. Government and corporate grants, loans, and
contracts, and private sector donations are mechanisms for both
funding and controlling a fiscally rickety organization. Financial
independence, then, is of overriding importance in maintaining the
integrity of an organization. But how, particularly in economically
hard times, can a social movement organization whiph advocates
fundamental transformation of the social order secure financial
autonomy?
Multiple-source funding is a strategy for minimizing external
control of a social movement organization and for reducing the
probabilities of co-optation. An organization which cultivates many
contributors, none of whom is allowed to give, barter, or loan enough
to become a predominant influence in the organization, can avoid
the accommodation that accompanies monetary dependence.
STOP, in 1975, went through major organizational soul-searching
concerning the advisability and morality of accepting $75,000 of
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration funds. The volunteers
and staff voted at that point in time to take the money on the condition that at least three other significant sources of funds be
obtained during the twelve subsequent months. A systematic search
for other funding resulted in the following income for fiscal 1976s
$78,000
10,000
32,000
20,000
12,000
5,000
1,030
2.so

$160,530

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
private foundation "A"
private foundation "B"
private foundation "C"
donations from individuals of $100 or less
sale of STOP literature
membership fees
speakers' fees
TOTAL INCOME (STOP Annual Report, 1976,3)
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The organization has continued this broad-based funding pattern
In 1979, the Law Enforcement Assistance

from 1976 through 1982.

Administration's funding ended.

municipal money.

It was replaced by $50,000 of

The task of creating and annually recreating funding from
multiple sources is a highly demanding one. To appeal successfully
and repeatedly to diverse contributors requires that an organization
develop a noteworthy track record, promotional literature, reports,
contract negotiations, grant applications, interorganizational
alliances, press relations, and a staff (paid or volunteer) able to
produce convinving oral and written justifications for its annual
dunning campaign.
STOP mounts its annual fundraising campaign using many tools.
It presents several years' worth of collected press clippings and
sophisticated, computerized statistics which reflect in detail the
amount of work accomplished by STOP and the number of women and
children assisted by the organization. STOP produces an annual
report, monthly newsletter, biannual report to donors, several
brochures, and a large variety of specialized literature for
victims and the public. Grant writing has become an integral part
of the staff's and volunteer leadership's work. Much outreach is
done with state, local, and federal officials; a state-wide antirape network of organizationsl community organizations; and
several professional organizations. Two staff people and six
volunteers in 1976-1980 spent no less than half their organizational
time on fund raising.
A sophisticated division of labor, administrative capacity,
and committed membership enables an organization to produce all
this work regularly. Within STOP, many parts of the organization
are put into play in the annual search for money. The health and
legal committees contribute statistics and anecdotal evidence of
the scope and nature of STOP's services to rape victims and the
city. The board of directors searches for large donors. Many
members contribute small amounts of money. The press committee
secures newspaper and radio coverage of the organization's financial
imperatives. The two chief administrators write grants and negotiate
contracts with city, state, and federal officials. And clerical
staff produce and distribute grant applications, press releases,
memos, and other communication necessary for the funding campaign.
In other words, in order to accomplish the feat of sustaining
financial autonomy through multi-based funding, STOP has to use all
its institutional capacities.
Co-optation, of course, can be secured through other than
financial means. Etzioni(1961,xvi,12) has postulated that there
are three major sources of control in the social order: physical,
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economic, and normative. Normative control is the power to
manipulate symbolic rewards such as acceptance, esteem, prestige,
and status.
A social movement organization, like all organizations, is
vulnerable to both material and symbolic co-optation. Its members
and leaders can be lured into accommodation to or even approval of
ruling elites by job offers and promotions: honorary positions, awards,
and degrees; memberships in prestigious clubs, boards, and societies;
favorable publicity; and inclusion in elite social circles.
STOP precludes such defection by employing a social movement
organization's best defense against this form of co-optation, the
creation of its own material and symbolic reward system. Materially,
STOP offers its staff salaries equivalent to those in mainstream
human service agencies. It provides members with marketable organizational and counseling skills. By now a well-known pillar of the
East Coast feminist community, STOP lends its participants significant
symbolic recognition at the local, regional, and sometimes national
level. Additionally, STOP provides its members with friendships,
intimacy, and community.
For an organization which develops a
community for itself,
with the shared relationships, history, and meanings that a community
entails, is an organization which can sustain the loyalty of its
members long after their initial excitement and interest fade. Within
such a community, an elaborate system of symbolic reward distribution
can be established. Awards, titled positions of responsibility,

and rituals of celebration publicize throughout the organization the
importance of an individual or group.
For example, STOP holds am annual awards banquet for members
and staff. It also highlights the work of individuals in feature
articles in the monthly newsletter. At every staff and volunteer
committee meeting, time is devoted to reports from anyone who is
doing work. Special attention is paid to participants' birthdays,
anniversaries, pregnancies, and graduations.
An institutionalized social movement organization, I suggest,
is better able than a less structured organization to create and
preserve community and symbolic cohesion among large numbers of people.
For institutions provide collectivities with temporal and spatial
continuity and regularity. They anchor a community, systematize its
everyday operations, and thereby free members' energies for spontaneous
and creative informal activity within the organization.
The "Tyranny of Structurelessness"
Oligarchy in women's movement organizations stems in part

from the failure of the organizations to create formal structures
for authority delegation and distribution (Freeman,1972t151-1 6 4).
Organizations which do not designate formal structures are ruled
necessarily by informal structures based on friendship networks.
For no group can remain structureless. Therefore, that group which
chooses not to authorize leaders and structure in an official manner
inevitably creates informal and covort leaders and structures.
And generally this informal leadership is drawn from friendship circles
which are exclusive.
STOP, for example, despite its formalized procedures and rules,
exhibited some tendencies toward rule by friendship cliques. In one
instance, three volunteers on the board of directors who had taken
office at the same time became close friends. They ate together
before board meetings and drank together afterwards. After joining
two of these informal gatherings, it became clear to me that much
negotiating and policy formulation took place before and after
board meetings, without the knowledge of other, newer board members.
Often, in social movement organizations, oligarchical
clusters of friends are created, whose qualifications for inclusion
in the group elite are not necessarily relevant to group purposes.
For example, a woman's sexual orientation or class background
might determine her acceptability as a friend, and consequently,
as a leader. If the group's ideology and mission demand the
participation of women of varied sexual preferences and classes,
the informal leadership that has emerged will be unrepresentative
and undemocratic. At one point in STOP's history, for example,
certain committees were composed of heterosexual women, primarily.
Others committees were predominantly lesbian. Women from both
sexual orientations complained to me in interviews of their inability
to gain respect and clout in groups in which they were sexual
minorities. They charged that though they were part of all offical
meetings and communication, they nonetheless missed out on
unofficial telephone networks, parties, and discussions.
Three conservatizing consequences flow from this "tyranny"
of informality. The leadership of the group is not accountable
to the entire group. Elevated by a subgroup within the whole,
leaders need not be responsible to the total group. The director
of STOP in 1976, for example, relied on her popularity with several
volunteers on the board of directors to gain the leeway required to
hire her friend as a staff member without advertising the position
in the manner stipulated by STOP's hiring guidelines. The director,
in this instance, was accountable only to three women on the board
who supported this act.
A second consequence of structural informality is that power
within an organization becomes inaccessible to people excluded from
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the group's informal friendship networks. This oligarchization
supplants the democratization intended by feminist principles.
At STOP, most Black volunteers reported that they did not feel
comfortable socializing with white volunteers. As a result, they
missed many social occasions at which I observed volunteers and staff
discussing issues such as the hiring of new staff, volunteer elections,
policy directions for the medical team, and interorganizational
alliances.
Finally, the absence of formal structures and leadership,
the absence of institutionalization, prevents the development of
a rational, democratic, and egalitarian division of labor. Instead
of assigning tasks by group consent on the basis of an individual's
competence, interests, and dependability, an informal elite assigns
tasks by subgroup consent on the basis of friendship bonds. That,
at times, may prove to be a rational process. Qualified people who
are also friends may well receive assignments which match their
interests and abilities. It cannot be, however, a democratic or
egaliatarian allocation process when a few carry it out without
the explicit knowledge or formal consent of the larger group.
Reviewing eight years of STOP's history revealed only a few
instances of irrational or undemocratic task assignment. On one
such occasion, a volunteer head of a work committee gave a photographic
assignment to her close friend on the committee who had recently
joined STOP and was learning photography. The committee head had
overlooked, in the process, a volunteer of four years who was a
professional photographer. This volunteer resigned from STOP over
this slight.
QUALIFICATIONS
Ideology as Safeguard
The institutionalization of social movement organizations
is a necessary but insufficient condition of organizational and
societal radicalization. Without the presence of a democratic
and egalitarian ideology, institutionalization can become the
bureaucratic horror which Max Weber and Robert Michels predicted.
In other words, the routinization of organizational structure must
not be accompanied by the routinization of goals if an organization
is to escape the rule of the "iron law of oligarchy" and goal
displacement (Michels,1949:23-25).
How does radical ideology save a social movement organization
from a conservatized fate? Ideology is, according to Killian (1973,24-5),
a systematic scheme of values, principles, and visions. Radical
ideology emphasizes democracy and equality as central values around
which to create the present and future. Feminist versions of radical
ideology place particular stress on the importance of extending
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democracy and equality into processes of everyday life and into
personal as well as occupational and public realms.
At STOP, commitment to abolishing racism within the organization
has led the group to establish a rule, since 1978, that no less
than one third of the staff positions and one third of elected
volunteer leadership posts must be held by Black members. This
policy, monitored by volunteers and staff members who sit on a
Task Force on Racism within STOP, has dramatically increased the
formal power of Blacks within the organization.
STOP's loyalty to democratic workings has encouraged it
to make all STOP's leaders, both paid and volunteer, accountable
to the entire membership. Every quarter,
each staff person
is evaluated by both the volunteer board of directors and the
committee most relevant to her work. Annually, the board and
appropriate committee vote on whether to rehire each staff person
for the following year.
Volunteer leaders, on the board of directors and committees,
are each elected for annual terms by the overall membership. Formal
debates among candidates for volunteer leadership jobs are held
at election time. A recall provision is written into STOP's
constitution, which allows for the dismissal of both the paid
director and the volunteer president of the board.
Operationally, a relatively small number of staff and
volunteers - approximately 20 women out of an active membership of
100 - makes the central policy decisions for STOP. Is this
oligarchy? Or is it representative democracy? STOP, I suggest,
is a dialectical middle ground between the two. Oligarchical

and democratic imperatives press on it from each side.

At times,

the paid staff shifts the organization away from the democratic
pole under the pressures of daily deadlines. This catalyzes
volunteer pressure to democratize STOP once again. Because of
STOP's institutionalized state, these shifts, tensions, and
struggles are primarily overt. They would likely be covert, and,

therefore, much more difficult to counterbalance in an organization
less formal in its accountability mechanisms.

Feminist ideologies in a social movement organization insist
on periodic reviews of the degree of democracy and equality present.
At STOP, as many volunteers and staff as possible go on an annual
retreat to explore such questions as: To what extent is leadership

shared and rotated?

Do all participants in organizational life

have access to policy making considerations? Are skills transmitted
by "veterans" to "rookies?" Can women without professional or
political credentials earn positions of power within the organization?
Do people within the organization treat each other with respect?
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How are minority individuals and subgroups regarded within the
organization? Each committee, the board , and the staff present
a written self-evaluation of progress made and backsliding noted
in relation to the above questions.
Systematic evaluation or "self-criticism" of attitudes and
behavior calls into question, embarrasses, and undermines oligarchical inclinations. For example, at the 1979 annual retreat, the health
committee volunteers criticised harshly the staff person responsible
to them. They presented to the whole membership multiple examples
of her unwillingness to share information they needed from her to
make policy recommendations and to evaluate her work. At first, she
accused them of meddling with her work. She later resigned from
the job.
What the presence of radical and feminist ideology serves to do
in an organization is to require the frequent re-examination of
structure, leadership, and the quality of organizational life in the
light of original group and movement values and goals. Consciousness
acts as the primary critic and conscience of institutionalized
organizations.
Rule by Experts
Another persistent danger that accompanies institutionalization
is the possibility that internal "experts" might capture and control
organizational leadership. Since it is in the nature of institutions
to create durable structures and leadership positions, the threat
that an institutionalized organization will create a core of leaders
who make careers of women's movement jobs and develop indispensable expertise is ever present. Rule by an oligarchy of homegrown experts
has an impact on the democratization of an organization that is similar
in its negativity to the consequences of rule by imported professionals,
a tack which is consciously avoided and deeply feared by most
feminist organizations.
Appointed and elected leaders at institutions like STOP
develop control over knowledge of organizational workings, control
which becomes difficult to monitor and penetrate. For example, at
STOP the co-director oversees the organization's fund raising and

budgeting processes.

Over a period of five years, she has developed

close relationships with federal, state, and local government officials
who dispense public funds. She has also built multiple contacts
with private foundation representatives. As a result, she embodies
a resource that is indispensable.
It is clear that the contributions of both internal experts
and imported professionals are significant to the success of many
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contemporary feminist organizations. It is equally clear that
rule by internal or external experts quickly rots the democratic
and egalitarian fiber of radical and feminist organizations. The
participation of experts is essentiali their hegemony is anathema
to feminist and radical principles. To fight the hegemony of
experts at STOP, all appointed or elected leaders are required to be
part of a "buddy system" of knowledge dissemination. For example,
the co-director is required to take an elected volunteer with her to
all meetings with public and private funding sources. She also
must share the content of all important fund raising phone calls and
written communication with her "buddy." Similarly, each staff
member and volunteer leader is assigned a "buddy" by the board to
share vital information and expertise with. The aim is to
minimize everyone's indispensability.
The articulateness, accumulated knowledge and skills, status,
and confidence of experts make it difficult for non-experts to
challenge an emergent or established regime of experts. Nonetheless,
that challenge is a sine qua non of the feminist ethos. So also is
the self-monitoring that feminist leaders must do as they attempt
to apply their knowledge and skills to organizational problems, while,
simultaneously, keeping their distance from dominance. At STOP,
since January, 1979, staff leaders have been meeting quarterly among
themselves to examine the degree to which they honor the democratic
and egalitarian articles of faith of feminism and of STOP. This
staff group, accoiding to five of its current members, has been useful
in identifying power monopolization problems before they become
hardened into irreversible patterns.
Alienation
The dangers which institutionalization poses include the
alienation of line workers and volunteers. Harry Braverman (19 74:39)
identifies the separation of conceptualization from implementation
in the performance of tasks as the underlying cause of alienation
from work. In many institutions, and STOP is among them, labor is
divided in a way that isolates thinking and planning from execution.
For example, STOP's board and staff do little direct service with rape
victims in the hospital, courts, or on the hotline. As organizational
leaders do less and less of it, direct service begins to be perceived
as the menial "dirty work" of the group (Hughes, 1971:313).
CONCLUSION
Institutions, as Berger and Berger have pointed out

(Berger

and Berger, 1975:10), both constrain individuals and simultaneously

connect them to universes larger than themselves. Institutions
specify and delimit the boundaries of acceptable behavior. They
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also transform the ideas and energies of individuals into traditions,
movements, and social networks. In short, institutions regulate

individuals while creating a social framework within which their words
and actions are grounded and transmitted.
Yet these institutions,which create a stable context within
which to promote social change, bring with them the triple dangers
of oligarchy, conservatism, and goal transformation. What benefits
does institutionalization offer to offset these risks? Institutions
mobilize resources. They can, by means of formalized planning
processes, explicit leadership patterns, and a community of followers,
attract and manage the human time, talent, and energy and the material
necessities crucial for survival and growth.
Because of its institutional properties, STOP, now in its
tenth year, has weathered repeated funding crises, mayoral and police
harassment, and physical dislocation.
Organizational stability has
enabled STOP to become a visible and respected advocacy and educational
force in a decade during which many grassroots organizations have
disintegrated. STOP's ongoing impact on the media's handling of
rapel on police, hospital, and legal procedures; and on public
perceptions of violence against women and children hinges upon its
durability and vitality in hard times.
Second, institutionalization replaces rule by informal cliques
with rule by elected and formally appointed leaders. Formal
leadership brings with it the potential of accountability, and,
therefore, the potential of democracy.
In contrast, informal rule
precludes accountability and ensures tyranny.
Finally, an institution is a community bound by material,
symbolic, and emotional ties. It is, as a consequence, an entity
resistant to co-optation, because it offers its adherents rewards
equal to or greater than those of the surrounding environment. An
institution like STOP has, in short, the material and normative

powers to command loyalty and to punish betrayal.
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ABSTRACT
Social organizers concerned with facilitating the reallocation of power must
not overlook psychological issues. Within groups, power hierarchies are a function
of individual methods of coping with social-emotional interactions. Clinical insights suggest that both empowered and disempowered people participate in the process of establishing and maintaining this hierarchial structure.

In her book, Powers of the Weak, Elizabeth Janeway (1980) points out that
power is a process of human interaction: it is a distribution of influence within
transactions between people that is created or supported by those persons as they
have dealings with one another. She takes care to show that persons who can be
characterized as the weak, the governed, the ruled, while in some sense powerless,
are also contributors to the power arrangements that regulate their lives, and,
insofar as they are contributors, they exercise power. She argues perceptively
that power is not an attribute of the powerful, a possession they carry, a personal
characteristic completely independent of the social interactions in which they
engage; and she points to "the sense of relationship and community which can license
the use of power and which operates to control its use." Power, she demonstrates,
"takes place between interacting members of a relationship."
Much of her book is devoted to an articulation of the actual and potential
powerfulness of the weak and the actual and potential powerlessness of those named
to the stronger power positions, the persons designated as rulers, governors, powerful and so forth. Her aim, with which we associate ourselves, is to help the weak
(for example, women) realize their potential power by recognizing, as did Richard
Emerson (1962), that "power resides implicitly in the other's dependency" and that
"balancing operations" always are alive in "power-dependence relations." The overcoming of irrational, "tyrannical" and "submissive" forms of power divisions, to
use Kaiser's terms (Fierman, 1965), is a major task, all the more important as
modern societies revert over and over again to authoritarianism in major social institutions.
In our efforts to learn why people who are oppressed resist social change, why
the weak, who should be angry with the people and systems that frustrate them, are
not angry or not appropriately angry, we have turned to the literature on "identification with the aggressor"(Fenichel, 1945; Ferenczi, 1955; Freud, 1937). In studying this literature and in figuring out the step by step process through which people
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move to become like that which dominates them or like what they are presumed to be
by those who oppose them, we have seen that there are discernable patterns of mutual
empowerment and disempowerment that take place in transactions with distinct socialemotional characteristics. In their methods for handling certain social-emotional
complexes that come to prominence in interactions (such as anxiety, anger or guilt
and self-hatred) some participants are empowered and some are disempowered.
If anxiety is the strongest social-emotional factor in a given relationship,
for instance, as when uncertainty about their common efforts spreads among the members of a group, the differing ways these members grapple with their anxiety may lead
to the empowerment of some and the disempowerment of others. It is functional for
the group to elevate to leadership in that anxious period those persons who can "own"
their anxiety, contain it and use it to mobilize themselves and others, as in alert
apprehension which enables effective action. It is disruptive to lean upon those who
are paralyzed by anxiety or who must repress it when others are ready to experience
the affect. Thus does power distribution take place, not always rationally and not
only in connection with social-emotional perplexities, but importantly influenced by
the social-emotional complexes that must be solved in the group context. We believe
we are studying an important and frequently neglected aspect of power, a necessary
supplement to a consideration of structural/material aspects of power, but not a
replacement of them.
The empowerment of some persons in the relationship entails their own efforts
toward that empowerment. On the one hand, these efforts may simply be effective
work with respect to the tasks and aims of the group such that goals are achieved
and the influence of the empowered person is recognized. Persons who manage well
their anxiety help the group move through periods of uncertainty and to goal attainment. Persons may suppress their anxiety primarily to be superior to others who are
anxious and may gather power from that maneuver.
Yet empowerment does not rest solely upon the endeavors of those who are empowered; it is also a function of those persons in the group who became disempowered.
As Janeway argues, power is relational and unfolds in interactions. Whether by a
task-centeredness that accepts the empowering person's influence, by acquiescence in
the empowering person's intimidating self-aggrandizement or by an active avoidance
of responsibility and influence, the disempowering individuals contribute to the
empowerment of others in the relationship. For example, again from Janeway (1980),
"In the power-dependence relationship, what the weak bring to the bargain is the
validation of the power of the powerful:
its legitimacy." And that is merely one
form of the contribution of the disempowered to the empowering person.
By the same logic, the disempowerment of some is both self-administered and
induced. It may be adopted for self-serving purposes such as avoidance of responsibility and risk, and thus be actively sought by persons becoming disempowered.1 Or

1.

Rather, we are simply allocating some
We are not herein "blaming the victim."
responsibility in respect to their powerlessness to the weak. Again, our purpose is to point out that the weak, through claiming their own unrecognized
potential, may become increasingly empowered.
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it may be imposed upon those disempowered by those persons acting to become empowered.
It may even be induced by demands from other members of the group who are disempowering themselves.
Disempowerment, like empowerment, is a mutual and transactional process.
A series of principles can be listed
from the viewpoint described herein. First,
the handling of social-emotional complexes in a group is a factor in power allocations.
Second, both empowerment and disempowerment are created and maintained jointly, with
contributions coming from others and with self-responsibility as well.
Sometimes it
appears that the empowered persons have all self-responsibility and no dependence, just
as it appears that the weak are all dependent and without responsibility, but that must
be taken as what it is:
appearance, persona meant to hide the other (frightening) half
of the equation. Third, those empowered do not fully "own" the allocated power, even
though it is easy to believe that they do. It is jointly maintained; it is not "an
attribute of the powerful."
Like anxiety, anger is a basic social-emotional complex that is implicated in the
allocations of power, one that inevitably comes to the forefront at certain stages of
rights movement, we can remember Malcolm X and Martin
From the civil
social struggle.
Luther King, Jr. and we can recognize the importance of the mobilization and management of anger in actions directed toward fundamental social change. Underlying their
political effectiveness, which was manifested in exceedingly different forms, the one
preaching violence and the other non-violence, was their ability to attract the anger
of oppressors as well as oppressed and to bring into transactions between them that
mutually felt rage such that the social-emotional complex of anger prevailed. Not
only was the self-destructive anger of Black people raised and redirected in the
civil rights successes; also brought into prominence was the rage and fury of the dominant forces in society. The management and shaping of those differing forms of anger
when oppressed and oppressors confronted each other represented the genius of these
leaders.
Indeed, anger raised to social engagement has been important to the women's movement, the gay liberation movement, the anti-war movement of the Vietnam era and the
glorious organizing days of the labor movement in the late 19th century and in the
1930's:
anger aroused, anger newly well-managed, anger made to serve a reallocation
of power in relationships.
The clinical materials on identification with the aggressor are helpful too in
showing how the dealing with anger serves as an empowering and disempowering process.
Inadequate handling of anger leads to identification with the aggressor on the part
of the weak. And such things as recognizing the anger, validating its appropriateness,
and forgiving one's own animosities are part of the process of recovery from the pathology that is identification with the aggressor (Eckhardt, 1968). It is not simply
anger unfulfilled that leads on to identification with the aggressor, however; it
is.
. . "helpless rage" (Berger, 1977).
Helpless rage, which is comprised of full-blown rage, and a devastating sense of
helplessness, is relatively infrequent. Flashes of anger that course through one's
being may remind one of the ineffective temper tantrums of childhood; momentary resentiaents and unrealized irritations
may also be signs of the prototypic helpless ra'e,
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hints of a mode of experiencing that is painful and unwelcome. These signals of helpless rage are common and are sufficient to cause empowering and disempowering activities to appear.
What is disempowering about helpless rage or its signals? Probably the sense
that one's anger, which at bottom is a mobilization of one's strengths is inadequate
for the realization of one's purposes in the given interactions.
It is the anger
turned into rage while purposeful intention is turned into helplessness that is a
basic recipe for giving in or justifying self-disempowerment.
There are various ways in which the anger of self-assertion and self-affirmation
may be transformed into helpless rage.
Identification with the aggressor was studied
first in connection with child abuse
(Ferenczi, 1955), the situation in which the child
is physically weaker than the abusing adult and usually emotionally dependent as well
so that rage is inevitably going to be helpless. A similar situation holds in concentration camps or prisons or other social institutions where authorities are endowed
with great power and open discretion to wield the power arbitrarily. Yet it is not
only in extreme circumstances that anger is turned into helpless rage.
In ordinary
dealings persons may be led to believe by others in their group that being openly
angry is inappropriate, is merely personal pique, or that decorum dictates that their
feelings are to be suppressed, even if they are true and relevant feelings. Persons
may be shamed into the helpless state ("you are having a problem with authority."
"You are behaving emotionally, just like a woman, not rationally like me.") or brought
into conflict with themselves so that they become confused about their primary purposes
and retreat rather than pursue matters. In brief, there are many patterns in transactions dominated by the social-emotion of anger that disempower by creating a sense
of helpless rage, from brute intimidation to hints of probable trouble.
Disempowerment represents an attempted resolution of the unpleasant social-emotional complex
that permeates the relationship.
If helpless rage is central to disempowerment, then controlled rage is the dialectical counterpart that fosters empowerment. As there are many alternative expressions of helpless rage, so there are numerous forms by means of which control is exerted over one's own or others' anger and empowerment is achieved. One person may
communicate that the anger being felt is profound but his or her self-discipline and
self-restraint are equal to it. Others in the presence of this person may be wary of
loosening the self-restraint of that person, for fear that they may flood the atmosphere and themselves in particular with the violence of that anger. They are intimidated by the person carrying anger with self-control, and participate in empowering
such a person by their wariness and their own consequent self-limitation. Another
individual may accrue power by connecting felt anger with the tasks of the group or
the rules of the system in which the relationship unfolds. By mixing together personal distemper and the authority of the group, and thereby causing others in the
relationship to be unsure whether the power mechanisms of the collective are in the
service of the confounding individual, the person acquires power.
Still a third version of controlled rage that is associated with self-aggrandizing empowerment comes from a particular character style.
Some persons find it
hard to experience their own anger directly. Because they cannot allow themselves
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t6 be flooded by feelings, they develop unconscious methods for producing those feelings in other people around them. Thus, at the first signs that anger-feelings are
imminent, they make someone around them angry while they remain unfeeling. They
"experience" their anger, as a matter of fact, but only as a perception of external
events as the anger of others in their presence, not as perception of an internal
emotional process. Since they do not show emotionality, they often rise to positions
of authority, and yet they are buffetted by emotions which are controlled--and they
not only control themselves, but others as well on the path of empowerment.
As with anxiety, so with anger, the management of a dominant social-emotional
complex may be a central ingredient in the empowering-disempowering processes of
group life. We can add to these two social-emotional complexes that of guilt/selfhatred. The abused children described by Ferenczi (1955) show clearly the disempowering side of guilt/self-hatred:
"It is difficult to imagine the behavior and emotions of children after such
violence. One would expect the first impulse to be that of reaction, hatred,
disgust and energetic refusal. . .
These children feel physically and
morally helpless, their personalities are not sufficiently consolidated in
order to be able to protest, even if only in thought, for the overpowering
force and authority of the adult makes them dumb and can rob them of their
senses. The same anxiety, however, if it reaches a certain maximum, compels
them to subordinate themselves like automata to the will of the aggressor,
to divine each of his desires and to gratify these; completely oblivious of
themselves they identify themselves with the aggressor. . . . The most important change, produced, in the mind of the child by the anxiety-fear-ridden
identification with the adult partner, is the introjection of the guilt feelings of the adult which makes hitherto harmless play appear as a punishable
offense."
Another way of stating this is that identification with the aggressor is a means
of resolving conflict between the impulses of the self and the criticism by the outside

world which this impulse generates and which is manifested in hostility between the
participants. The disempowering person tries to resolve the struggle by internalizing
the angry criticism of the empowering, stronger other. A social conflict becomes an
intrapsychic one: the disempowering person disapproves of his or her impulses, becomes
internally an aggressor against them, which is an institutionalization of guilt and of
hatred of one's impulses; but the same disempowering person also hates the internal,
controlling, suppressing force which is a proxy for the angry, empowering other person.
So self-hatred is a double-edged factor. There is hatred of self as possessor of
desires that are socially problematic; and there is hatred of one's self-denying representative of the social pressure (Freud, 1961). Again from Ferenczi(1955):
"Thus we
arrive at the assumption of a mind which consists only of the id and super-ego . . .
And we might add that the id hates the super-ego and vice versa, or the person hates
internally both in the service of the id and in the service of the super-ego. This
self-hatred fuels the disempowering process.
Yet guilt/self-hatred do not belong solely to the weak in their internalization
of the social-emotional complex of anger. The empowering persons push their empowering process through control of their anger, but they come to merge and confound the
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demands of the group or the system with their own needs in the process of managing
that anger. Thus, whereas the weak install the anger first in superego territory,
the strong try to divest themselves of their own particular needs by merging with
collective functions. When the powerless feel guilt, it is about violating standards
set by authority and convention; when the powerful feel guilt, it is more an ontological guilt, a sacrifice of their own, unique, individual impulses and need patterns. By molding anger (and in controlling other participants), they violate their
autonomous desires, their id. The trade-off is Faust's, for worldly power the soul
is given over. Self-hatred is also double-edged for the powerful and it is fuel for
the incessant need for additional affirmation that continues the empowering process.
The weak and the powerful recognize each other and collude because they are
managing the same social-emotions, the social-emotions that characterize transactions
between them. They become all the more fused as the power differences between them
increase, as the disempowering and empowering aspects of interaction become more prominent and the achievements of the group fade into secondary importance. That is, when
the relationship of the powerful and the weak becomes more significant than the purposes that determine their being together, the powerful and the weak become fused with
each other and cannot proceed without the support to the patterns each has adopted
that the others render.
This understanding of the place of social-emotional complexes in the empoweringdisempowering process carries implications for those of us active in social struggle.
Although most political and community organizers are aware that the mobilization of
anger among the oppressed, and the redirection of that anger once it is aroused, represent vital factors in the organizing activity, few have gone far in their thinking
beyond this simple awareness. We know of no theory concerned with organizing for
collective action that takes into account the subtle empowering-disempowering developments that we have been describing. Failure to integrate these insights limits the
effectiveness and long-term possibilities for social struggle.
Indeed, much resistance to collective struggle may stem from first becoming socially active and then
having had bad experiences that resulted from unsophisticated treatment of socialemotional complexes that arose in the struggles undertaken.
For example, there is need to consider the fact that the many people who are
oppressed have real grounds for being angry, but they are also predisposed by experience to know their anger as helpless rage. Too often, when their anger has surfaced, it has lead to a new sense of powerlessness and defeat, and thus to new motives
for avoiding feeling actively angry. It is incumbent upon any socially activist group
to prevent anger that is aroused from running this course. That is, the revival of
anger and its renewed dissipation in helpless rage is a further contribution to disempowerment and discouragement. A first lesson, then, is that the anger of the oppressed is not to be toyed with.
A second lesson comes from the realization that for a reallocation of power by
means of the social-emotional complex of anger, the rage of the weak and also that of
the powerful must be brought into play in transactions between them. The true recovery for their capacities for anger depends upon the revival in all participants of
the social-emotional complex. The transforming element, beneficial to the powerful
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as well as to the weak, amounts to the establishment of new ways to manage anger in
the group, ways that empower appropriately and equitably all participants in the
transactions.
A key insight here is that the reallocation of power in transactions between
the ruled and the rulers is both a disempowerment and an empowerment of the rulers;
it is not simply a taking from the powerful and giving to the weak. The power of
the rulers is a mixture of presumed personal superiority on the one hand, and capacity
and position to implement group gQals, on the other. The controlled rage of the powerful has the paradoxical effect of empowering the individual in the group while
divesting that same individual of possibilities for self-realization derived from
needs not authorized by the system. That is, control of one's own anger is costly
as well as empowering to the person. Among other things, this very self-control
leads to the delusion of personal superiority (Ansbacher and Ansbacher, 1956) and all
the personally negative things this means. When transactions between the weak and
the powerful lead to reallocations of power, the ability of the powerful to help
realize group goals is kept intact and so true power is realized. At the same time,
the individual is relieved of excessive self-control, loses the drive for personal
superiority, and can be himself or herself more fully and with greater personal satisfaction.
A third lesson from this analysis of the social-emotional keys to the division
of power is that anger is not easily mobilized, whether we refer to the anger of the
oppressed, the anger of the oppressors, -r to the more difficult situation of the
anger of the oppressed and oppressors engaged in transactions.
It is hard to bring
out anger in other than extreme crises. Why? Because people have expended great
energy in containing rage that has threatened to destroy them or others. That anger
has been contained by being internalized, by being turned against the self. The
psyches of oppressed and oppressors alike are confounded by the guilt and self-hatred
that are the expressions of the internalized anger. Consequently, alleviation of
guilt and self-hatred is essential to successful political and community organizing.
Guilt and self-hatred must be dealt with before anger can be productively and readily
released into transactions.
It is common clinical knowledge, for example, that women who are abused feel
guilty and worthless and cannot express or maintain their anger towards their abusers
until they can forgive themselves and even their abusers. This is the specific clinical instance that informs social action. People must be enabled to "own" their guilt
and their self-hatred, to recognize its existence and accept its control in their
lives. Only then can they forgive themselves and allow pure anger to flow into the
empowering-disempowering transactions.
Too often organizers ignore the guilt and self-hatred and try immediately to
organize and direct anger towards an enemy. For the oppressed, it is the evil oppressors who are the enemy; and for the rulers it is the wicked, lazy, inferior ruled. The
development of what can be recognized as a paranoid perspective ignores the contributions each makes to the situation of its enemy, but more importantly, perhaps, avoids
the guilt and self-hatred that all participants carry. When all persons have this
guilt and self-hatred, they appropriately distrust organizers who ignore these, and
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they resist entering into collective actions fostered by such organizers. When, for
a brief period, the women's movement made all men enemies and all women sisters, it
was found that too many women resisted such organizing efforts. Feminist leaders
(Yates, 1975) then began to discover the enemy within themselves too, to acknowledge
that the relations between women and men are determined by both sides, and they began
to attend to the guilt and self-hatred experienced by most women. Their organizing
could then proceed on a new level because it could reach the more oppressed women
who had internalized their anger and felt much guilt and self-hatred.
A final lesson, one that guides our work as well as flows from it, is that activists must pay considerably more attention to the social-emotional factors in transactions meant to transform social relations and social structures. Not only achieved
power is relational; so too are the empowering and disempowering processes. There
exist important psychological issues in social struggle.
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ERODING FILIAL PIETY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE

Pei N. Chen, M.S.W.; M.P.A., D.S.W..
Private Practitioner

ABSTRACT

A pilot study was conducted in the Asian American
communities on practitioners' assessment of the effects
of compliance/non-compliance with the value of filial
piety and its impact on Asian American adult children,
aged parents and practitioners themselves.
Eighty-two practitioners in six cities returned
mailed questionnaires.
Since filial piety was an emotionladen topic, projective technique was used in questionnaire
design. Practitioners were asked questions regarding a
hypothetical case.
The findings demonstrated a gradual shift of filial
responsibilities to health/social service providers with
concomitant affective conflicts on the part of Asian American adult children, aged parents and practitioners themselves. With greater understanding of these conflicts, it
is hoped that filial piety and the extended family support
system will be strengthened.

INTRODUCTION
For two thousand years, the cultural value of filial
piety has guided the actions and behaviors of Asian people
in their relationships with their aging parents.
It was
the foundation of all virtues including loyalty and devotion to one's country.
The word "filial" indicates the relationships between
children and their parents and the concept of "piety"
includes: respect, honor, fidelity, devotion, dutifulness,
and sacrifice.
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The first recorded document on filial piety was in the
Classics, specifically the anonymously written, twenty-four
volume Canons of Filial Piety. Confucius and his disciples
elaborately depicted the standards of proper behavior of
children toward parents, and by extension, to all elders in
society. Confucian doctrine stipulated that "the man of
great filial piety, to the end of his life, has his desire
toward his parents."
Confucius said, "Are not filial piety
and fraternity the basis of benevolence?", "a youth should
be filial at home and fraternal when away," and "in serving
his parents, he should exert his utmost strength" (Legge,
1960).
Most Asian Americans in the United States still adhere
to this ancient value. However, changing circumstances with
changing times have led to drastic changes in the expectations, norms and attitudes regarding filial piety. Today,
some adult children feel that filial piety is both impossible and unnecessary. Some aged parents no longer expect
fulfillment of filial responsibilities from their children.
Health and social service practitioners are often
caught in a dilemma of choosing between strengthening or
weakening this cultural value in their attempt to deliver
adequate services. Should filial responsibilities be
shifted to health/social service providers? Is it adult
children's responsibility to take care of aged parents or is
it institutions' and society's responsibility?
The focus of this paper is to examine some of the psychological conflicts within Asian American adult children,
aged parents, and practitioners who are confronted with
decisions implicit in compliance or non-compliance with the
value of filial piety.
Previous Research Studies on Filial Piety
Little has been researched in the area of filial piety.
Most literature points to studies regarding filial responsibilities.
Seelback (1977) referred filial responsibilities to the
obligations of adults to meet their parents' needs. The
findings showed gender, ethnic and class differences in
expectations for fulfillment of filial responsibilities.
Socio-economic mobility of the younger generation might
have contributed to the breakdown of ethnic traditions among
Japanese Americans (Levine, 1973).
Assimilation and acculturation of the values of the
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dominant American culture might account for the erosion of
sub-cultural values. Fong's study (1973) of the Chinese
American college students illustrated that Chinese Americans
whose families had been in the United States for two or
more generations were largely assimilated.
Sue and Sue (1971) devised three typological characters: the traditionalist adhered strongly to cultural values
of the original country, whereas the Marginal Man and the
Asian American rebelled against parental values and preferred dominant American values.
DeVos and Abbott (1966) depicted the Chinese and
Japanese Americans' respect for elders as equivalent to
respect for authority. Self blame was the usual consequence
of one's failure to live up to the elders' expectations.
Wu's study (1974) described the serious erosion of the
value of filial piety and its impact on the Mandarin speaking Chinese American kinship support system.
Similarly, Yu (1974) indicated that the definition of
filial piety had been modified and differed from the Canons
of Filial Piety in a study of Chinese high school students
in Taiwan.
Osako's study (1976) revealed that the socio-economic
status of Japanese adult children affected their relationships with their parents. Refusal of assistance to parents
occurred when it conflicted with adult children's performance in other roles.
Chen (1979) found in successive studies (1972-1976)
that lack of filial piety on the part of the Chinese American adult children was the cause of great unhappiness among
their parents who live independently in Los Angeles Chinatown hotel rooms.
RESEARCH STUDY
Research Objectives and Questions
The focus of this study was practitioners' assessment
of the effects of compliance/non-compliance with the value
of filial piety and its impact on adult children and aged
parents (clientele) as well as on themselves.
Specifically, the study aimed to determine 1)
extent of the psychological conflicts within adult
2) the
aged parents and practitioners themselves;
of alternatives available in regard to problematic
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the
children,
types
families

with aged parents; 3) the role of practitioners in strengthening or weakening the value of filial piety.
Four research questions were posed:
1. Should Asian American adult children comply/not comply
with the value of filial piety?
2. What are the psychological or affective consequences of
compliance/non-compliance on adult children and aged
parents?

3. In attempting to deliver comprehensive health/social
services, have practitioners weakened or strengthened
the value of filial piety?
4. Are filial responsibilities being shifted to health/
social service providers?
Methodology
The research design was a survey of a cross section of
health and social service practitioners in the Asian American communities. Six cities: New York, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Chicago, Boston and Detroit were selected
because of their high co-ncentration of Asian Americans and
health/social services. Since little was known on this
topic, an exploratory pilot study was deemed appropriate.
Over a three-months period from July to September,
1979, data were collected in several stages:
1. Compilation of an adequate listing of health/social
service providers by visiting each city, calling Asian
American organizations and United Way agencies; and by
purchasing health/social services directories and
resource handbooks.
2. Telephone contacts with each appropriate health/social
service provider to inquire about the number of practitioners working in their agencies/organizations who
served Asian American clientele, i.e. aged parents,
their adult children and other family members.
3. Mailing appropriate numbers of questionnaires to each
health/social service provider to be distributed to
each practitioner.
Of a total of 150 mailed questionnaires, 82 were
returned (48 Chinese Americans, 8 Japanese Americans,
7 Filipino Americans, 4 Korean Americans, 5 Caucasians,
10 Vietnamese or Cambodian Americans and all others).
S* 3 A

Due to manpower and cost constraints, there were no telephone follow-ups.
The questionnaire consisted of mostly open-ended
questions. Since filial piety was a highly emotive subject,
projective techniques were used in which respondents were
asked about a hypothetical case rather than about their own
life experiences.
The following hypothetical case was presented in
which respondents were asked a list of questions regarding
their assessments of clients' attitudes, behaviors, expectations, feelings and actions regarding filial piety, and
their role in contributing to the strengthening or weakening of this cultural value.
.r. C is the oldest son, 2nd generation
Chinese American, 50 years old with moderate
income. He was brought up with Chinese culture,
traditions and values such as "filial piety".
Currently, he has a full-time job. He has three
children: the oldest son, 20 years old, who goes
to college; a 17 year old daughter and another
15 year old son. His wife is not working, having
to take care of his aged mother, 72 years old,
who is getting forgetful, and has cataracts,
They all live
hypertension, and heart ailment.
together in a five bedroom house. His wife
They
feels that the aged mother is a nuisance.
have their own children to think of. Mr. C is
also feeling the financial, physical and emotional burden of having to support and take care
of his aged mother. Due to the strained relationship between his wife and his aged mother,
he is faced with the dilemma whether to send his
aged mother to a nursing home or keeping her at
home. He has approached your social agency/
organization for assistance.
Perceived Actions of Adult Child
The practitioners gave numerous actions which Mr. C,
The most frequently mentioned
the adult child should take.
was to place the mother in a nursing home and obtain employment for Mrs. C. Other courses of action included family
gatherings, independent living for mother, employment for
Mr. C's oldest son, moving to a bigger house, and parttime employment for YM. C. Respondents agreed that Mr. C
should set a good model as a pious son for the next generation in a way which did not incur sacrifice or impose
burdens on his wife.
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Treatment Plans for Adult Child
Table 1 represents the practitioners' suggested treatment plans and alternatives for the adult child, Mr. c.

TABLE 1
Suggested Treatment Plans and Alternatives
for the Adult Child

Frequency
Obtain financial aid for mother .................... 62

Receive family counseling .......................... 54
Find activities for mother ......................... 46
Find a homemaker .................................... 42
Visit mother regularly .............................. 41
Find elderly apartment/communal living for mother

29

Nursing home placement for mother .................. 22
Find independent living accommodation for mother .
17
Discuss feelings with everyone in the family .....
10
Ask other family members to take more responsibi-

lities ..............................................

9

Ask siblings to help mother ........................

4

Ask wife to go to work ..............................
Place mother in hospital or convalescent home ....

4
4

Social agency's responsibility to care for the aged

4

Other accommodations for mother ....................

4

Keep mother at home .................................
All others ...........................................

3
15

The majority of the practitioners (76) recommended
physical removal of the mother from the home by placing her
in either an elderly apartment building/communal setting
(29), or in an institution such as a nursing home (22), or
a separate independent living accommodation (17), or a
hospital/convalescent home (4). Other practitioners
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suggested obtaining financial aid (62), counseling services
(54), home-maker services (42), recreational/cultural
"Keeping mother at home" was
activities (46) for mother.
rarely mentioned (3) and sacrifice of the adult child, his
spouse and his children to accommodate the aged mother was
not mentioned at all.
Perceived Affective Consequences on
Adult Child and Aged Parents
Given the treatment plans which practitioners outlined,
the perceived affective consequences were both positive and
negative. Mr. C's positive affects were listed as relief
(25), and happiness (10), which included feelings of comfort, relaxation, satisfaction and contentment. Mr. C
would become less anxious, frustrated and burdened (12).
The negative affects were guilt (17), a sense of irresponsibility and desertion, or heightened anxiety and feelings
of ambivalence and confusion (13). Some respondents sensed
that r:.C would become angry at mother or self or resentful which included feelings of unhappiness, fear and dissatisfactions (6).
Similarly, the perceived affective consequences on the
aged mother were both positive and negative. The perceived
positive affects of the mother were the same as those cited
for the adult son, that is, feelings of relief (17) which
included freedom, independence, no longer a burden to adult
child and more contacts with the outside world. Practitioners generally felt that the mother would be happier and
more satisfied living away from her adult son's family (12).
Others were of the opinion, however, that the mother should
be loved and cared for at home where she would be appreciated and accepted (12).
Since the majority of the practitioners listed placements away from home, therefore, the most frequently quoted
negative affects on the part of the mother were feelings of
being rejected, forsaken, deserted, abandoned and neglected
(13). She would become angry toward her son and other
family members or self (11). She would be resentful (9),
lonely and isolated (5), depressed, disappointed and hurt
(7), or she might be shocked, confused and frustrated (5).
Guilt was also mentioned by several responsents (5) for
being a burden. Ten practitioners commented that the mother
would eventually resign herself to the situation with
understanding (10).
Role of Practitioners
The question whether practitioners had strengthened or
weakened the value of filial piety had elicited considerable
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Slightly over half
feelings of discomfort and conflicts.
of the total number of respondents (45.5%) viewed their role
as strengthening the value of filial piety. Thirteen
(16.8%) admitted that they had weakened filial piety in
their recommended treatment plans and methods of intervention, and 37.7% replied that they had neither strengthened
nor weakened it.
A few were ambivalent and defensive about
their practices and inquired, "Is it not the right way?".
Others commented that they were disappointed about the lack
of filial piety among their clientele.
Nevertheless, health
and social services were often the last resort for most
problematic Asian American families.
Practitioners' Opinions Regarding Filial Piety
The opinions of practitioners on this emotive topic
were varied.
It ranged from "lack of upbringing and teaching of filial piety" to "regarding the elderly as useless
parasites and not deserving of all the goodness children
gave them".
For the most part, however, practitioners felt
that filial piety should be kept and strengthened but
perhaps modified due to influences of a changing society
(18).
Some practitioners pointed out that there were other
ways of expressing love and respect without living together
under the same roof (9).
The traditional filial piety was
seen as obsolete.
A few explained that sacrifice was not
necessary. The adult child's responsibility was primarily
towards his own nuclear family members (5) and not the
extended family members.
Many practitioners expressed that it was necessary to
be realistic in the United States (5).
In the ancient and
traditional sense, the practitioners felt that they might
have weakened filial piety in their practices.
Nonetheless,
in their new modified definition of filial piety, they had
in fact strengthened it by helping adult children and aged
parents to choose the lesser of the two evils between
strained family relationships or independent living for
mother. Som- practitioners admitted encouraging independence in their clients and strengthening the nuclear rather
than the extended family support network. A few (5) commented that the practitioner's goal should be to blend selfreliance wit.h social services and community support. Remaining objective in the client's situation was seen as
most difficult.
The fact that clients wanted outside intervention and resources had already indicated a weakening of
filial piety and family support networks. Three practitioners related their attempts to reach some compromises
between aged parents and their adult children without
seriously weakening filial piety.
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Shifting Filial Responsibilities to
Health and Social Service Providers
Eighty percent of the practitioners disclosed that
filial responsibilities were gradually being shifted from
Asian American adult children to health and social service
providers.
Frimarily, practiReasons cited for the shift varied.
tioners argued that there was less stigma today in using
Taking care of the aged was
health/social services (13).
seen as the government's responsibility or the responsibility of health/social services rather than that of the adult
children (7).
Often, it was felt that the practitioners
Praccould do a better job than adult children could (7).
titioners verbalized that many adult children were too busy
(6) and had their own problems (10). Since more professional services were currently available to clientele (7),
coupled with changes in societal attitudes (12), and children's attitudes (10), it was natural 'or service providers
and institutions to replace and fill in the gaps left by
adult children. With more alternatives currently available
for aged parents and adult children, weakening of filial
piety was perhaps inevitable.
DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study demonstrates that eroding filial piety has
its concomitant effects on Asian American adult children,
It
aged parents and health/social services practitioners.
has induced tremendous stresses and affective conflicts.
The intensity of these stresses and conflicts may depend on
one's definition of filial piety and one's expectations of
the extent of fulfillment of filial responsibilities.
The Asian American Adult Child
If the adult child complies with filial piety norms and
attempts to fulfill filial obligations, the consequences may
be to add to the existing financial, social, physical and
emotional burden of having to support the aged parent(s)
besides spouse and children. Although sacrifice is very
rare, the extra burden itself may cause anxiety and frustration on the part of the adult child and even resentment,
leading to willful neglect and maltreatment of the parent(s).
The psychological conflicts may become intensified especially when the adult child lacks the capabilities, the
resources or the willingness to fulfill filial responsibilities. However, if the adult child does not comply with
filial piety norms and attempts to fulfill filial responsibilities, the psychological conflicts may be guilt, self-
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blame and shame, including feelings of ambivalence, confusion and anxiety.
Previous literature has disclosed that self-blame was
the result when a younger Asian American failed to live up
to the elders' expectations (DeVos and Abbott, 1966).
The
degree of guilt and self-blame may depend on the degree of
assimilation and acculturation to the American society.
Fong (1973) has postulated that the second and third generation Asian Americans have retained very little of the
cultural values of parents and are largely assimilated.
Thus, the greater the assimilation and acculturation of the
younger generations, the less adherence to the cultural
value of filial piety.
The Asian American Aged Parents
This survey illustrates that in the opinions of practitioners most Asian American aged parents still expect
filial piety to some extent. At the same time, they fear
dependency and becoming burdens to their children. These
conflictual feelings may be especially intense if they are
first generation immigrants and therefore have not yet
been assimilated and acculturated to the American society.
Based on their experi2nce with Asian American clientele, most practitioners also deduced that when the adult
child complies with filial piety norms and attempts to
fulfill filial responsibilities, the aged parent is more
likely to live with the adult child's family, obtain direct
psychological, financial and social support, and enjoy a
general sense of well-being and happiness. However, the
negative consequences may be greater hardships on the adult
child's family.
In such instances, the aged parent's feelings of guilt and fear of being a burden to the adult
child may be intensified.
On the other hand, when the adult child does not comply with filial piety norm and does not attempt to fulfill
filial responsibilities, the aged parent may feel disappointed, depressed and angry. Feelings of loneliness and
isolation may be accompanied by fear of being unwanted,
rejected and neglected by the adult child.
The American norm is that a dependent person carries
the connotation that he/she is weak. Dependency may refer
to helplessness or powerlessness in a social/personal relationship (Hill, 1970; Brody, 1974).
Dependency may also
refer to a psychological and physical need to be looked
after, controlled or nurtured.
If the aged parent is able to maintain independent
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living, he/she may enjoy greater freedom and contentment.
If he/she cannot maintain independent living, the family is
the traditional natural support system for all elderly in
all societies.
When this natural support system fails,
health/social services providers may then step in.

Health/Social Services Practitioners
Rosow (1968) believes that responsibility for aged
parents is being increasingly shifted from the adult children to the state.
Practitioners participating in this
study are sometimes caught in a dilemma of choosing between
fostering 'filial piety' by limiting health/social services
provisions or attempting to fill in the gaps Left by unfulfilled filial responsibilities.
Blenkner (1965) proposes that the ambiguity of the
adult child is partially the fault of the social service
system which has not provided the support that adult children need during the time of 'filial crisis', i.e., when
the adult child is faced with increasing dependency on him/
her by an aged parent, and a consequent change in role
which Blenkner identifies as 'filial maturity'.
Practitioners and their clientele may differ in their
views regarding filial obligat.ons toward aged parents.
Practitioners may emphasize greater independence, selfreliance in favor of the nuclear support network, whereas
clients may place greater value on mutual inter-dependence
and the extended family support network.
Since practitioners tend to be more westernized and
acculturated to the American society than do some of their
clients, the perceived course of action which the adult
child should take may differ too.
The practitioners may
encourage separate living arrangements for the aged parent
in their treatment plans.
This study has pointed out that
most practitioners felt that the definition of filial piety
should be modified to exclude sacrifice. The adult child's
prime responsibility was seen as toward the nuclear family
members and not his/her parents.
Most of the practitioners perceived their role as
having strengthened filial piety. Nevertheless, in the
course of implementing the designed treatment plans, is it
possible that practitioners could have unintentionally
weakened filial piety and the extended family ties?
By
taking over some of the filial responsibilities, is it
possible that practitioners have inadvertently discouraged
filial support by replacing it with professional services
and government support.
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One may argue as some practitioners did that they can
often do a better job than adult children can. This may be
true but at the same time, the consequences can be negative.
The aged parent may end up in a nursing home or another
type of institution. The adult child may visit occasionally. The affective consequences may lead to the
intensification of feelings of rejection and mental anguish
on the part of the aged parent and guilt and shame on the
part of the adult child.
Directions for Future Researchers
and Administrators
Should practitioners provide comprehensive health/
social services in all instances?
Should these services be
limited so that filial responsibilities can be fulfilled?
Has the existence of various alternatives led to incoherence and loosening of the Asian American families?
This research study is centered around practitioners'
perceptions, and thus the perceptions of clients (aged
parents and their adult children) are still largely unknown.
A comparative study on perceptions of both clients and
practitioners will be necessary to explore these questions.
At present, the results are too inconclusive to merit comparisons.
Future researchers may be interested in finding out
more about both
the positive and negative consequences of
the provisions of professional services.
It is important
for researchers and administrators to examine how these
services and government support may have influenced the
type of support Asian American aged parents may expect from
their adult children. Services should supplement rather
than substitute for family ties. Hence, in designing
service delivery, all efforts should be made to strengthen
the natural extended family support systems.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Filial piety is an eroding value in the Asian American
communities.
This study has demonstrated that this erosion
has affected kinship relationships, especially between aged
parents and their adult children. Decisions inherent in
compliance or non-compliance with this historically prime
value have both positive and negative consequences on the
adult children as well as their parents.
Health and social service practitioners are caught in
a dilemma of strengthening or weakening this cultural value.
This study has shown that filial responsibilities are
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gradually being -hifted fLm adult children to service
providers and tle government. With greater understanding
of these changes and conflicts, it is hoped that the negative consequences can be pr vented and the extended family
support system strengthened.
If commitmert to filial piety is strained among Asian
Americans, wherc the tradition is strongly rooted, then it
might be expectea *- be even more seriously disrupted where
the tradition is weaker. It pointF -o the need for comparative studies of Asian American and non-Asian American groups
to further understanc( the effects of this eroding cultural
value.
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THREE MODELS OF SOCIAL PLANNING FOR HUMAN SERVICES
IN ENERGY-IMPACTED COMMUNITIES
Bernie Jones, University of Denver Graduate School
of Social Work and University of Colorado at Denver,
Community Research Center, and Janet Benson Jones,
National Conference of State Legislatures.
ABSTRACT
Human service workers encounter many challenges as they face energy boom
town situations in the Western United States. Currently, they respond following one of two models, corresponding to the role reserved for human services in
the conservative laissez-faire and liberal enlightened capitalism models of
American corporate behavior.
In the first model of social planning for human services in impacted communities, human service workers react after the boom, sweeping up the human debris in the wake of laissez-faire corporate approaches to energy development.
In the second model, they participate proactively with enlightened capitalists
in planning energy projects, but do not call into question the appropriateness
of such energy projects. Both of these models accept the definition of the situation which holds that an energy supply crisis exists, thus justifying no-holdsbarred development of our natural resources
Based on the following four notions:
A redefinition of the energy crisis as not solely a supply crisis.
The potentials of solar energy and conservation or "soft path"
means of meeting our energy needs.
The devastating cost-benefit return to boom town residents, and
The likelihood of boom towns becoming rural colonies of oppressed
people.
a third model of social planning for human services in impacted communities is
proposed. Under this model, the human service worker would strive to meet basic
human service needs but also work as an enabler, organizing against hard path
and for soft path energy projects, raising consciousness, and building groups and
coalitions. Such a model has implications for human service workers' political
postures, necessary content knowledge, and awareness of extra-local political
economic phenOMIermd operating upon communities.
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The reappearance of boom towns in the inter-mountain Western United States
has triggered a massive wave of concern, research, conferences, and hectic
scrambling to respond among human service workers, public officials, and social
and behavioral scientists. The basic outlines of what constitutes an energyimpacted community have, by now, been delineated almost to the point of overkill
(e.g. Cortese and Jones, 1977; Freudenberg, 1976; Davenport and Davenport, 1980).
Moving beyond that first level of knowledge, researchers have now started to
specialize by addressing the plight of various at-risk populations, such as
women, racial/ethnic minorities, and the elderly (Moen, 1980; Robbins, 1980;
Larson, 1980).
Boom towns or impacted communities are nothing new in American history: the
West experienced them during the nineteenth century as part of gold, silver and
coal mining. Early in the twentieth century, many boom towns were spawned in
the wake of coal, gas, oil, and uranium mining. What is new about this current
wave of boom towns is threefold. First, the number of boom towns simultaneously
occurring, eventually to be in the hundreds, is without precedent. Second, the
physical and monetary scales of energy projects have greatly expanded since the
projects of the nineteenth century. For example, current oil shale industry
plans would bring 200,000 new residents to a four county area of Colorado to
produce up to two million barrels of oil per day, creating the world's largest
underground mine. Third, public attention has been focused on these energy projects and the resultant boom towns as never before through the efforts of
scholars, public officials and even TV's 60 Minutes.
The reason behind this rapid growth of Western boom towns is energy and the
generally accepted lack of it.
In America, there is a wide-spread belief that
we are currently facing an "energy crisis" as a consequence of continued high
energy consumption and diminished or likely-to-be depleted oil supplies from the
Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC). In other words, the energy crisis
is defined as one of supply not meeting demand. Behavior flowing from this definition of the situation has taken the form of a mad flurry of energy extraction and development projects in the West. Here one finds the nation's largest
supplies of oil, coal, oil shale, and uranium, from which to produce electricity
and petroleum-based products (Rounds, 1980, 1980, 1980; Smith, 1980).
Enormous social problems result for small rural communities from the rapid
influx of new populations of temporary construction workers and permanent operating forces for mines or power plants (Mountain West Research, 1975; McKeown
and Lantz, n.d.). Unable to absorb so many newcomers and their demands in a
short time, communities, local governments, human services, public schools,
other specific community institutions, and individual persons show definite
signs of strain. This process of rapid growth has been described by Cortese
and Jones (1977) and later by Massey (1979) as one of urbanization or modernization experienced in a time-compressed way, as a community goes through in
two to five years what ordinarily might take 20 to 50 years.
Current Models of Social Planning
With so many problems making up boom town life, it is no surprise that human
service workers come to play a visible role in such communities in service de-
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livery and social planning for service delivery. Although most of the human service response to "boom" conditions is merely an after-the-fact reaction in the
best ways workers know, one can retrospectively discern two models of social
planning for human services which corresponds to two different models of business
conduct within a capitalist political economy.
In the first model of corporate behavior, articulated in the traditional
laissez-faire philosophy initiated by Adam Smith in the 1775 publication The
Wealth of Nations and now the cornerstone of Reaganomics, private enterprise
operates relatively free of public or government intervention. The conservative
assumption supporting the laissez-faire model contends that the invisible hand of
the marketplace will result in a match between supply and demand, and the corollary assumption is that human needs will be satisfied by private enterprises'
market operations. Today the economic theories of Milton Friedman (1978) and
David Stockman best epitomize the twentieth century version of conservative economics.
Applied to energy development, this conservative model holds that projects
geared to produce more coal, oil, oil shale or uranium should be allowed to happen, and the problems generated by them will somehow be dealt with through the
marketplace. The human service worker's role under this reactive approach is
that of "capitalism's janitor", cleaning up the human debris which the private
marketplace does not find to be a profitable venture. Thus, one sees in boom
towns, human service workers dashing about madly trying to cope with increased
incidences of mental illness, substance abuse, community tensions, child and
spouse abuse, and the like. They find themselves facing not only a quantitative
impact of providing more of the existing services to the swollen populations,
but also a qualitative impact of having to provide services in situations they'
ve never or rarely handled or witnessed before. For example, one Colorado county
had a half-dozen child abuse cases in pre-boom years; that number mushroomed to
34 the following year as growth occured and 50 during the next 9 months (Quality
Development Associates, 1979). Davenport and Davenport describe the qualitative
impact theme in discussing the lack of rape crisis services in Wyoming boom towns.
Depicted graphically, this model of social planning for human services under
a laissez-faire political economy appears thus:
Definition of
energy crisis
as one of supply

.-

Proposed project
(oil, oil shale,
gas, uranium, coal)

Project
occur

1

-

Negative
social
-e
impacts

Reactive social planning
for, and delivery of,
human services

The notion of qualitative vs. quantitative impacts comes from Cortese and Jones
(1977), and has been applied to the area of rape crisis services by Davenport
and Davenport (1979).
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Although laissez-faire philosophy in its pure eighteenth century form is not
widely subscribed to today, many corporations still try to act out that set of beliefs and President Reagan's brand of economics harkens back to that earlier philosophy, with its stress on deregulation, decontrol, and the unleashing of private
enterprise.
Increasingly during the last decade, this model of business oepration became
harder to follow due to governmental intervention in the form of Environmental
Impact Statements, permitting processes, energy facility siting councils, and other
regulations, plus the defensive actions of environmental and consumer groups.
Somewhat in contrast to model one is a second model of American corporate
behavior, generally referred to as "enlightened capitalism" which has become the
prevalent approach. Subscribing to this model, an energy company proposing a
major project in a rural area will put considerable effort into "front end"
planning so as to minimize the negative physical and social impacts of the project, thereby defusing opposition to the project and lowering costs in the long
run. Specialized in-house staff or consultants, sometimes with a background in
human services, are retained by the company to work with the targeted community
to engage in planning activities on any number of issues, including human services. As a consequence of such efforts, human service councils may emerge to
coordinate existing or proposed human service programs.
One noteworthy example of this model is the so-called "French Connection"
in Mercer County, North Dakota where a French company, the Department of Energy,
and the local communities have teamed up to work on energy development in such
a way that negative impacts are minimized (Pierce and Hagstrom, 1981). Because
of its more proactive posture, model two of social planning for human service
delivery is likely to reduce the eventual negative impacts, compared with the
results of model one, and that constitutes a difference. The similarity between
the two models is, however, more significant: like model one, model two still
accepts the legitimacy and the appropriateness of the profit motive and private
decision making as the driving forces in setting energy policy, and thereby
shaping Western communities. As such, this model reflects modern liberal philosophy. Diagrammatically, model two appears as follows:

Proactive social

Definition of
energy crisis

as one of supply

Proprosed project
(oil,oil shale,

as, uranium, coal)

Pratv
oial
planning to mini-

mize negative
social impacts

Project

occurs

Lessened negative

social impacts

A Critical Perspective
The social problems of impacted communities have come upon the human service
professions very rapidly and with such force that little time has been available
for critical reflection on which model one is following (if indeed one is even
aware of following a model), what definitions of situations one is acting upon,
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and what political ramifications flow from one's actions.
Nearly a decade of experience on the part of the senior author as researcher
and consultant in impacted communities leads us to propose another perspective on
social planning for human services in energy-impacted communities. This third
model is derived from a very different definition of the energy situation as well
as from a critical analysis of the experiences of boom towns.
First, the definition of the energy crisis as one of supply is open to debate (Bramhall, 1981). That current demand is outstripping current supply is not
contested. However, current demand is largely a contrivance, brought about by
energy company and general corporate policies which foster higher consumption to
generate higher profits. In addition, that demand stands where it does because
of wide-spread practices of using overly sophisticated forms of energy for very
simple tasks, such as, in effect, boiling water in nuclear power plants to convert
to electricity which is inefficiently transmitted to honies to boil water and heat
homes! The energy crisis is also one of rising costs as we continue to exhaust the
relatively cheaper forms of energy, leaving us with a depleted supply of relatively
more costly energy forms. When energy costs for households go up, so do energy
company profits, built as they are, on a percentage basis; this means the energy
crisis is a cost-benefit one: as consumers' costs increase corporate suppliers
benefit.
Another facet of the energy crisis, redefined, is the fact that energy forms
currently pursued, such as oil shale and nuclear power, are potentially dangerous
to our society, in and of themselves. Finally, in one respect the energy supply
is also an artificial one to the extent that this nation was forced into an unhealthy reliance on foreign energy sources only after American corporations made
their decisions to invest in those more profitable sources abroad rather than
developing domestic sources.
Consequently, a combination of federal and corporate energy policies focused
on supply increases, with the resultant "rape of the West" masks over larger questions of energy costs, forms, and controls. Underlying that supply-oriented thrust
is an assumption, which can be refuted, that energy growth is necessary to have
general economic growth; the California Energy Commission has successfully refuted
that assumption by showing that billions saved by the use of conservation and alternative energy sources generate other consumer demands and hence, new jobs (Doctor,
1980).
A second source of an alternative model for human service planning in impacted communities comes form the mounting evidence that a very sizable portion
of the nation's energy needs could be derived from renewable sources, including
various forms of solar energy, and that demand could be significantly reduced
through conservation measures - a position amply documented by Amory Levins (1979)
To use Lovins' terminology, we would do better following a "soft path" of reliance
on conservation and renewable sources of energy, than a "hard path" of reliance on
nonrenewable sources such as coal, gas, oil, oil shale, and uranium. Again,
California has taken significant steps in state-encouraged use of soft path energy
forms, such as solar-powered homes, wind machines, biomass, etc. Such a policy,
applied nationwide, would reduce the degree to which nonrenewable energy projects
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and their attendant boom towns need to be perpetuated (Doctor, 1980).
Third among our sources of this alternative model is a critical analysis of
the benefits generally portrayed as accruing to impacted communities. This more
critical analysis reveals a negative balance sheet. Evidence is mounting that
there's very little benefit to having one's community impacted by a conventional
energy project:
At-risk populations, such as women, minorities, and the elderly
are getting little out of the economic largesse that is accumulated
in boom towns (Moen, 1980; Feldman, 1980; National Urban Coalition
1980);
The costs ot local areas from environmental devastation cannot be
recouped (INFORM, 1980);
The new jobs created by large-scale energy projects are not going
to local residents as promised (Lovejoy, 1980);
The wealth produced by such hard path energy projects does not remain in the local area to be used in meeting human needs generated
by the project (Colorado Open Space Council, 1976);
The lion's share of the new business opportunities in impacted communities are captured by absentee chain operations, not by the
local businesspeople who had enthusiastically supported the project
believing it would bring in new business for them but often lacked
the entrepreneurial skill or drive to captue the opportunities of
expanded markets (Cortese and Jones, 1977).
Finally, this alternative model builds on the kind of analysis being developed
by Lovejoy and Krannich, who hold that rural areas being industrialized by largescale energy projects amount to little more than colonies of urban areas (Lovejoy
and Krannich, 1980). Lovejoy and Krannich quote Gray and Flinn (1976) who suggest colonial-type dominance exists in rural areas being industrialized when the
following conditions exist:
The employment generated goes to non-local residents;
The finished product (in this case energy) goes to non-locals
(i.e., high energy consumers in cities and suburbs) while the
negative impacts stay in the rural area;
The economic and political exchange relations between urban and
rural areas are out of balance; and
The rural area receives inadequate, if any, compensation for the
resources extracted from it.
Thus, the rural community being impacted by energy projects is not just
losing its autonomy and way of life, but it is becoming a colony housing America's
newest but not yet officially recognized oppressed minority.
A different definition of the situation would generate for the human service
worker different definitions of goals and roles as is spelled out in the following
chart:
2

Colorado State Treasurer, Roy Romer, has repeatedly noted the capital-shortage
problem of small firms in energy-impacted areas (Ruhl, 1980).
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Differentiating
AsDects

Model

Definition of human service issues

Liberal

Conservative
Human needs will be
met by reliance on
market mechanisms,
with some minimal
public assistance
for "truly needy"

Human service work- Preserve social
er goal
harmony

Radical

Human needs are not
being taken into
account in project
planning and should
be

Decisions about human needs (as well
as everything else
with regard to project) are being made
on basis of profit,
not human needs

Serve imediate
human service
needs

Foster social change
to preserve local
autonomy

How social planning In minimal way so
At local level, by
should occur
as not to interfere'human service authwith market opera- orities, with contions
sumer involvement

Broader discussion
beyond human services to larger social changes

What human services "Safety nets" sershould be provided vices to "truly
needy"

Whole range of
standard services
for various at-risk
populations

Basic human services
+ consiousness-raising and group-building activities as
"private ills" are
translated into "public troubles"

Roles for human
service workers

Direct service,
brokering of services

Direct service,
brokering, social
planning, lobbying,
some advocacy

Those in
column +
zing and
building

Possible employers
of human service
workers

Local agencies public and private

Local agencies public and private

Local agencies public and private +
extra-local organizations (churches,
consumer groups,
public interest law
firms, environmental
groups, etc.)

liberal
organicoalition(enabling)

From this cirtical/radical perspective, the situation in energy-impacted communities is nothing different than the usual operations of capitalism but does
show those operations in bold relief. This affords the opportunity for the human
service worker to translate the expression of "private ills" into a braoder analysis of "public troubles", and to translate the expression of local negative so-
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cial into an analysis of societal political economic issues. The skewed distribution of the costs and benefits in a boom town is easy to convey to those paying the costs, while the human service worker is in the process of meeting basic
needs.
This human service worker might move beyond basic service provision to
group-building ' la Middleman and Goldberg's (1974) paradigm and beyond that to
regional coalition-building since no small rural town on its own will be able to
contend very successfully with multi-national energy corporations. Looking at
the issues in the community more holistically, the worker might respond to the
unemployment situation (which often sells a community on a "hard path" energy
project) by organizing around the creation of alternative energy projects which
have been shown to be more labor-intensive (Grossman and Daneker, 1977; Commoner,
1977). Such economic development efforts might complement efforts to stop "hard
path" energy projects, where that is still a feasible strategy.
In summary, the human service worker operating from this basis would address
basic human needs but also work as an enabler to broaden the horizons of clients
by educating about energy issues, to challenge projects based on old definitions,
and to forge creative alternatives that foster local self-reliance.
The differences between this third model and the two currently followed models show up on the following diagram of model three:
Address basic human'needs
Definition of

Different definitions
of energy crisis and

as one of supply

critical analysis of
boom town experiences

Oppose hard path projects
Encourage alternative soft
path projects
Consciousness-raising
Group-building
Organizing & coalition-building

Preservation of local autonomy
and local self-reliance
ft path energy future
Larger vision of social change

This third approach, as far as the authors know, is not being employed systematically anywhere by human service workers. It will be labelled, correctly,
as a "political" orientation to human service delivery, but so are the other two
models. One's initial analysis or definition of the situation is indeed a political act in that it implies support of one national energy policy or another,
accepts or challenges a given set of power relations, and has a defined (or ignored) set of implications for the political economic future of the impacted community.
Implications for the Human Service Professions
All three postures described here are political. Model one buys into a conservative philosophy, model two subscribes to a liberal ideology, and model three
derives from a more progressive or radical set of beliefs. The first key implication of the foregoing analysis, as contended by Galper (1975), is that human
service work has a political dimension.
A second implication is that the modern human service worker has a responsibility to acquire content knowledge as well as the usual process skills, in
this case, knowledge about energy forms, uses, costs, etc. Failing to prepare
oneself in this way raises questions about professional responsibility.
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Third, there is a need to focus attention on a community's political economy, that basic set of human relations centering on the business of producing
what a society or a community needs to keep going, as a basic shaping element
of our society and our communities. That this element of analysis of human
service planning and delivery is often ignored is a direct reflection of its
omission in most human service curricula.
Human service professionals generally view a community in terms of social
structure comprised of its set of institutions and their roles; a culture involving beliefs, values and norms; and a spatial or physical form. In all communities, but especially in energy boom towns, the larger society's political
economy must be recognized as a significant example of what Roland Warren (1963)
called "vertical relations". The modern boom town cannot be fully understood
without reference to the operations of multi-national energy companies and their
relations to the government, and the interaction of those two extra-local systems
yields the energy policies that give rise to the phenomenon of boom towns. Ignoring those vertical relations of the societal political economy puts human
service workers in an unfortunate posture as reinforcers of the powers that contribute to the destruction of community in energy boom towns.

REFERENCES
Bramhall, David. 1981. Personal Communication
Colorado Open Space Council. 1976. The Corporate Connection: Economic Relationships Among Holders of Coal Leases on Colorado Public Lands. Denver: Colorado
Open Space Council.
Commoner, Barry. 1977. "Energy, Employment and the Environment." Keynote address
at the Energy, Employment and the Environment Conference, Denver.
Cortese, Charles F. and Bernie Jones. 1977. "The Sociological Analysis of Boom
Towns
Western Sociological Review 8: 76-90
Davenport, Judith and Joseph Davenport. 1979. "Rape Crisis Strategies and Rural
Realities." Wyoming Issues 2: 17-18
Davenport, Joseph III and Judith Ann Davenport (eds.). 1980. The Boom Town:
Problems and Promises in the Energy Vortex. Laramie: University of Wyoming.
Doctor, Ronald D. 1980. "Alternative Energy Development Tug of War." Paper delivered at the Denver Conference on Renewable Energy Resources.
Feldman, Dede. 1980. "Boomtown Women". Environmental Action. May: 16-70
Freudenberg, William R. 1976. "The Social Impact of Energy Development on Rural
Communities: A Review of Literature and Some Predictions." Paper presented
at the meetings of the American Sociological Association.
Friedman, Milton. 1978. The Economics of Freedom. Cleveland: Standard Oil
Company.
Galper, Jeffry H. 1975. The Politics of Social Services. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.
Gray, Thomas and William Flinn. 1978. "Perspectives on Rural Industrialization
and Rural Growth." Paper presented at the meetings of the Rural Sociological
Society. San Francisco.

-532-

Grossman, Richard and Gail Danekar. 1977. A Guide to Jobs and Energy. Washington:
Environmentalists for Full Employment.
INFORM. 1980. Reclaiming the West. New York: INFORM.
Larson, Sharon S. 1980. "The Elderly: Victims of the Energy Venture." Pp. 33-42
in The Boom Town: Problems and Promises in the Energy Vortex, edited by
Joseph Davenport III and Judith Ann Davenport. Laramie: University of Wyoming.
Lovejoy, Stephen B. 1980. "An Examination of the Direct Employment Gains to Rural
Residents from Energy Development." Station Bulletin No. 286, Department of
Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana.
Lovejoy, Stephen B. and Richard S. Krannich. 1980. "Nonmetropolitan Industrialization and Patterns of Dominance: Is Nonmetropolitan America a Colony?" Station
Bulletin No. 289, Department of Agricultural Economic, Purdue University, West
Lafayette, Indiana.
Lovins, Amory. 1977. Soft Energy Paths. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger.
1979. The Energy Controversy. Washington: Friends of the Earth.
MceW-n, Robert L. and Alma Lantz. n.d. "Rapid Growth and the Impact on Quality
of Life in Rural Communities: A Case Study." Unpublished paper.
Massey, Garth. 1979. "Critical Dimensions in Urban Life: Energy Extraction and
Community Collapse in Wyoming." Paper delivered at the meetings of the Midwest
Sociological Society, Milwaukee.
Middleman, Ruth and Gale Goldberg. 1974. Social Service Delivery: A Structural
Approach to Social Work Practice. New York: Columbia University.
Moen, Elizabeth. 1980. "Social Problems in Energy Boom Towns and the Role of
Women in their Prevention and Mitigation." Pp. 5-20 in The Boom Town: Problems
and Promises in the Energy Vortex, edited by Joseph Davenport III and Judith
Ann Davenport. Laramie: University of Wyoming.
Mountain West Research. 1975. Construction Worker Profile. Butte, Montana: Old
West Regional Commission.
National Urban Coalition. 1980. Energy and Jobs for Minorities and Women: Highlights of a National Conference. Denver: National Urban Coalition.
Pierce, Neal R. and Jerry Hagstrom. 1981. "Mercer Counties French Connection A Model for Boom Town Development." National Journal, February 17: 266-269.
Quality Development Associates, Inc. 1979. Development Patterns and Social Impacts:
A Focus on the Oil Shale Region. Denver: Quality Development Associates, Inc.
Robbins, Lynn A. 1980. "Native American Experiences with Energy Developments."
Pp. 21-32 in The Boom Town:
Problems and Promises in the Energy Vortex, edited
by Joseph Davenport III and Judith Ann Davenport. Laramie: University of Wyoming.
Rounds, Michael. 1980. "Coal Production in West Could Jump 500%." Rocky Mountain
News, August 14: 112.
• 1980. "Uranium: Colorado's Next Energy Boom." Rocky Mountain News,
September 14: 84.
• 1980. "Energy Drama on Stage in Western Colorado." Rocky Mountain News,
October 26: 96.
Ruhl, Jerry. 1980. "Energy Boom Called Threat to Small Firms." Rocky Mountain News,
January 22: 50.
Smith, David. 1981. "Eco-Armageddon." Westword, December 12 - January 8: 10-12.
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. 1976. Resource Development in the Intermountain
West - Its Impact on Women and Minorities. Denver: U.S. Commission on Civil Right
Warren, Roland. 1963. The Community in America. Chicago: Rand McNally.

-533-

SHARED ETHNICITY AS A CORRELATE OF ACCEPTANCE OF
THE FORMERLY HOSPITALIZED MENTALLY ILL
Jonathan Rabinowit z
Maleleine Borg Counseling Services
Boro Park Office
Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services
New York, New York

Abstract

This study looked at shared ethnicity of former mental patient and community
member as a possible correlate of acceptance of the formerly hospitalized
mental patient as a potential tenant. This study is an exploratory study with
a comparative perspective using a design in which the willingness to accept a
former mental patient as a renter in one of four groups is explored. Current
research in this field has ignored the variable of shared ethnicity. The findings of this study did not reach the .05 level of significance, however the
results seem to indicate that in some cases shared ethnicity is a positive
correlate of acceptance of formerly hospitalized mental patients.
Introduction
Deinstitutionilization of long term mental patients and the contemporary focus
on community based care for the mentally ill has given rise to a whole gamut
of social services. Among the services provided by the community mental health
movement in an attempt to minimize hospitalization, are mental health clinics
(equipped to distribute and monitor the use of medication), lounge programs,
group homes, individual and group psychotherapy and housing referral services.
A major concern is the attitudes of the community towards the formerly hospitalized mentally ill because community acceptance is basic to successful rehabilitation. Lack of sensitivity to community attitudes has resulted in the destruction
of group homes, harassment of former mental patients and discrimination by renters towards this group.
In this study shared ethnicity of community member and former mental patient
as a possible correlate of acceptance of the former mental patient as a potential
tenant was studied. This study is an exploratory study with a comparative
perspective using a design in which the willingness to accept a former mental
patient as a renter in one of four groups is explored. Current research in this
field has ignored the variable of shared ethnicity.
Review of the Literature
Acceptance of former mental patients is operationalized in the literature as
community tolerance of community based facilities, social distance, willingness
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to provide accommodations to, to accept as a border and to accept as a coworker. High education and lower age are predictors of acceptance (1,3,19).
Only in the case of willingness to accept as a boarder was high age (no children
at home) associated with acceptance (1).
Knowledge about mental illness, in
particular the ability to correctly identify it, is reported by some to be a
positive correlate of acceptance (5, 9); and by others to be a correlate of
rejection (12, 15).
Higher economic status has been linked to greater degrees
of acceptance (6, 17, 19).
Some researchers have found a positive linkage between subscription to the
medical model of mental illness and acceptance, meaning that those who view
mental illness as if it were a physical illness will be more accepting than
those who do not (3).
Others debate this point (18).
Some studies have found whites to be more accepting of former mental patients
than blacks (19). More recent studies dispute these findings.
They found that
controlling for socioeconomic status, blacks and whites of similar status have
similar attitudes (16).
There is little evidence available regarding sex as a predictor of acceptance.
The available evidence indicates that females are more accepting of female coworkers bearing the label of mental patient than are males of similar male coworkers (7).
Being married is a positive correlate of acceptance (19).
Certain characteristics of the mentally ill and characteristics attributed to
the mentally ill have been found to be correlates of acceptance. The label
"mentally ill" is the most debated of the predictors of acceptance. One group
has linked the label with extreme rejection,
contention (3).
Some have made an effort to
function of different research methodologies
are rejected more readily than female former

(8, 4, 18, 11) others reject this
explain the differences as being a
(2).
Male former mental patients
mental patients (10).

Behavior that differs from expected norms has been found to be a predictor of
rejection (1).
Rejection is influenced to a greater extent by how visibly
behavior deviates from expected behavior than "on the pathology of the behavior
from a mental health point of view." (13,14) Occupational prestige is a positive
predictor of acceptance (10).
The help-source is a correlate of rejection, the most stigmatizing being the
mental hospital.
In the order of least rejection are psychiatrists, physicians
and clergy (12).
The variables of sex, education, race and socioeconomic status have been found
to be predictors of the degree of acceptance of former mental patients. One
area which has received no attention in previous research is shared ethnicity
of the mentally ill person and the community as possible correlate of acceptance.
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Study Design
In this study, the hypothesis is that shared ethnic and racial background
are correlates of acceptance. Using a purposive sample of Jews and Blacks,
acceptance is operationalized as the willingness to rent living quarters to
a former mental patient.
I replicated a design used by Page (11).
In his study "Effects of the mental
illness label in attempts to obtain accommodations", he compared lfarmer mental
patients with ex-convicts. He had different callers who purported to either
be former mental patients or ex-convicts, inquiring as to whether the rooms
advertised were still available for rent.*
Subjects for the present study were sixteen individuals who had advertised
rooms for rent during October, 1980, in the "Cleveland Jewish News" and fourteen from the "Call and Post", a Black weekly.
In an attempt to insure that
the renters were members of the ethnic groups, each phone number was checked
in the Haynes Criss Cross Telekey Directory to determine the name and geographic
location of the renter. This was felt to be a valid check as the neighborhoods
are ethnically homogeneous.
One hundred and twenty calls were made to renters, sixty-four in the Jewish
group and fifty-six in the Black group. Each of the renters received four
phone calls. The four experimental conditions were a call made by a mental
patient member of the same ethnic group, mental patient non-member of ethnic
group, non-mental patient member of ethnic group and non-patient non-member of
the ethnic group.
The calls were conducted in the following manner. For example the Black mental
patient said almost verbatim, "yes my name is Delores Jones.
I am Black, I
should tell you that I am a patient now in a mental hospital, but I'm going to
leave in a day or two, and I'm calling to find out if your room is still for
rent or not."
If the response was negative the caller said "thank you" and
promptly hung up, without any further conversation. The other calls followed
the same format, providing the renter with the information germane to the
experimental condition.
All responses were regarded as being either a yes or no.
If questions were
asked by the renter, for example, "how long have you been sick" or "what were
you in for" or if the renter was indecisive about the availability of the
apartment, e.g. "I have somebody coming to see the apartment in a few minutes",
the response was regarded as a no. The da.y and time the call was placed was
recorded by the four callers in an effort to check that the apartments were
still for rent.
The main results, i.e., the number of positive and negative responses obtained
in the various conditions, are presented in Table 1, Table 2 presents the
findings in percentages.
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The hypothesis that shared ethnicity is a correlate of acceptance of former
mental patients would seem to have some support from the data, although the
difference did not reach the .05 level of significance in any case but one.
The smallest difference was in the Jewish landlord sample between Jewish and
Non-Jewish Non-Mental Patients which was p_/ .02. In the Jewish and Non-Jewish
Mental Patient groups and the Black and Non-Black Non-Mental Patient groups,
In the Black and Non-Black Mental
the difference in both cases was p/ .30.
Patient groups the difference was p/ .20.
Discussion
The results of this study would seem to indicate that under some conditions
shared ethnicity would appear to be a correlate of acceptance. The present
study is limited as it is not statistically significant; however, this may
be due to the small sample size. As this was intended to be a descriptive
study, it would appear to present evidence that shared ethnicity should be
further explored as a correlate of acceptance and may in fact have some policy
implications as far as placing former mental patients in the community.
Future studies should include a comparative perspective of acceptance among
other ethnic groups as well and focus on varying attitudes among these groups
towards the mentally ill and mental illness. As this study is an exploratory
study I used a sample of Jews and Blacks as these two groups constitute
separate communities in this metropolitan area and Blacks and Jewish renters
The choice of
were readily identified through their respective newspapers.
groups for the study also reflects my own familiarity with these groups and my
involvement at the time with the deinstitutionalization of former Jewish mental
patients.
Although a traditional questionnaire would have rendered a larger sample with
greater ease, I chose the above design. Attitudes measured by questionnaires
are typically unrelated or only slightly related to actions. The correlation
between attitudes and overt behavior are rarely above .30 and often near zero,
and only seldom can as much as 10 percent of the variance in overt behavioral
measures be accounted for by attitudinal data (20).
Further research in the area of correlates of acceptance of the formerly
hospitalized mentally ill should incorporate ethnicity as a variable in multivariate designs. Agencies involved in placing former patients in the community
should match the former patient and community along ethnic lines. This strategy
should prove to be helpful in finding the most accepting communal setting for
the former mental patient.
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Appendix
Table I
Chi Square
Jewish Sample
Non Mental Patients
Jewish

Non Jewish
14
(9)
2 (2)

14 (9)
2 (2)

yes
no

2

16

X =5.54 p/ .02
df=l

Mental Patients
Jewish
(7.5)
9

yes
no

7

Non Jewish

6
10

(8.5)

16

2
X =1.13 pj .3

(7.5)
(8.5)

16

Black Sample
Non Mental Patients

Non Black
7 (8.5)
7 (5.5)

Black

10 (8.5)
4 (5.5)

yes
no

2

X =1.34 p/
df=l

14
.3

Mental Patients
Black
8
(6)

yes
no

6

(8)

Non Black
4 (6)
10
(8)

2
X =2.34 p
df=l

.2

Table 2
Acceptance Rate in Percentage
Black Landlord Sample
Jewish Landlord Sample
Caller
Black
71%
Non Black
50%
Black Mental Patient 57%
Non Black Mental Patient

Caller
Jew
87.5%
Non Jew
87.5%
Jewish Mental Patient
56%
Non Jewish Mental Patient
37.5%

28%
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Social

Notes
*After consulting the most recent Ethical Principles in the Conduct of Research
with Human Participants (American Psychological Association, 1973) and conferring with colleagues I decided that may failure to make disclosure to renters
did not violate ethical standards of conducting research with human subjects.
I
believe that this study does not compromise the dignity or welfare of the participants, e.g., calls were conducted in an innocuous fashion, callers were noncommittal in the face of a positive reply and polite in the face of a negative
reply, anonymity of the renter was preserved by destroying renter's name and
address before the calls were made. Additionally it should be noted that this
study design has precedence in the literature, as for example the study design
I replicated from Pages 1977 article in the Canadian Journal of Behavioral
Science.
At the time this article was written the author was affiliated with the Dept.
of Social Services, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio. Acknowledgments
to Zev Harel for his comments and Serena Hersh, Lillian Rabishaw, Eva Schwartz
and Mary Jane Senders for their technical assistance.
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IN THE CASE OF MANIPULATION
James L. Wolk, D.S.W.
Southwest Missouri State University

ABSTRACT
This article reports on the findings of research into the
manipulative tendencies of 289 professional social workers in
Michigan. Utilizing the Machiavellian scale and comparing the
results with other studies, the author concludes that social
workers, contrary to the conventional wisdom, have strong
manipulative tendencies. Additionally, the more manipulative
social workers are not isolated in any specific field or area of
practice, but are scattered throughout the profession. Rather
than be alarmed by this recognition, the author feels the
profession must accept this reality and acknowledge that these
manipulative tendencies are mitigated by a compassionate,
humanistic value system.

IN THE CASE OF MANIPULATION
Certain words have such a negative connotation within the
social work profession that their mere utterance immediately
impugns the credibility of the source. Probably the most
representative of this category of words in social work is
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manipulation. In competition with such wholesome and ethical terms
as individuality, self-determination, and non-judgmental attitudes,
manipulation cognitively as well as behaviorally emerges as
sinister and foreboding. The profession's conventional wisdom
fosters the belief that manipulation is an act performed by
unscrupulous people whose goals and values cannot hope to measure
up to the lofty ideals of social work. Used car salesmen
manipulate, political lobbyists manipulate, and periodically
Madison Avenue hucksters manipulate, but professional, compassionate social workers do not or at least should not manipulate.
This is not to suggest that the notion of manipulation is
entirely censored from the social work literature. Some authors
have incorporated the concept of manipulation into their writings
on social work practice in a very gentle and seemingly acceptable
manner. Hollis dared to discuss the necessity of environmental 1
manipulation as a legitimate social work intervention technique.
Rothman is somewhat more explicit about the appropriate exercise
of manipulation. In outlining his three models of community
organization, he notes that the medium of change for the practitioner is manipulation of small task-oriented groups, manipulation
of formal organizations, and manipulation of mass organizations
2
It is never suggested in either writing
and political processes.
that the practitioner manipulates individuals, for this
Unfortunately,
admission would violate the social work gospel.
this deception simply becomes a classic example of reification.
Obviously, all groups, organizations, and institutions are
comprised of people and it is these individual people that must
ultimately be manipulated if the desired changes in the environIt seems clear from this
mental entities are to transpire.
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assessment that manipulation is an appropriate professional
technique or skill, providing it is pursued in the consumer's
interests.
Brager began to address this subtle contradiction that
permeates the social work profession regarding the ethical use of
manipulation. He observed that many social workers are engaged in
client advocacy, that advocacy requires political behavior, and
3
Having made this
that political behavior includes manipulation.
radical statement, he subsequently apologizes, but he does not
withdraw the contention. He states, "the point, of course, is not
that artfulness (manipulation) is necessarily desirable, but that
it is an inevitable concommitant of certain roles and tasks".4
He also claims that "manipulation should generally be eschewed
except when it is clearly in the best interests of the disadvan5
Brager reluctantly endorses manipulative
taged client".
techniques by social workers of other individuals (non-clients) in
certain circumscribed advocacy situations.
Given Brager's contribution to the field and his rather
limited prescripton for manipulative action, social work should
have welcomed such a fundamental discussion. However, his article
prompted some indignant responses. Rothenberg was very adamant
in her displeasure; "if we accept the use of manipulation and
guile as legitimate techniques to be used against target systems,
we do also accept these same values as legitimate techniques to
be used with clients? Are we, as a profession developing one set
of values to be used in relation to target systems and another
6
Notwithstanding
set to be used for those with whom we identify?"
her confusion between techniques and values, Rothenberg refuses
to acknowledge that social workers should ever engage in
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manipulation, and by inference, those social workers who do
intentionally manipulate are abdicating their professional
responsibility.
In another reaction, Ginsberg takes similar
umbrage; "students of political science and politicians would
find the equation of political
behavior and manipulation
7
insulting."
MACHIAVELLIAN SCALE
It is responsible to conclude that the term manipulation
creates consternation both inside and outside the profession of
social work. At the mention of the word, people instantly begin
disclaiming any affection for such an odious concept. Partly in
response to this propensity, Richard Christie and others at
Columbia University began an intensive investigation of manipulation. This investigation included the types of people who
have manipulative tendencies and their behavior patterns. Their
working definition of manipulative tendencies was an individual's
belief or attitude that others can be influenced or change in
their thinking, perceptions, or behaviors
through the use of
8
guile in interpersonal relations.
In order to measure this notion about a person's belief
regarding human nature and the quality of human relationships,
Christie and his colleagues began extracting passages from
Machiavelli's The Prince and The Discourses.
After considerable
trials, seventy-one items were culled from the writings. The items
included such statements as "honest is the best policy in all
cases", "anyone who completely trusts
anyone else is asking for
trouble", and "it is possible to be good in all
respects".
These
statements were then administered in Likert format to 1,196
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undergraduates in three different universities. Analysis of the
responses indicated fifty of the items discriminated between high
and low scores, with twenty of the most discriminating statements
isolated for further research. An early version of the
Machiavellian Scale (Mach IV) included twenty items, ten of them
stated as pro-Machiavellian positions and the other ten stated
as anti-Machiavellian positions. In essence, a high score
indicated a strong belief that others could be influenced (manipulated) while a low score indicated a belief to the contrary.
The reversal of the Machiavellian positions in the Mach IV
was an attempt to reduce response set biases. However, this
counterbalancing did not effectively eliminate respondents
answering questions in socially desirable ways.
In an effort to
further reduce this tendency and this increase the validity and
reliability of the instrument, the Mach V scale was developed.
9
The Mach V incorporated the Edwards Social Desirability Scale
and therefore minimized the likelihood that people would respond
in socially acceptable terms rather than their actual inclinations.
The resulting Mach V scale was a twenty question forced choice
format that reflected the willingness of respondents to agree with
Machiavelli and his perception of the human condition.
For illustrative purposes, the following item from the Mach V
scale is presented:
A.
It is best to give others the impression that you can change
your mind easily.
B. It is a good working policy to keep on good terms with
everyone.
C. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
The instructions stated that the respondents should read each of
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the three statements in each group. They should then decide first
which of the statements is most true or comes closest to
describing their own beliefs and put a plus (+) by that statement.
The respondents should then decide which of the remaining two
statements was mst false or farthest from their own beliefs and
put a minus (-) by that statement. 'It was imperative for the
twenty items in this manner.
respondents to complete all
In reference to the preceding example, the most Machiavellian
(manipulative tendency) response was a plus by statement "B" and
a minus by statement "C", with statement "A", the matched socially
desirable statement left
blank.
The least Machiavellian response
a plus by statement "C" and a minus by
was the opposite, that is,
statement "B".
Any other combination of responses was a midrange
belief between the two extremes.
The scoring of the Mach V was a relatively simple process.
Each of the twenty items was rated separately and then added
together for a total score and only the total score was salient.
Returning to the illustration, the most Machiavellian response
(B+C-) received seven points while the least Machiavellian
response (C+B-) received one point. Any other set of responses
received three or five points contingent upon the arrangement; a
(A+B-) or (C+A-) received three points and a (A+C-) or (B+A-)
received five points. Obviously, the potential cumulative range
for the twenty item Mach V based on the scoring system was from
20 to 140. However, in order to establish a theoretical mean of
100, Christie added twenty points to each score elevating the
range from 40 to 160.
The Machiavellian scale has been rigorously tested since its
initial development from several different perspectives. The
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analysis of the data has taken the form of dividing the respondents into high and low Mach scores. High Mach scores are
those above the actual mean, while low Mach scores are below the
actual mean, and then comparing these findings to another characteristic or behavior. All of these studies repeatedly demonstrate
that high Machs (strong manipulative tendencies) do not appear
significantly different from their low Mach opposites on most
measures of social and personality traits, intelligence, political
preference, ideology, and racial attitudes.
Much of the research in this area is concerned with the actual
behavioral differences between people who score high or low on the
Machiavellian scale. Since the inception of Christie's original
scales, at least fifty laboratory experiments have been conducted.1 0
These studies have contributed much to the developing data base on
the behavioral implications of manipulation. The majority of these
experiments tend to corroborate the findings that high Machs
perceive other people as readily manipulatable and easily
influenced. This attitude unalterably led to high Machs winning,
influencing, or controlling situations in which bargaining or
compromise strategies are essential. Yet, high Machs have not been
shown to be necessarily more hostile, vicious, or vindictive
compared to lows.
Christie and his associates have involved themselves very
intimately into the study of Machiavellianism, in particular, high
Machs. Their initial impression of a high Mach was a negative one
"associated with shadowy and unsavory manipulations."1 1 After
considerably investigation with Machiavellianism, Christie's
group now states, "after watching subjects in laboratory experiments
we found ourselves having a perverse admiration for the high Machs'
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ability to outdo others in

experimental situations."

12

SOCIAL WORK AND MACHIAVELLIANISM
Previous Research
As discussed previously, the profession of social work has an
almost natural aversion to the notion of manipulation. In an
13
effort to assess the legitimacy of this belief, Homer et. al.
administered the Mach scale to 45 graduate students and 49 seniors
majoring in social work and 12 graduate students and 40 seniors
majoring in business administration at a large midwestern university. The authors felt "it made sense to argue that the
humanitarian tradition and publicized value base of social work
would result in the recruitment of students committed to viewing
individuals as an end in themselves rather than a means to the
4
ends of another."1
Imagine the enigma they confronted when their
findings indicated that graduate level social work students had in
their phraseology the "dubious distinction" of attaining the
highest Mach scores of the four study samples. To be specific,
56% of the graduate social work students, but only 45% of the
graduate business students had a high Machiavellian orientation.
On the other hand, 42% of the undergraduate social work students,
but 51% of the undergraduate business students had a high
Machiavellian commitment. They were not surprised to find that
social workers interested in macro level practice evidenced
greater adherence to the ideas of Machiavelli than those interested in micro level practice.
Current Research Methodology
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Following a similar line of logic, if not a similar predisposition to manipulative tendencies, this author studied a sample of
professional social workers obtained from the National Association
of Social Workers membership list in the state of Michigan. Twenty
percent of the approximately 2350 members of the chapter were selected at random to participate in the research. The 470 social
workers in this sample were mailed two questionnaires with a
follow-up reminder letter three weeks later.
The first questionnaire sought demographic and professional
information such as sex, race, age, level of education, number
of years in practice, field of practice, i.e. direct service,
consultation, administration. The second questionnaire was the
previously described Mach V scale developed by Christie.
Of the 470 research packets mailed, 289 or 61% were returned
by the final cut-off date. The returns came proportionately from
every section of Michigan effectively mitigating any geographic
variances. Table 1 illustrates the frequency and percentage
results of the respondents to the demographic questionnaire for
sex, race, age, degree, and years in practice. In order to place
this study's findings in perspective, they were compared with
analogous information compiled by the NASW Manpower Data Bank (MDB)
in a nationwide survey published in February, 1975. This current
study's sample was comprised of 73% females and 27% males compared
to MDB's 63% females and 37% males. The racial composition was very
similar in the two studies. Whites provided by far the largest
group with an 89% proportion in this study versus 85.5% in the MDB.
Blacks comprised approximately 8% in both studies while the MDB
predictably had a wider range of other racial groupings.*
*The percentage of Hispanic social workers would not be as likely
to occur in Michigan as opposed to Texas, N.Y. CA. etc.

-549-

The age characteristic could not be compared directly with
the MDB sample because surprisingly age was not an item in that
study. Yet, compared with a somewhat analogous category, years in
practice, several comparisons can be made. For example, the
current research indicated 56% of the sample were in professional
practice eight years or less; the MDB sample found that 54% of
their sample were in practice nine years or less.
The current
study found 15% were in practice twenty-one years or more; the MDB
was slightly higher at 20 percent. This comparison suggests that
not only were there similarities between the two studies regarding
years in practice, but also that the age characteristic of this
study is probably representative.
Finally, even though NASW changed the requirements for
joining the organization several years ago, the composition of
NASW by educational degree has not been significantly altered.
The 1975 MDB study showed that 82% of the sample had an MSW while
13% had a BA/BSW and 3% had doctorates. This study's findings
were 84% MSW, 10% BA/BSW and 3% doctorates.
Table 2 demonstrates frequency and percentages by field and
area of practice. Here again, comparisons with the MDB were
somewhat restricted due to variations in category clusters. Nevertheless, broad similarities were manifestly apparent.
For instance,
this research indicated 8% were employed by public welfare as
opposed to 7% in the MDB. Additionally, 45% of the Michigan sample,
while 38% of the national sample were employed by mental health
related agencies. In the health field, 10% in the Michigan sample
and 16% in the national sample were providing such services. In
the areas of practice, similar comparisons were conducted. For
instance, 43% of the NASW members in Michigan stated they were
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performing direct services, while a like percentage, 44%, were
carrying out like functions in the national NASW sample.
Interestingly, administration in the Michigan sample was stated
by 12% as opposed to 21% nationally, while supervision was listed
by 15% of the Michigan sample compared to 8% nationally. When
these categories are combined the percentages are 27% and 29%
respectively.
Despite the differences manifested between the demographic
characteristics of the state and national samples, the similarities
were impressive. It seems quite clear that the sample for this
study, not only provides a fair profile of the state but closely
resembles the characteristics of the recent NASW nationwide survey.
Findings
The findings of this current study of professional social
workers in Michigan utilizing the Mach V scale will be compared
with other researchers employing the same instrument. Particular
emphasis will be placed on the 1963 National Public Opinion
Research Center (NORC) study. The 1482 respondents in the NORC
study were a representative sample of non-institutionalized adults
in the United States. It is the only national sample survey for
non-college adults responding to the scale.
Table 3 delineates the range, frequency, and percentage of
Mach V scores by professional social workers in Michigan. In this
table and discussions low Mach means the respondent believed
others could not be easily influenced nor were the respondents
likely to be successful at manipulating others, while high Mach
means the respondents believed others could be influenced and the
respondents were likely to be successful at manipulating others.
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As shown, the mean score for the entire social work sample was
101.95 with a median score of 102.00.
These figures compare to
a mean of 92.26 for the NORC sample. This finding certainly
corroborates Horner's unexpected discovery on social work and
business students. However, previous use of the Mach scale with
other helping professions, psychologists and psychiatrists,
foreshadowed the possibility of this kind of data. 15
Michigan NASW members might have manipulative tendencies in
general, but perhaps it is a special type of social worker that is
more Machiavellian than others. Table 4 focuses on that issue by
sex, race, age degree, and years in practice. With the exception
of age, there were no significant findings regarding Mach scores.
That is, low and high Mach social workers were dispersed randomly
throughout the various demographic categories. Regarding age, as
the age cohort increases, the Mach score concommitantly decreases.
The finding was expected given the work of Christie and others
on age and Mach score relationships. The surprising aspect of the
age variable was the discovery that even the age cohorts; 46-55,
56-65, and 66+ had a higher mean Mach score than the NORC sample
where the median age was 42. Even taking into consideration that
Mach scores overall may be rising, the comparison is instructive.
If the more highly manipulative social workers were not
clustered by any demographic characteristics than possibly they
gravitated to certain fields or areas of practice. For example,
Christie suggested that administrators probably need to be more
manipulative1 6 and Brager emphasized that social workers engaged in
political behavior are inclined to manipulate. Table 5 represents
Machiavellian scores by fields and areas of practice. This data
indicates the relationship between those social workers who stated
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they were in a specific field or area versus those who were not.
The findings were very illuminating. By field of practice, only
Mental Health respondents had significantly greater manipulative
tendencies. The remaining fields clearly had a scattering of
high and low Machs including such fields as corrections and
The most interesting finding relating to area of
politics.
practice was that no area differed significantly from any other on
mean Mach V scores save teaching. The data indicates that the more
Machiavellian, manipulative social workers in Michigan were not
concentrated in any specific field or area, rather, low and high
Machs practiced throughout all fields and areas.
Discussion
Manipulation, in word and deed, remains a provocative element
in the profession of social work. The profession's norms suggest
that practitioners do not believe in and certainly proscribe
manipulation of other people, especially their clients. Social
work even has such timeless concepts as non-judgmental attitudes
and self-determination that ostensibly protect the profession and
its consumers against abuses. Yet, two different studies, examining
two different social work populations arrived at the same conclusion: social workers do support the propositions of Machiavelli
along a range of manipulative tendencies.
Homer, Reid, and Okanes found this prospect to be unsettling.
They view some manipulation as a necessary incentive to social
work intervention, but they are concerned about an excessive
manipulative orientation. They state, "Our study suggests that
educators should be on the lookout for manipulative tendencies and
can reasonably assume that a substantial portion of social work
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This
students have relatively high manipulative orientations".
current research strongly supports the realization that social work
students and ultimately social work practitioners manipulate, however, the cautionary admonition Homer offers is presumptuous.
There is absolutely no research evidence to indicate that the more
manipulative social workers are less successful in accomplishing
professional goals and objectives. In fact, the laboratory experiments conducted with high Mach people emphasize their ability to
succeed regularly in those situations involving negotiation,
compromise, and bargaining.
In many respects, this conclusion that social workers are
manipulators should neither be shocking nor alarming. Members
from other helping professions were shown to have this attribute.
The nature of social work is to bring about change through faceto-face interactions, challenge the status quo, and to act
professionally, not emotionally. These are all characteristics
isolated by Christie in his initial research and are the bases of
Machiavellianism. It appears necessary that social workers must
participate in some forms of manipulation if they are to accomplish
any goals consistent with their consumers, agencies, and political
beliefs.
Social work must disavow the self deceiving notion that its
members do not manipulate. Social workers do manipulate others.
Hopefully these manipulative tendencies are mitigated by the
profession's values that promote the general welfare, support
purposeful relationships, and adhere to a humanistic code of ethics.
Moreover, it is essential that these manipulative tendencies are
manifested consciously and purposefully to allow for the individual's professional judgment regarding the appropriateness of the
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activity. Therefore, the primary issue is not whether social
workers will manipulate--they will--but whether these manipulations
are instituted to accomplish social goals in concert with
transcending professional values.
At the micro level of practice, the premise that professional
values will supercede unhealthy manipulations is supported in a
recent article by Shore. He states, "It is the ethical responsibility of therapists to use their skills to manipulate behavior
and assist those who are suffering. Therapists who are inflexibly
'supportive' while alcoholics continue to kill themselygs need to
reconsider the moral repercussions of their position".
He
concludes with the clarifying opinion, "manipulation of behavior
is unethical only when used to meet the therapist's needs, not
the client's. Therayists
who deny their role as manipulators are
19
fooling themselves".
At the macro level of practice, professionally responsible
manipulations are demonstrated in the writings and actions of Saul
Alinsky. Alinsky, though not a social worker, is a model for
much of the community organization and social action undertaken in
the profession. Certainly no one can readily discount the
importance of his work on behalf of neighborhood and community
groups. Throughout his essays, but especially "Of Means and
Ends" 20 Alinsky's commitment to ethical manipulative practices is
very evident and his support for the poor, disenfranchised and
disadvantaged is unequivocal.
If the profession of social work is serious about cultivating
change in individuals, organizations, and institutions, then the
concept of manipulation cannot be summarily repudiated. Unless
there is some attempt to attain this recognition, social work
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practitioners and consumers will be done an important disservice.
In essence, this is the manipulative strategy many strive for in
order to impact individuals, communities, and intransigent system.
Irrespective of one's personal philosophy towards these methods,
the changes pursued are synonymous with changes long endorsed by
social work. This objective is especially true now given the
wholesale assault on the powerless presently occurring. Alinsky
captures the ethical dilemma in the form of a question, "Do
these particular ends justify these particular means?" 2 1 If the
profession's members, individually and collectively, can adopt
an affirmative response to this question and accept manipulation
openly as a viable tool for change, perhaps social workers can
also neutralize such other pejorative concepts as power and
conflict.
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TABLE 1

Demographic Characteristics by Sex, Race, Age, Degree, Years in
Practice (n7289)
Variable
Frequency
Percentage
SEX

Female
Male
Total

73
27
100%

RACE

Black
White
Other
Total

8

89

3

100%

AGE

25 and Below
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
66 and Above
Total

8
34
21
21
11
5

100%

DEGRE E

B.A.
B.S.W.
M.S.W.
Ph.D/D. S.W.

-559-

Other
Total
YEARS IN PRACTICE
2 and Less
3-8
9-14
15-20
21 and More
Total
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10
289

3
100%

62
102
54
28
43
289

21
35
19
10
15
100%

TABLE 2

Demographic Characteristics by Field and Area of Practice (n=289)
Percentage
Frequency
Characteristic
FIELD
8
Public Welfare
45
Mental Health
10
Health
4
Corrections
13
Schools
6
Education
5
1
Politics
13
Other*
46
354+

Total

100%

AREA
43
11
5
15
12
5
6
3

Direct Service
Consultation
Community Organization
Supervision
Administration
Planning
Teaching
Other**
Total

100%

*Includes a variety of different types of fields; child welfare,
gerontology, family service, etc.
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**Includes a variety of different areas, research, community
relations, labor-management relations, etc.
+Respondents were able to select more than one field or area of
practice.
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TABLE 3

Frequency and Percentage Distribution of Michigan Social Workers
by Mach V Scores (n=289)
Frequency
Percentage
Score
LOW MACH
82
.4
1.0
86
1.7
88
2.8
90
92
5.5
94
9.0
10.0
96
98
10.0
100
9.3
102
8.7
104
7.3
106
7.6
108
7.3
110
5.6
112
4.5
114
2.4
116
2.4
118
1.7
120
122
HIGH MACH
Total
289
I=0
NOTE: x = 101.94
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TABLE 4
Machiavellian Soores of Michigan Social Workers by Sex, Race, Age,
Degree, and Years in Practice (n=289)
Characteristics

Mean

S.D.

Frequency (%)

SEX
Female
Male

101.84
102.22

8.03
7.81

210
79

RACE
Black
White
Other

103.33
102.02
95.25

8.64
7.92
3.20

(8%)
(89%)
(3%)

AGE
25 and Below
26-35
36-45
46-55
56-65
66 and Above

103.25
103.87
100.61
101.21
100.31
98.93

6.82
8.53
8.14
7.62
7.38
4.95

(8%)
(34%)
(21%)
(21%)
(11%)
(5%)

DEGREE
B.A.
B.S.W.
M.S.W.
Ph.D/D. S.W.
Other

101.62
103.17
101.82
103.75
102.60

6.94
5.56
8.10
9.88
8.00

(6%)
(4%)
(84%)
(3%)
(3%)
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(73%)
(27%)

YEARS IN PRACTICE
2 and Less
3-8
9-14
15-20
21 and More

6.61
9.25
7.98
7.44
6.52

103.07
102.36
101.96
100.14
100.46
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62
102
54
28
43

(21%)
(35%)
(19%)
(10%)
(15%)

TABLE 5
Machiavellian Scores of Michigan Social Workers by Field and Area
of Practice
Characteristic

Mean

S.D.

FIELD
Public Welfare
Mental Health*
Health
Corrections
Schools
Education
Politics

99.75
102.92
101.33
99.20
100.58
102.76
102.00

7.20
7.84
8.34
5.23
8.49
7.52
8.72

AREA
Direct Service
Consultation
Community Organization
Supervision
Administration
Planning
Teaching*

101.80
101.79
101.23
101.86
101.76
101.21
103.15

7.89
8.10
8.20
8.06
7.75
6.81
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6.89

Book Reviews

Poverty in America by RALPH SELIGMAN and ASOKE BASU.
Press, 1981. 446 pp. $35.00 cloth.

Westport, Conn.:

Greenwood

PAUL TERRELL
University of California, Berkeley
Poverty in America is a mean-tempered, sloppy, and pedantic book that seeks to
describe the array of social welfare programs in the United States and to argue their
ineffectiveness.
In their analysis, Seligman and Basu present the Welfare State in
its most unappealing light--a fragmented, expensive, dependency creating institution
with social and economic costs that exceed its benefits.
The authors argue that the Welfare State has engendered a persistent underclass
lured by welfare benefits into lives of dependency, hopelessness, and alienation.
Relying principally on the culture of poverty literature of the 1960s, Seligman and
Basu paint a picture of poverty as pathology--an enlarging class of people lacking in
self-respect and work habits, suspicious of the dominant culture, and living for the
moment alone. Jimmy Breslin's evidence is typical:
"The daughters of the poor
regard pregnancy as the way to welfare and welfare as the way to lives of their own.
There is not any other dream."
Public welfare does not stand alone in Seligman and Basu's denunciation. Trying
to help the poor, the authors argue, programs like unemployment insurance and housing
assistance have ignored the realities of the marketplace and "done great harm to the
intended beneficiaries" (p. 342).
Ignoring the principles of less eligibility, and
mythologizing the capabilities of the poor, the programs of the 1960s have worsened
the problems of poverty stigma, and instability.
Seligman and Basu take the usual potshots at the Great Society, and studiously
ignore the substantial reduction in poverty of the 1960s and 1970s, the vast increase
in medical and educational opportunities, and the important advances in social protection offered by the expansion of social regulation and civil rights. In arguing
the welfare/dependency equation, in addition, the authors ignore facts and analyses
that do not conform to their thesis. The problem of poverty is a continuum of
problems, but complexity and multiple explanations are not the authors' strong
points.
Most contemporary ethnographic work on poverty communities, for example,
relates a human diversity that simply cannot be captured by Seligman and Basu's
laboriously constructed stereotypes. The recent series of articles by Ken Auletta
in the New Yorker, for example, describes an underclass of real people, with substantial differences and complexities. AFDC mothers, for example, far from being
acutely alienated from the world of work and the culture of the marketplace, are
often striving desperately against dependency. AFDC mothers, indeed, constitute one
of the welfare populations most likely to benefit from job skills programs.
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While the social legislation of the sixties and seventies certainly resulted in
unintended and incomplete results, the plain fact is that the living conditions and
opportunities of American poor were improved as never before in history. Public
intervention is surely not the panacea for all social problems, but public intervention just as clearly is an indispensable instrument to advance equality and
community in our society.
This volume is carelessly constructed, repetitive, and dated, despite its 1981
copyright. Anachronisms creep in (HEW becomes HHS and back again). The large mass
of cited material is generally from the 1960s and early 1970s. Organizations are
misnamed (Student Nonviolent Committee for Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee). Writing about "Negroes" may be pace-setting, but I doubt it. And for Californians, Seligman and Basu seem oblivious of the massive recent immigration of
Asians and Mexicanos "sin papeles," arguing that immigration has long been "at a
plateau or decline."
Finally, the authors argue by accretion. A single telling example is never
offered when 25 will do. Poverty in America reads like a series of literature
reviews spliced together from 1960 dissertations. The bibliography is over 500
items, and they are all heard from, frequently at great length. The authors' method
is clear in their very first paragraph.
Hoult defines poverty as (1) "a scarcity of the means of subsistence"
and (2) "a level of living that is below a particular minimum standard."
The Theodorsons define it as "a standard of living that lasts long enough
to undermine the health, morale, and self-respect of an individual or
group of individuals."
Before the paragraph is through, Robert Theobald and Harold Watts are cited; before
we reach the first subsection, sixteen more parties are heard from. At the completion of almost any section of this book, a careful reader is left swimming in a
potpourri of arguments, typologies, and jargon.
This is not the book for readers who want the facts and figures on poverty, an
understanding of the program components of the Welfare State, or an introduction to
some of the dimensions of controversy concerning its values and operations. While
provocative and forceful on a number of issues (such as arguing the insurance rather
than the income transfer nature of social security), Poverty in America is generally
undistinguished by brevity, cogency, or humor.
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Social Development:
and RAMA S. PANDEY.

Conceptual, Methodological and Policy Issues by JOHN F. JONES
St. Martin's Press, 1981. 183 pp. $15.95 cloth.
New York:
ROBERT E. WOOD
Rutgers University, Camden

This is the sort of book one would like
The authors' hearts are in the right place.
the poor and the dispossessed, of grassroots
It is hard
of unified development planning.
could disagree with.

to recommend more highly than one can.
They are in favor of a better life for
democracy, of non-violent social change,
to find anything in the book that one

This, however, is the problem with the book. Its bland well-intentioned genersystematic represalities seem unconnected with the realities of underdevelopment:
sion, class exploitation, pervasive corruption, foreign intervention, dependency in
all its forms, government indifference to social needs and hostility to independent
forms of mass organization, etc. For someone grappling with how to deal with these
fundamental problems, the book offers very little guidance.
The book consists of ten essays, mostly although not exclusively by present or
former faculty at the School of Social Development at the University of MinnesotaDuluth. The essays overlap a good deal, but the editors describe them as presenting
in turn "the conceptual framework of social development" (Chs. 1-4), the "methodology of development," (Chs. 5-8), and an analysis of education and social development
(Chs. 9-10).
In his introductory essay, co-editor Jones defines social development as "the
process of planned institutional change to bring about a better correspondence
between human needs, on the one hand, and social policies and programs on the other"
Such a notion is obviously open to widely varying interpretations, which
(p. 3).
presumably is what enables Daniel Sanders, in his essay on "International Cooperation
"It is evident that the low income countries
for Development," to inform us that:
This is indeed good news,
of the world have opted for social development" (p. 51).
but one wonders what it means when one looks at some of the 38 countries designated
e.g., Afghanistan, Haiti, Indonesia, Bangladesh,
as low income by the World Bank:
Chad, Zaire, Pakistan, and Uganda, among others. The precise meaning and analytic
status of the concept of social development are never clearly delineated.
A Humanistic-Egalitarian
David Gil's "Social Policies and Social Development:
Perspective," stands out from the other essays in its treatment of social development. Gil begins by incisively locating social policy within the power relations of
a society, and then goes on to propose a frankly radical conception of social
development. For Gil, social development is only meaningful if it is a strategy of
radical transformation in the direction of complete equality, including the collective ownership and democratic control of society's wealth. Noting that there are
other, supposedly more pragmatic concepts of social development, Gil debunks them,
"The result of such pragmatic development policies is at best an
concluding that:
illusion of social development.... " (p. 79)
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Gil's article is eloquent, but it underlines the ambiguity of the rest of the
book. Given the apparent assumption of his fellow authors that social development
is happening in most of the Third World, their concepts would seem to be those Gil
is attacking as an illusion. They certainly might take Gil to task for failing to
explain how his concept of social development can be applied in the particular circumstances of Third World societies, but the debate is not joined. Instead we are
offered a steady diet of assertions that add up, in this reviewer's eyes, to a
severe case of pollyanna. We are told optimistically that all countries without
exception are developing, that national planning leads to decentralization, that
industrialization is based on consensus, that social development is a "partnership
operation," that the "styles" of social development can even include "top down,
bureaucratic approaches." The neutrality of the state apparatus is assumed; what is
needed is the definition of the proper social development strategy. It is hard to
imagine that real-life planners and organizers will find much here to aid their work.
The authors seem most interested in developing typologies. Most of the chapters
provide some sort of classification scheme for sorting out different types of
resources, goals, institutional contexts, etc. While some of these are interesting,
their usefulness is limited by the near-total absence of empirical propositions
connecting these categories to real life situations. These discussions are without
exception exceedingly general.
In sum, as a discussion of general goals and orientations for planners in the
Third World (although the essays emphasize underdeveloped societies, the authors
assert that the concept of social development applies to developed societies as
well), this book puts a welcome emphasis on the need for institutional change to meet
human needs. As an analysis of planning within the concrete conditions of underdevelopment, however, it is severely limited. Almost no reference is made to the
vast sociological literature on the subjects of class structure, dependency, power
relations, etc. in underdeveloped societies. Calling for an integrated approach to
development, the book unfortunately fails to integrate its concern with planning
with what we know about the oppressive realities of underdevelopment.

Single Rooms: Stories of an Urban Subculture by ELLIE WINBERG and TOM WILSON.
Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1941. 100 pp. S14.50 cloth. S7.95 paper.
JIM BAUMOHL
University of California, Berkeley
As David Gil observes in the foreword to this slim volume, the authors have
attempted a "picture-book-in-words" about the residents and conditions in single
room occupancy hotels (SRO's) in New York City. In 34 sketches, residents of SRO's
speak plainly about themselves, their environment, and the welfare institutions that
have a dramatic effect on their lives. These sketches are orzanized into seven
chapters which are intended as a sort of typology of SRO residents: employees of
welfare hotels, the aged, former mental patients, drinkers, ex-offenders, addicts,
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and urban nomads. Each chapter is briefly introduced by the authors, and the text
of each sketch is drawn from transcripts of interviews with SRO residents conducted
in 1976 and 1977.
The purpose of the book is to make public the voices of impoverished individuals who are rarely heard; to lend individuality and distinctiveness to the statistics by which our social casualties are monitored. The authors succeed rather well
in this. The voices are real and compelling; the poverty and animosity of SRO life
is plausibly and concretely presented. While the book is a modest and persuasive
documentary as far as it goes, there is a flaw in the work that undermines its
intent to provide an accurate portrait of this brand of poverty. The authors fail
to focus on the distinctions residents make among themselves and, most importantly,
the practical implications of such distinctions. It is clear that many residents
are concerned about the large number of "mental cases" in their midst, and about the
"junkies" and "winos." It is not at all clear, though, how such distinctions are
made or how such categorization limits social integration and contributes to the
maintenance of suspicion and disorganization. In short, the book does not fully
capture the social logic of the setting, and ultimately remains on the outside,
looking in through categories derived, apparently, from the authors' assumptions
about what matters of biography and behavior are salient.
But perhaps this is to expect too much from too little. Single Rooms is not the
product of a full-blown field study, nor is it intended to be. It is a simple,
straightforward presentation of 34 individuals explaining themselves, and doing so
with occasional eloquence. If the book is not an illuminating urban ethnography, it
is useful nonetheless.

The States of Welfare: A Comparative Analysis of Social Policy by JOAN HIGGINS.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 193 pp. $25.00 cloth.
SARA ROSENBERRY
Virginia Polytechnic Institute
As implied in its name, the field of comparative social policy involves both a
subject matter and a research method. There is a certain tension between these
elements in that the need to respect the complexity and diversity of the subject
matter often conflicts with the pressure to develop general conclusions which might
be used in generating theory about social policy. This tension is reflected in a
division within the field of comparative social policy between rich, though often
ethnocentric, descriptions of particular situations and efforts which rely on more
structured and often more superficial analysis of aggregate data to develop conclusions about a large number of cases. Traditionally, individuals within the field have
fallen into one camp or the other. They choose either to pursue in depth explorations of a limited number of cases, which often suggest important and often complex
questions, or they attempt to test specific hypotheses using available data from a
larger number of countries.
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and urban nomads. Each chapter is briefly introduced by the authors, and the text
of each sketch is drawn froir transcripts of interviews r+ith SRO residents conducted
in L976 and l'977.
The purpose of the book is to nake public the voices of impoverished lndividuals who äre^rarely heard; to lend indiviiluality and distinctiveness to the statistics by which our iocial casualties are nonitored. The authors succeed rather h'e1l
in this. The voices are real and cornpelling; the poverty and aninosity of SRO life
is plausibly and concretely presented. I{hile the book is a modest and persuasj've
docurnentary as far as it gôei, there is a flaw in the work that undermines its
intent to provicle an accuiate portrait of this brand of poverty. The authors fail
to focus on the distinctions residents make anong themselves and, most importantly,
the practical implications of such disti-nctions. It is clear that many resj-dents
a.u õor"""r,ed about the large number of rtnental casesrr in their midst, and about the
iljr¡nkiesrrandrrwinos.rt It is not at all cÌear, though, how such distinctions are
made or how such categorization linits sociaf integration and contributes to the
maintenance of suspicion and disorganization. In short, the book does not fully
capture the social logic of the setting, and ultirnately renains on the outside,
1oòking in through categories derived, apparently, from the authorsr assumptions
about what matters of biography and behavlor are salient.
Singfe Rooms is not the
But perhaps this is to expect too much from too little.
product of a full-blown field study, nor is it intended to be. It j-s a sinple,
Átraightforward presentation of 34 i-ndividuals explaining themselves, and dolng so j-t
with õccasional eloquence. If the book is not an illwninating urban ethnography,
i-s useful nonetheless.
The States

of I'/elfare: A Comparative Analysis of SrçÞf_IS]1q by
SARÄ ROSENBERRY

J0AN HIGGINS.

Virginia Polytechnic Institute
As implied 1n its name, the field of comparative social policy involves both a
subject *"it". and a research method. There is a certain tension between these
elements in that the need to respect the cornplexity and diversity of the subject
matter'often conflicts t/ith the pressure to develop general conclusions whj-ch mj-ght
be used in generating theory about social policy. This tension is reffected in a
division wiihin the field of comparative social policy between rich, though often
ethnocentric, descriptions of particular situations and efforts which rely on more
structured and often nore superficial analysis of aggregate data to develop conclusions about a large number of cases. Traditionally, individuals h'ithin the field have
fal-len into one canp or the other. They choose either to pursue in depth explorations of a limited number of cases, which often suggest irnportant and often complex
questions, or they attenpt to test specifj-c hypotheses using available data from a
larger number of countries.

Dr. Higgins recognizes this division in her book The States of !úelfare and
acknowIedgesapreferãnceforanimportantqueStionovffiis
bias, which is admirable, i-s reflected in the organization and substance of her
book, meant as an introduction to the field of comparative social poì-icy. The bulk
of the book, whi-ch wasrrdesigned primarily for the undergraduate student,rrì-s organized around issues which define the focus of the field. These include the role of
the state, the role of religion, r^/ork and welfare, and public and private systems of
welfare. Each of these chapters serves to illustrate the complexity of the field
of social policy and should encourage students to ask j"mportant, even if difficult
to answer questions.
Higgins is l-ess successfuf i-n her treatnent of the comparative method. She
asserts that comparative social policy is not so much a field of study as a method
of study (p. 5), but lirni-ts her lntroduction of that metEõif:Eo a r+eIl considõõã'discussion of the problens j-n developing a methodology which allows for valid comparisons among countries. These problems include the lack of conparable defini-tions,
Iack of standardized data, and a lack of substantive and methodologlcal expertise on
the part of the individuals invofved. Higgins recognizes that thesé methodologicaÌ
problens contribute to the division of the field into detailed descri-ptive efforts
(which tend to produce concfusions about thertuniquenessrrof countries'efforts) and
attempts at a large scale aggregate explanation (which general-ly support arguments
about convergence). Unfortunately, she offers little encouragement or nethodological
guidance to students who might want to bridge that division by finding means to pursue anslrers to the questions suggested in her substantive chapters.
She refers to the effort to refine and develop the techniques of comparative
analysis asrrthe challenge of the futurerr (p. f76). In doing so she fails to
acknowledge the consj-derable progress already made in finding means to identify
patterns anong countries and reÌatlonshlps between concepts, defined in her last
chapter as important. CÌearly Wilensky and Korpi have each j-llustrated the i-mportance of thoughtful and irnaginative nethods j-n devefoping defensible generaf conclusions about concepts Higgins has cited as i-mportant. Both individualsr cÍforts
represent progress in closing the gap between reseårch which asks important questions
and that which produces general concl-usions. Because of their methodological imagination and rigor, they have produced concfusions which are neither narror,/ nor superficial. In doing so, they have provided the basis for theory buj-Iding. They also
provide ¡nuch needed examples of the kind of research effort students should strive
to replicate.

fact that Higgins does not give more attention to the progress being nade in
is both conceptually rich and nethodologically defensible
is the najor weakness in her book. She wisely ernphasizes the importance of beginning
with important questions and provides a rich introduction to issues r+hich students
nust consider as they begin their research efforts. If that substantive introduction
coufd be complemented by an equally good discussion and exampÌes of how those issues
The

producing research which

have been and mj-ght be addressed through structured research, then readers would have
a very sound introduction to the field of conparâtive social policy.

lfanuscripts for the Journal should be subnitted

to

:

Robert Iæighninger
Journal of Sociology and Socia1 Welfare
Weste¡n !f,lchigan UnlversltY
School of Socisl Work
Kalanazoo, lúichigan 49OO8
Hlesse subelt three copies of the nanuscript.
a broad range of articles concerned with
eroplrlcal research on social welfare, analysis of problens in
social welfare, "thÍ¡tk pieceerr and others.

The Journel welcones

SUSSCRIFTIOT{S

SUBSCRIPTIO¡¡S

SUESCRIPTI0¡6

Subscriptione to the Journal

ny be obtained by writing to:

Jou¡nal of Sociologr and Socl¿I Welfare
UnLvereity of Connecticut
School of Sociel Work
18OO Asylun Avenur
llest fbrtford, Connecticut 06117

Vol¡ne-8çC
Students - $10
Indivtdus'le - $12

Institutions or Libreries, U.S. - $20
Institutions or Libraries, overseas -

$25

Beck Issues

Students:

Individuals:

Institutlons or Lib¡aries:

Vol.l-3
4
yoL.5-?

ûe.OO per 2 Volunes

VoI.l-3
i
Ì'loL. 5 - ?
VoI.t-3
Vot. l

$?.oO per Volrne

Vol.
Vol.

YoL.5-?

S6.90

$e.00 per
ç9.35
$fO.OO

Volrrne

per Volrne

$fo.oo per

Vo1une

ûL3.35

$f5.0O per Volr.ue

Indlvidr¡el lsgues of the Jou¡n¿l my be purchased at $2.50 per iosue.
Please include check with otder.

